
Class 

Book T4T 



THE RETURN OF 

THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY 

TO POWER IN 1884 



HARRISON COOK THOMAS, A. B. 

Instructor in History, DeWitt Clinton High School 
New York City 



SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS 
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
IN THE 

Faculty of Political Science 
Columbia University 



NEW YORK 
1919 



THE RETURN OF 

THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY 

TO POWER IN 1884 



HARRISON COOK THOMAS, A. B. 

Instructor in History, DeWitt Clinton High School 
New York City 



SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS 
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
IN THE 

Faculty of Political Science 
Columbia University 



NEW YORK 
1919 



Copyright, 1919 

'by 

HARRISON COOK THOMAS 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER I 
Old Parties and New Issues 

PA6E 

Democrats returned because of lack of issues 15 

Former issues between the parties IS 

Lack of issues not due to lack of problems 16 

Economic development 1860-1884 16 

Problems arising from economic changes 16 

The West 17 

Relation of government to business 17 

Labor problems 17 

Natural resources 19 

No issues on questions admittedly political 20 

Currency 20 

Sectional lines stronger than those of party 21 

History of Democratic attitude toward greenbacks. ... 21 

History of Republican attitude toward greenbacks .... 22 

National banks 22 

Indistinctness of party lines shown by state platforms 23 

Parties ends in themselves rather than means 24 

Reasons for lack of issues 24 

War feeling still alive 24 

Character of leaders ... 25 

Lack of intelligent public opinion 25 

CHAPTER II 
Republican Dissensions 

The Independents 27 

Type of men in movement . • • • 27 

Not economic reformers 27 

Main aims efficiency and economy 28 

185] 5 



6 CONTENTS [186 

PAGS 

Campaign of 1872 r 28 

Liberal movement 28 

Horace Greeley 29 

Grant or Greeley — choice of evils 30 

Election results 31 

Republican scandals lead to landslide of 1874 32 

Quarrels over spoils cause split among Republicans 32 

Stalwarts 33 

Half-Breeds 33 

Blaine and Conkling 33 

Three groups not distinct 34 

Grant and Republican nomination in 1876 34 

Blaine's early popularity with Independents 34 

Blaine's attack on Jefferson Davis in House 35 

Blaine's railroad transactions 35 

House committee investigation of sale of Little Rock bonds. . 36 

Fisher and Mulligan .' 36 

Blaine's speech in House . . . . • 36 

Blaine's ruling as speaker in 1869 37 

Blaine's activities as bond broker 37 

Failure to make adequate explanation 38 

Fifth Avenue conference 1876 39 

Stalwarts unite with Independents to defeat Blaine's nomination. 39 

Tilden nominated by Democrats 40 

Stalwart and Independent rivalry to control Hayes 41 

Stalwart disgust with Hayes' appointments and policy toward the 

South 42 

Accomplishments of Hayes' administration 43 

CHAPTER III 

Stalwarts and Half-Breeds 

Candidates for Republican nomination for Presidency 1880 .... 45 

New York election of 1879 46 

Republican factions 46 

Democratic factions 47 

Sherman and Evarts campaign for Conkling's candidate ... 48 

Blaine's strength 4Q 

Independents oppose Grant and Blaine 50 

St. Louis anti-third-term convention SO 

Republican convention 51 

Garfield 52 

Democratic convention • ■ 53 



187] CONTENTS y 

PAGE 

Platforms 54 

Campaign of 1880 55 

Garfield's alleged bargain with Stalwarts 55 

Tariff as an issue 55 

Republicans gain Presidency and control of Congress .... 56 

Garfield's appointments 56 

Early harmony destroyed by appointment of Robertson ... 57 

Conkling and Piatt resign from the Senate 59 

Struggle at Albany over election of their successors 59 

Assassination of Garfield 59 

CHAPTER IV 

Arthur's Administration 

Arthur an unexpectedly good President 60 

Failure of Republicans to take stand on important questions ... 62 

Restriction of Chinese immigration 63 

Action during Hayes' administration 63 

Act of 1882 64 

Both parties claim credit for law 64 

Extravagance of Congress 64 

Business depression makes extravagance more noticeable. . . 65 

Condemnation of, in Democratic state platforms 66 

Civil service reform as an issue in 1882 68 

Failure of Congress to act 68 

State platforms 69 

The Irish question as an issue in 1882 69 

Condemnation of administration for failure to protect Ameri- 
can citizens 70 

State platforms 70 

Prohibition question and effect on election 71 

An issue in various states 71 

Attitude of parties toward 71 

New York election in 1882 72 

Democratic factions 72 

Republican factions 73 

Cleveland's great victory 74 

Elections ot 1882 — reasons for results 75 

Arthur's second session of Congress 76 

Elections of 1883 76 

Democratic House 1884 78 

Lack of party policy 78 

Both parties preparing for Presidential election and refuse to 

commit themselves 78 



g CONTENTS [188 

PAGE 

CHAPTER V 

The Issues in 1884— Civil Service Reform 

Lack of distinct issues 81 

Evils of spoils system increases with growth of country 81 

Assessment of office-holders 82 

Law of 1876 82 

Hayes* executive order of 1877 83 

Investigation by Senate committee 1879 83 

In campaign of 1880 84 

In campaign of 1882 85 

Protests of New York Civil Service Reform Association ... 86 

Conviction of General Curtis under act of 1876 86 

Republican attitude toward • 87 

Star route frauds ....... 87 

Scandals develop reform spirit 88 

Slight public interest 88 

Grant's civil service commission 89 

Hayes' attitude toward reform 89 

Growth of reform associations 90 

Garfield's attitude toward reform 90 

Arthur urges reform 91 

Effect of election of 1882 in hastening reform 92 

Pendleton bill 93 

Provisions 93 

Debate in Senate 95 

Passage by Senate 98 

Passage by House 98 

First civil service commission 98 

Effect of act on political assessments 99 

Attitude of politicians toward reform 100 

Party platforms on reform in 1884 102 

Importance^ attitude of President for success of reform 103 

Blaine's civil service record 103 

Cleveland's civil service record 104 

Importance of civil service reform in campaign of 1884 105 

CHAPTER VI 
The Issues in 1884— the Tariff 

Tariff much misunderstood as a political issue 106 

High rates originally a war measure 107 

Bill of 1875 108 



i8 9 ] 



CONTENTS 



PAGE 

Failure of Democrats to solidify party for tariff reductions, 1875- 

1880 109 

Tariff in campaign of 1880 109 

Surplus makes action necessary no 

Attempts to reduce surplus by increased appropriations 111 

Tariff Commission of 1883 113 

Appointment 113 

Report 114 

Bill of 1883 • • • 115 

Arthur's recommendations 115 

Passage 116 

Provisions 117 

Democratic attempts to make reductions 1884 117 

Speakership contest. 118 

Attitude of President and Secretary of Treasury 118 

Morrison bill 119 

Provisions 119 

Defeated by Democratic votes 120 

Weakness of Democratic position 121 

Effect of business depression of 1884 on tariff as an issue 121 

Part played by tariff in Republican nomination. ... 124 

Democratic platform on tariff 126 

Republican platform on tariff 127 

No agreement as to exactly what tariff issue was 128 



CHAPTER VII 

?he Issues in 1884 — Minor Issues and Minor Parties 

Southern question 129 

Not a live issue 129 

Investigation by Senate committee of Danville and Copiah 

outrages 130 

Platforms 131 

Prejudice against Democrats because of former position . . . 132 

Currency 132 

Foreign affairs 133 

Questions affecting farmer and workingman 134 

Failure of old parties to meet problems 134 

Farmers' state anti-monopoly and greenback parties 135 

Labor in politics 135 

Greenback party 1876, 1878, 1880 135 

Effect of business depression on labor party 1884 136 



IO CONTENTS [190 

PAGE 

Anti-monopoly convention 1884 137 

Greenback convention 1884 138 

Benjamin Butler 139 

Platforms of major parties 1884 140 

Prohibition 141 

Growing importance of movement . 141 

Prohibition party 1872-1880 141 

Convention 1884 142 

Platform 142 

Republican and Democratic platforms on minor issues 143 

CHAPTER VIII 
The Republican Nomination 

Blaine and Arthur leading candidates 145 

Other candidates 145 

Arthur 146 

General good record 146 

Sources of weakness 147 

Attitude of Independents toward 147 

Blaine 148 

Record in Senate 149 

Record as Secretary of State 149 

Policy toward Chili and Peru 149 

Plan for Latin- American peace congress 150 

Policy toward England 152 

Vigorous policy unpopular 155 

Attitude toward nomination 155 

Opposition of Independents to 156 

The Independents 157 

Formation of conference committee 158 

Favor Edmunds 158 

Rules for choosing delegates to convention 159 

The convention 159 

Blaine candidate for temporary chairman defeated 159 

Harmony on questions of organization 159 

Attempt to bind delegates to support nominee 160 

Hawley, Sherman, Logan nominated 161 

Arthur nominated 161 

Blaine nominated 162 

Piatt seconds Blaine's nomination 162 

Edmunds nominated by Long 162 



I 9 i] CONTENTS u 



PAGE 



Curtis' speech seconding Edmunds' nomination 163 

Attempts to unite anti-Blaine forces 164 

The ballots 165 

Blaine's nomination fairly won 166 

Strength and weakness of Blaine as a candidate 166 

Logan nominated for Vice-President 167 

Logan's record and character 167 

CHAPTER IX 

The Democratic Nomination 

Multiplicity of weak candidates for Democratic nomination. . . . 169 

McDonald .... 169 

Hendricks 170 

Ohio candidates 171 

Tilden 171 

Bayard 172 

Butler 173 

Flower 173 

Cleveland 173 

Mayor of Buffalo 173 

Governor of New York 174 

Character 174 

Attitude toward party 175 

Tammany's opposition 177 

Attitude toward labor 177 

Attitude toward corporations 178 

Roman Catholic opposition to 179 

In New York state convention 180 

Attitude of Independents toward 181 

The convention 182 

Attempt to defeat unit rule 182 

Butler's platform 183 

Butler's speech defending platform 184 

Eulogy of Tilden 186 

Nomination of McDonald, Carlisle. Thurman, Hoadly, Bayard, 

Randall 187 

Attacks on Cleveland 188 

Cleveland nominated by Lockwood 188 

Tammany attacks Cleveland. 189 

Genaral Bragg's speech supporting Cleveland 190 

Attempt to stampede convention for Hendricks 191 



12 CONTENTS [ I9 2 

paos 

Strength and weakness of Cleveland as a candidate 193 

Hendricks nominated for Vice-President . . 193 

Hendricks' record and character 194 

CHAPTER X 
The Campaign and the Election 

Candidates' letters of acceptance 195 

National committees 196 

Blaine's speaking tour 196 

Cleveland's few speeches 197 

Mugwump movement 197 

Origin of term 197 

Organization meeting in New York 198 

Work of national committee 199 

Individuals prominent in movement 200 

Newspapers endorsing 200 

Reformers who refused to join 201 

Attitude of Stalwarts toward .... 202 

Republican tactics toward 203 

Attempt to explain as free-trade movement 204 

Blaine's railroad transactions 205 

Republican method of meeting attack 206 

New Mulligan letters 206 

Other relations with big business brought up against Blaine. . 207 

The " millionaire dinner " 208 

Attempt to prove Cleveland the enemy of labor 209 

Butler's part in campaign 209 

Charge that Butler was financed by Republicans 210 

Attack on Cleveland's moral character 212 

Attack on Blaine's family history 214 

Southern question 214 

Tariff 215 

Democratic attempt to keep in background 215 

Republicans force it to front 215 

Blaine's part in making it main issue 215 

Republicans insincere in declaring it to be main issue .... 217 

Prohibition 218 

Attempt to get St. John to withdraw 218 

Blaine's attitude toward 219 

Draws strength from Republicans 219 

Tammany 220 

Reluctant support of Cleveland 220 



I93 ] CONTENTS 13 

PAGE 

Charge of disloyalty to Cleveland 221 

The German vote 221 

The Irish vote 221 

" Rum, Romanism and Rebellion" 222 

October elections 223 

No definite program offered by either party 225 

Result of election in doubt 225 

Republican charges of fraud 226 

Analysis of vote 227 

The Congressional election 228 

Reasons for result 228 

Many factors involved 228 

Independent movement 229 

Situation favorable for, in 1884 230 

Reason for Independent distrust of Blaine 230 

Blaine's strength . . • • 231 

Part played by business depression in Republican defeat 231 

CHAPTER XI 
The Democrats in Power 

Problems facing Democrats 232 

Negative accomplishments of Democrats 233 

Results of war maintained, 233 

Pension policy 234 

Finances not disturbed 235 

No scandal 236 

Civil service reform 237 

Difficulty of Cleveland's position 237 

Early action of Cleveland pleases reformers 238 

Democratic politicians' hostility to 238 

Cleveland yields to party pressure 240 

Conflict with Senate over removals 241 

Cleveland's impatience with critics 242 

Executive order to office-holders 1886 243 

Disappointment of Independents 244 

Cleveland's achievements 245 

The Tariff 246 

Surplus makes reduction necessary 246 

Cleveland urges reduction 246 

Reduction prevented by Democratic votes 247 

Cleveland's message of 1887 248 



I 4 CONTENTS [194 

PAGE 

Mills bill 250 

Provisions 250 

Minority report 251 

Debate on bill in Congress 251 

Endorsement by Democratic convention 1888 252 

Passage by House 252 

Republican convention's attack on 253 

Senate bill 253 

In campaign of 1888 253 

Clarification of issues by action of Democrats 254 

Positive achievements of Democrats 254 

Public land policy 254 

Navy 255 

Laws enacted. ... • 255 

Dawes Indian act 256 

Interstate commerce act 256 

Labor problems 257 

Lack of party policy toward 258 

Democratic party not a labor party 258 

Main achievements of Democrats negative rather than positive.. . 259 

Cleveland's part in achievements of Democrats 260 

Justification for Mugwump movement 260 

Effect of return of Democrats to power in uniting North and South. 261 



CHAPTER I 
Old Parties and New Issues 

On March 4, 1885, Grover Cleveland took up his duties 
as President of the United States, the first Democrat to be 
trusted with that responsibility since James Buchanan laid 
it down in the troubled days of March, 1861. In 186 1 the 
Democrats had gone out of power on a great issue. They 
came back to power not on another great issue but because 
the lack of issues between them and their opponents made 
the character of the candidates the determining factor for 
a large number of voters. 

The Republican party came into existence with the defi- 
nite purpose of preventing the extension of slavery, at a 
time when the Democratic party was committed to permit- 
ting or actually encouraging its extension. During the war 
the Republican party, or Union party as it was called in 
1864, became the " win the war " party, while the Demo- 
crats protested against the exercise of extra-constitutional 
powers by the federal government and declared that " jus- 
tice, humanity, liberty, and the public welfare demand that 
immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities, 
with a view to an ultimate convention of the States." * At 
the close of the war there was another realignment on the 
question of reconstruction. The Republicans, now under 
the control of the " radical " faction, put through their plan 
of military reconstruction and negro suffrage, while the 

1 Democratic Platform 1864, Starwood, History of the Presidency, 
p. 304- 

195] 15 



1 6 THE DEMO CRA TIC RETURN TO PO WER [ T gft 

Democrats, strengthened by many " win the war " men, 
were in favor of the Presidential plan of reconstruction and 
of leaving the question of suffrage to the states. 1 There 
were, then, during the period of the war and of reconstruc- 
ton, clear-cut issues between the parties. But as the prob- 
lems arising from the war were settled and their settlement 
accepted, the issues between the parties became more and 
more indistinct. 

The lack of issues was not due to any lack of problems 
before the nation or to any unanimity of opinion as to the 
best way of handling these problems. The twenty- four 
years during which the Democrats had been out of power 
had been years of great progress throughout the world and 
especially in the United States. The extension and devel- 
opment of railroads had made available the products of the 
fertile lands and rich mines of the West. Improvements in 
ocean shipping had also helped to make the United States 
the chief source of supply of food products and of raw 
materials for manufacturing for the countries of Europe. 
The increased use of steam power and machinery had 
brought about in manufacturing an industrial revolution 
hardly less important than the one of half a century before 
in England. Everything that is commonly summed up in 
the term " business " had enjoyed a tremendous develop- 
ment. 2 

These changes brought with them new problems. The 
functions of government were necessarily extended both in 
number and in kind and there was a constant demand for 
even further extension. The West, with all the needs of a 

1 Cf. Dunning, " The Second Birth of the Republican Party," in 
American Historical Review, Oct., 1910. 

1 The table on the following page shows the growth of the country 
along various lines during the period. Vide also Bogart, Economic 
History of the United States, chaps, xxii, xxiv, xxv; Wells, Recent 
Economic Cfianges, pp. 5-90. 



197 ] OLD PARTIES AND NEW ISSUES Y y 

new community, was clamorous for attention. Regulation 
i the railroads on which it was dependent for existence, 
the establishment of a policy in regard to the public lands 
that would benefit the actual settler rather than the absentee 
i »wner, and expansion of the currency to meet the expan- 
sion of business and the consequent increased purchasing 
power of the dollar were foremost among its demands. 

As business became national rather than local in scope 
the pioneers of business, who had inherited from the pio- 
neers of the previous generation the idea that the public 
interest was merely a collection of individual interests and 
that it could best be promoted by stimulating individual 
economic activity, turned from the state governments to the 
national government for aid to business in various forms. 1 
The business man and the corporation lawyer came to be 
common figures in governmental positions. According to 
the idea of these business men the alliance between business 
and government ended with the furnishing by the govern- 
ment of the help needed, and business was jealous of any 
attempt on the part of the government to interfere with 
what it considered its legitimate functions. Just what 
privileges business should be given and just how far it 
lid be controlled by the government, had become ques- 
tions of national importance. 

The development of large-scale business and industry 
necessitated an ever larger proportion of workers dependent 
on this business and industry for their livelihood. Periods 
of depression which inevitably came meant suffering for the 
workers and they began to organize to secure for themselves 
a larger share of the profits of industry. The " labor vote " 
had begun to be an element to be considered. Such ques- 
tions as Chinese exclusion, control of immigration, limita- 

1 Croly, Marcus Alonso Hanna, chap, xxviii, passim. 



t8 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [ig$ 

Progress of the United States 1860-1884 

From "Progress of the United States" in Statistical Abstract of the 
United States, 1910, pp. 672-723 

i860 1880 1884 

Population 31,443,321 50,155,783 54,911,000 

Wealth — total $16,159,616,000 $43,642,000,000 

Wealth— per capita .. . $513-93 $850.20 

Money in circulation 

July 1 $435,407,252 $973,382,228 $1,243,925,969 

Bank clearings $7,231,143,057 $37,182,128,621 $34,092,037,338 

Government receipts 1 

ordinary $56,054,600 $333,526,501 $348,519,870 

Government disburse- 
ments 1 ordinary . . $63,200,876 $264,847,637 $244,126,244 
Value of imports ... . $353,616,119 $459,652,883 $457,813,509 
Value of exports ... . $333,576,057 $835,638,658 $740,513,609 

Number of farms 2,044,077 4,008,907 

Acreage of farms 2 

improved 160,000,000 280,000,000 

Value of farms and 

farm property $7,980,493,063 $12,180,501,538 

Wheat produced (bus.) 173,104,924 498,549,868 

Corn produced (bus.) 838,792,740 1,717,434,543 1,795,528,000 

Cotton produced (500 

lb. bales) 3,841,416 6,356,998 5,682,000 

Wool produced (lbs.) 60,264,913 232,500,000 300,000,000 

Value of exports, food 

stuffs in crude con- 
dition and food 

animals $12,166,447 $266,108,950 $130,395,872 

Value of exports of 

food stuffs partly or 

wholly manufactured $38,624,949 $193,352,723 $194,703,245 

Value total production 

minerals $89,544,435 •" $364,928,298 $406,110,405 

Coal produced (long 

tons) 13,044,680 63,822,830 107,281,742 

Iron ore produced 

(long tons) 2,873,460 7,120,362 

1 Fiscal year, ending June 30. 

2 U. S. Statistical Atlas, 1900, p/a^e no. 128. 
s Bogart, Economic History of U. S., p. 323. 



I99 ] OLD PARTIES AND NEW ISSUES io . 

Pig iron produced 

(long tons) 821,223 3,835,191 4,097,86$ 

Steel produced (long 

tons) 1,247,335 1,550,879 

Petroleum produced 

(gals.) 21,000,000 1,104,017,166 1,017,174,396 

Miles of railroad in 

operation 30,626 93,267 125,345 

No. of manufacturing 

establishments 140433 253,852 

No. wage earners in 

manufacturing 1,311,246 2,732,595 

Value of manufactured 

products $1,885,861,676 $5,369,579,191 

tation of hours of labor, improvement of conditions of 
labor, regulation of convict labor, and the establishment of 
labor bureaus and departments were forced on Congress as 
well as on the state legislatures. 1 

It had been the policy of the government to make lavish 
grants of the natural resources of the country to all who 
asked. There had been no objection to this as long as the 
resources seemed to be inexhaustible, since the public in- 
terest was promoted, for the time at least, by the promotion 
of private interests. Now, however, there were no longer 
enough resources to satisfy the demands of all those who 
wanted them and sound policy demanded that the public 
itself, rather than any private interest, should derive the 
benefits from what was left of the public property. Again, 
the government had given generously of its lands and its 
credit to encourage the building of railroads, leaving to 
private enterprise, however, the details of construction. 
Suffering from the effects of unregulated private control of 
these public utilities, the people were demanding that the 
national government take a hand in their regulation. 

*For an interesting account of the early attempts to organize labor 
by one of the men prominent in the movement vide Powderly, Thirty 
Years of Labor. 



20 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [ 2 oo 

On none of these questions was there a definite issue be- 
tween the parties. Their platforms contained either mean- 
ingless platitudes which promised no action, or empty 
■ptances of reforms already forced upon them. Votes 
in Congress showed a similar lack of party policy. 1 There 
was, it is true, but little clarified public sentiment on any of 
these questions, but the two major political parties had done 
nothing to develop such a sentiment or to direct that which 
existed. 

The lack of any definite part}' policy on such questions 
as these might have been expected, as the dominant political 
theory of the period, in so far as one existed, was that of 
laissez fairc, the control of private business, using the term 
in its broadest sense, not being considered a proper field for 
governmental activity. But even along lines where govern- 
mental action was admittedly necessary, there was an equal 
absence of party policy or of party orthodoxy once a policy 
had been declared. The politicians of both parties had been 
for years proclaiming in public their devotion to civil ser- 
vice reform and doing in private all in their power to block 
it. On questions that involved what is popularly termed 
'■ p« rk ", such as appropriations for rivers and harbors, 
public buildings and pensions, the votes were uniformly 
non-partisan. 2 

On questions of finance and currency the parties had 
i in theory at odds at different times, but here too there 
was great divergence between theory and practice and even 
between theories in different parts of the country. The Re- 
publicans claimed credit for being the party of sound finance 
and hard money and attacked the Democrats, unjustly the 
Democrats claimed, for their inflationist and repudiating 

1 McPherson, Handbook of Politics, 1872-1884, gives the party align- 
ment on all important votes during the period. 
- Ibid., passim. 



201] OLD PARTIES AXD NEW ISSUES 21 

tendencies and for their hostile attitude toward the national 
bank act. Neither party, however, could show a consistent 
record. Sectional and economic lines had always been 
stronger than party lines. There were in both parties 
strong elements, mainly from the East, who consistently 
opposed all attempts at inflation or repudiation; but there 
were also in both parties strong elements, mainly from the 
West, who insisted that these things alone would cure the 
ills of the country. It is true that the Republican party, 
the party to which most of the Eastern capitalists and 
bankers belonged, was likely to furnish more votes for 
scheme of hard money than the Democrats. 

In their platform of 1868 the Democrats declared for 
"one currency for the government and the people, the 
laborer and the office-holder, the pensioner and the soldier, 
the producer and the bond-holder," for the taxation of 
government bonds, and for payment of the obligations of 
the government in " lawful money " when the law under 
which they were issued did not expressly provide other- 
wise. The soft-money men were unable, however, to bring 
about the nomination of their candidate, Pendleton of Ohio. 1 
In 1872 the Democrats accepted the platform of the Liberal 
Republicans, which declared that " the public credit must 
be sacredly maintained " and denounced " repudiation in 
every form and guise." 2 Although the Republicans had 
always announced hard-money principles in their platforms, 
they had been unable to rally all groups within the party to 
this standard. They had started to retire the greenbacks at 
the close of the war but the hostility of the debtor West 
forced a Republican Congress to pass the act of 1868 sus- 
pending contraction and that of 1874 attempting inflation. 

1 Stanwood, op. cit, p. 322; Dunning, Reconstruction Political and 
Economic, p. 133. 

2 Stanwood, op. cit., p. 343. 



22 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [202 

To this latter act, however, President Grant interposed a 
successful veto. 1 They delayed for ten years after the war 
before taking any definite steps toward specie payments and 
twenty- four Republicans voted against the resumption act 
of 1875 while the votes of thirty-six were not recorded. 2 
In the Republican National Convention of 1876 the com- 
mittee on resolutions brought in a financial plank demand- 
ing redemption of greenbacks in coin at the earliest possible 
date " by a continuous and steady progress toward specie 
payments." The convention refused to replace this by a 
resolution pledging the party definitely to carry out the pro- 
visions of the resumption act already passed. 3 On various 
bills introduced in the House from 1877 to 1879 to repeal or 
emasculate the resumption act, there was always a small 
number of Republicans voting yea and a larger number who 
avoided being recorded, so the passage of many of these 
bills was prevented by the votes of hard-money Democrats. 4 
After resumption was accomplished in 1879, both parties, 
so far as their national platforms showed, were in accord in 
accepting it and equally in accord as to other matters deal- 
ing with the currency. 

There was the same lack of party alignment in votes 
concerning the national banks — the West usually voting to 
limit the power of the banks and the East to sustain or in- 
crease it. Neither party had as yet taken a stand on the 
silver question which was to be so important an issue later. 
The votes on the Bland-Allison act and on other bills tend- 
ing in the direction of free silver were not along party 
lines. 5 In party platforms there had been an issue on the 

1 Dewey, Financial History of the U. S., p. 340. 
'* McPherson, op. cit., 1876, p. 125. 

3 Proceedings of the National Republican Convention of 1876, p. 64. 
* McPherson, op. cit., 1876, p. 177, 1880, pp. 78, 147, 149. 
5 Ibid., 1876, p. 182, 1878, p. 128, 1880, pp. 46, 145, 1882, p. 28, 1884, 
P. 144- 



203] OLD PARTIES AND NEW ISSUES 23 

tariff and a great deal was made of it in the campaigns of 
1880 and 1884, but here again the practice of the parties 
did not follow the theory. 1 

The indistinctness of party lines during this period is 
brought out strikingly by an examination of party platforms 
in the different states. The currency and the tariff were the 
subjects most often treated and the widest divergence in 
the various state platforms of the same party was common. 
The Maine Democrats in 1874 declared that " an inflated 
and irredeemable paper currency is among the worst evils 
that can afflict a community," while the same year the Illi- 
nois Democrats opposed any cancellation of greenbacks. By 
1882 the Maine Democrats had so far forgotten their prin- 
ciples of 1874 as to demand greenbacks and protest against 
any substitution of national bank notes for them. In 1875 
the Democrats of New York declared against any further 
inflation, for a speedy return to specie payments, and that 
gold and silver should be the only legal tender. The same 
year Ohio Democrats demanded that the " volume of cur- 
rency be kept equal to the wants of trade " and that legal 
tenders should replace bank notes. In 1877 the New York 
Democrats reaffirmed the currency plank of their platform 
of 1875, while the Democrats of Ohio, Iowa and Indiana 
demanded that there be no contraction of greenbacks and 
that the resumption act be repealed. In 1878, while most 
of the Democratic platforms were calling for a tariff for 
revenue only, and many in the. South for free trade, the 
Pennsylvania Democrats declared that " the Republicans by 
reducing the tariff on coal and iron, steel, wool and metals 
ten percent struck a fatal blow at the interests of Penn- 
sylvania." Similar differences due to local conditions can 
be found in the state platforms of the Republican party 
during this period. In general, the platforms of the two 

1 Cf. infra, pp. no, 215. 



24 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [204 

parties in the same states were much more similar than 
those of the same party in different states. 1 

Differences between political parties are always apt to 
be more apparent than real. A party organized for the at- 
tainment of certain definite ends tends to become, in the 
minds of many of its followers, an end in itself, and the 
ideals of the party degenerate into schemes for keeping itself 
in power. This was especially true of the two great parties 
in the United States in the years following the Civil War 
and had become more and more evident in the four years 
that preceded Cleveland's election. 

The Republican party at the close of the war period had a 
powerful hold on the mind of the North as the party that 
had abolished slavery and preserved the Union. The Demo- 
cratic party, on the other hand, was disorganized and dis- 
credited. It had a tremendous psychological handicap to 
overcome before it could hope to be again a powerful na- 
tional party. Feelings aroused by the war were still strong 
and emotion was a more potent factor than reason in deter- 
mining how men would vote. Patriotism was made to 
cover a multitude of sins. The fact that the Democratic 
party had been the party of slavery and secession was a 
premise from which a demagogue could draw the conclu- 
sion, and have it generally accepted, that every member of 
that party was still secretly planning the restoration of 
slavery and the disruption of the Union. The Democrats 
felt, therefore, that as long as they were under suspicion 
of being disloyal they must try to avoid issues rather than 
make them. The ideal thing would have been for the lead- 
ers of both parties to forget the past and to attempt to work 
out a solution for the new problems before the nation. The 
easy thing for the Republicans was to keep alive in every 

1 McPherson, op. cit., 1874-1882, passim. 



205] 0LD PARTIES AXD NEW ISSUES 



-3 



possible way the bitter feelings aroused by the war by ap- 
pealing to their constituents with tales of the unrepentant 
spirit of the Southern whites, of negro massacres, of threat- 
ened raids by the ex-Confederates on the national treasury, 
and of the menace of the solid South, trusting in this appeal 
to hold the organization together and keep the party in 
power so that it might enjoy the spoils of office whether it 
accomplished anything or not. The easy thing for the 
Democrats, when out of office, was to criticize the Repub- 
licans for their shortcomings, and when in, to copy their 
methods, to appeal to local prejudice with whatever p< la- 
ical nostrum seemed likely to get votes, and to discard any 
really constructive policy on the plea of party harm 

That the leaders of both parties chose the easy rather than 
the ideal way may have been due in part to the character of 
the leaders. As business expanded and grew powerful, it 
attracted more and more the ablest minds of the country, 
and political leadership fell into the hands of men who went 
into politics, more or less consciously, to further some special 
business interest, or of those who saw in politics merely 
an opportunity for personal aggrandizement. These men 
gained their power not through the ideas which they held 
and advocated, but through their ability to manipulate the 
party machinery, to control the caucus and the convention, 
and they kept their power by their ability to hold the lesser 
politicians in line by skillful distribution of the patronage. 
What they thought on the great topics of the day no one 
knew and apparently no one cared. 

The general lack of understanding of or interest in polit- 
ical questions, however, was a more fundamental reason 
for the misgovernment that existed than was the character 
of the leaders. For a generation the voters had been 
trained to think of politics only in terms of slavery and 
secession and to judge candidates for office solely by their 



2 6 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [206 

attitude toward these questions. The transition from these 
emotional and spectacular issues to more practical and pro- 
saic economic ones was bound to be slow and difficult. 
Moreover, the country as a whole was prosperous. The ele- 
ments in the country which were most vocal and most 
powerful in controlling public opinion were extremely pros- 
perous. These elements, naturally, were anxious to retain 
the party in power which would, at least, do nothing to 
check this prosperity, and the majority of voters accepted 
" good times " as they came without bothering about causes, 
content to allow the politicians to run the government as 
they chose as long as " good times " lasted. 

Whether, with conditions as they were, it would have 
been possible for a party that had a definite constructive 
policy to rally enough support to accomplish its ends, is 
questionable. The fact remains that neither of the two 
great parties had such a policy. The control of both was 
in the hands of men who seemed determined to avoid all 
issues rather than to seek them. The only clear and distinct 
issues between the parties since the war, had been on ques- 
tions arising from the war, and as these questions were 
settled and their settlement accepted, the struggle between 
the parties became more and more merely a struggle for 
office. A strict party alignment emerged only on those 
questions that affected the parties themselves, such as the 
control of elections or the distribution of the patronage. 



CHAPTER II 
Republican Dissensions 

The lack of issues between the parties and the character 
of the leadership in both made possible, if not inevitable, the 
rise of the " Independents ". They were mainly men who 
had been allied with the Republicans in their crusade 
against slavery and in their effort to win the war. The 
great majority of them still called themselves Republicans. 
They were not in sympathy, however, with the policy of 
the dominant element of the Republican party on various 
questions, and particularly they were disgusted with the 
inefficiency and corruption that had grown up in the ad- 
ministration of national affairs. Nor did they feel that the 
Democrats gave promise of anything better. 1 They were 
a group ready to support the candidate of either party who 
gave most promise of good government. Although not 
closely organized, or not organized at all in many cases, 
they made their influence felt in local and national elections 
all through the seventies and eighties. 

The term " reformers " is often applied to the Independ- 
ents, but they should not be confused with the more radical 
groups of reformers such as the greenbackers or the anti- 
monopolists, who were interested mainly in economic ques- 
tions. The reform that the Independents were most inter- 
ested in was that of the civil service. They were largely 
intellectuals — college professors, journalists, lawyers. They 
rather prided themselves on being a sort of intellectual 
aristocracy. Most of them gloried in the name " conserva- 
tive ". Few of them were anxious to make any changes 

1 Eaton, The Independent Movement in N. Y., p. 61. 
207] 27 



2 8 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [ 2 qS 

in the existing economic system or to try any experiments 
in the extension of democracy. They deprecated as dema- 
gogic any appeal to the workingmen or to any other class 
as a class. 1 They held widely divergent views among them- 
selves on various questions but were agreed on the one idea 
that what the government did it should do honestly, effi- 
ciently and economically. They agreed that " party, old 
or new, should be the means of expressing the view of the 
people, and not the means of stifling public opinion." 2 

The Independents first came into prominence in the 
Presidential campaign of 1872. Grant had fallen completely 
under the control of the radicals and the policy of the ad- 
ministration, as dictated by such leaders as Butler, Morton, 
Cameron and Conkling, alienated a large number of the 
men who had supported him in 1868. The attitude of the 
administration toward the South was the chief cause of 
dissatisfaction, but failure to reduce taxes, especially the 
tariff, and the corruption of the civil service due to Grant's 
policy of turning the offices over to politicians for distribu- 
tion, were prominent among the grievances of the Inde- 
pendents. 3 

In 1870 a split had occurred in the Republican party in 
Missouri mainly on the question of the disfranchisement of 
Confederate sympathizers. The faction led by Carl Schurz 
and Gratz Brown, which took the name of Liberal Repub- 
licans, had united with the Democrats and gained control of 
the state. 4 In 1872 the Missouri Liberal Republicans issued 

1 Cf. Nation, June 26, 1884. 

2 Report of the Executive Committee of Republicans and Independents 
(N. Y, 1885), p. 23. 

3 Dunning, Reconstruction Pol. and Econ., chap, xii ; Speeches, Corres- 
pondence and Political Papers of Carl Schurz, vol. i, p. 520. 

* American Annual Cyclopedia, 1870, p. 517; Schurz, Works, vol. ii. 
PP- 6-35; Bancroft and Dunning, Carl Schurs's Political Career (In 
Reminiscences of Carl Schurz, vol. iii), p. 322. 



JO q] republican dissensions 29 

a call for a national convention of men with ideas similar 
to their own to nominate a candidate for the Presidency. 
The call met with a hearty response from the various groups 
opposed to the administration. These groups included a 
large number of the most able and honorable men of the 
• try — statesmen, scholars, lawyers and journalists. They 
included a considerable number of disappointed spoils- 
men who adopted as their slogan, "Anything to beat Grant." 
a sentiment which became popular in spite of the efforts of 
Schurz and his friends to keep the movement on a higher 
plane. 1 

The convention, winch was a mass meeting, adopted a 
platform which severely arraigned Grant and his friends. 
demanded reforms in the civil service, and a policy of "uni- 
versal suffrage and universal amnesty " toward the South. 
The tariff plank was a disappointment to many but was 
considered neces - a concession to the protectionists. 

It declared that there were differences of opinion on the 
>ubject and left it to be decided by the people in the Con- 
gressional elections. 2 When it came to nominating a can- 
didate for the Presidency, the politicians got control and 
iled what chances the movement might have had for 
success. By a deal between the followers of Gratz Brown 
and Horace Greeley, to which, however, Greeley himself 
was not a party, Greeley was nominated. 3 

No one whom they might have chosen could have had 
better intentions, greater honesty, or greater weaknesses 
than Greeley. As editor of the New York Tribune since 
the early forties, he had embraced many " isms ", had con- 

1 Dunning, Reconstruction Pol. and Econ., p. 195; Schurz, Works, vol. 
ii, p. 361 ; Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress, vol. ii. p. 5 : 7- 

*Stan«vood, op. cit., p. 341. 

3 Schurz, Works, vol. ii, pp. 361, 364, 369, 382; Merriam, Life of Samuel 
Bowles, vol. ii, p. 184; Julian, Political Recollections, p. 339; Bancroft 
and Dunning, op. cit., p. 338; Rhodes, History of the U. S.. vol. vi, p. 422. 



30 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [ 2 io 

tradicted himself many times, had made many friends and 
many enemies. He was a national figure of no little influ- 
ence but he allowed his ambition to get the better of his 
common sense when he accepted the nomination of such a 
party on such a platform, especially when it came to him 
not by the will of those really interested in the movement 
but by the trick of a group to whom the new party was but 
a new means for obtaining a share in the spoils. Greeley 
was not the educated type of reformer that would gain the 
hearty support of the leaders of the movement. He had, it 
is true, ever since Lee's surrender, been preaching " uni- 
versal suffrage and universal amnesty," but here his sym- 
pathy with the ideals of the party ended. He had through- 
out his career been one of the high priests of protection and 
had never shown any appreciation of the problem of civil 
service reform. The last grotesque touch was added by the 
ratification of his nomination by the Democrats, the men 
to whom for thirty years he had found no epithets too harsh 
to apply. 1 

Grant was renominated by the Republicans as a matter 
of course, on a platform which glorified their past record, 
endorsed the enforcement acts and denounced the Liberals 
for their disloyalty, but showed the effect of the Liberal 
movement by declaring for amnesty and civil service re- 
form. 2 For thoughtful men the choice offered was only a 
choice of evils. Schurz, Sumner and Trumbull supported 
Greeley, although without much enthusiasm. 3 Many others. 

1 Schurz, Works, vol. ii, p. 386; Merriam, Bozvlcs, vol. ii, p. 191; 
Dunning, Reconst. Pol. and Econ., p. 197 ; Rhodes, vol. vi, p. 422 ; Linn. 
Life of Horace Greeley, passim ; Nation, May-Nov., 1872, especially May 
9, 16; for Greeley's views on various question vide N. Y, Tribune, 
especially Dec. 29, 1867, Jan. 4, 7, Feb. II, 1868, May 31, 1870, Feb. 27. 
1871, May 4, 6, 7, 1872. 

*Stanwood, op. cit., p. 341. 

3 Schurz, Works, vol. ii, p. 361 et passim. 



2i I ] REPUBLICAN DISSENSIONS 3I 

while not for the most part doubting Greeley's sincerity, 
felt that he had the same weaknesses as Grant and that his 
naivete would be no match for the wiles of the politicians. 
They had no desire to exchange a government by the worst 
element of the Republicans for one by a combination of 
Republicans and Democrats of the same type. 1 The N. Y. 
Times, the N. Y. Evening Post, the Nation and Harper's 
Weekly with Nast's incomparable cartoons supported 
Grant. Greeley aroused no enthusiasm among Democrats 
anywhere and many in the North could not bring them- 
selves to support him. 2 In addition, the business interests 
were all for Grant and contributed liberally to his campaign 
fund. 3 No matter how dishonest or inefficient the admin- 
istration might be, business was good, and Grant was a 
" safe " man. No one who had flirted with Fourierism and 
who held Greeley's views as to the rights of labor could hope 
to get support of the financial interests. 4 

Greeley carried but seven states, all of them former slave 
states, while Grant had a popular plurality of more than 
750,000. With this disastrous defeat the Liberal organiza- 
tion disintegrated and as a party ceased to exist. The Lib- 
eral idea, however, was not dead, and the Independents re- 
mained a force to be reckoned with in future campaigns. 
The movement had one salutary effect in clarifying the 
issues, for the Democratic party in accepting the Liberal 
platform had accepted the results of the war as embodied 
in the constitution. 5 

1 Merriam, Bowles, vol. ii, p. 182; Schurz, Works, vol. ii, p. 376; Ban- 
croft and Dunning, op. cit., p. 347. 
1 Julian, Recollections, p. 348. 
* Rhodes, vol. vi, p. 436 ; Julian, op. cit., pp. 342, 348. 

4 Parton, Life of Horace Greeley, p. 199; N. Y. Times, Aug. ir, 16, 
Oct. 29, Nov. 1, 4, 1872. 

5 Schurz, Works, vol. ii, p. 446. 



32 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [ 2 t 2 

The satisfaction of the radicals over their victory was 
doomed to be short-lived. The " salary grab " act raised a 
storm of protest, which was increased by the revelations in 
regard to the Credit Mobilier. Other scandals followed, 
some of them proven, others only hinted at, until it was 
the general opinion that every department of the govern- 
ment was inefficient and corrupt from bottom to top. 1 
These scandals together with the hard times caused by the 
panic of 1873 were too much for the Republicans. In the 
elections of 1874 the Democrats carried a majority of the 
states, including Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana and Massa- 
chusetts and changed the majority in the national House of 
Representatives from more than one hundred Republican 
to nearly seventy Democratic." The Democratic House, 
blocked from passing any partisan legislation by a Repub- 
lican Senate and President, devoted itself to laying bare the 
sordid record of the Republican administration. One after 
another of the executive departments was subject to in- 
vestigation and practically without exception was shown to 
be honeycombed with inefficiency and corruption. 

The scandals in which they became involved were not the 
< inly bad effects on the Republicans of the orgy of spoils in 
which they had been indulging. A party which exists 
mainly for the spoils of office is bound to suffer from the 
fact that there are never spoils enough to go around. There 
grew up in the Republican party during Grant's adminis- 
trations factions whose origin was due partly to dissatisfac- 
tion over the distribution of the patronage and partly to 
personal jealousies among the leaders. The faction which 
had the favor of the administration came later to be called 
the " Stalwarts ". The other faction received the name 

'Dunning, op. cit., chaps, xiv, xv ; Rhodes, vol. vii, chap, xl; Hoar, 
Autobiography vf Seventy Years, vol. i, p. 305. 
2 Am. Ann. Cyc.. 1874, articles on the several states. 



213] REPUBLICAN DISSENSIONS 33 

" Haif-Breeds ". Both of these factions differed from the 
Independents in that they put allegiance to party above all 
else. With them principles were secondary to party success. 
The Stalwarts, confident of their power, had little regard 
for public opinion and were openly scornful of " reform 'V 
It is difficult to say whether the Half-Breeds were more 
devoted to the interests of the country or merely more hypo- 
critical. They were much more respectful of public opinion 
and were usually ardent in their protestations of their de- 
votion to " reform ". 2 

The more conspicuous Stalwart leaders were Conkling, 
.Morton, Logan and Cameron. These men had gained 
power in national affairs through their control of the party 
organizations in their respective states and they used the 
power of the administration to maintain their hold in those 
states. Besides those states — New York, Indiana, Illinois 
and Pennsylvania — the Stalwarts had complete control of 
the Republican organizations in the South. The Half- 
Breeds were stronger in Xew England and in the middle 
West. The Half-Breed leader par excellence w r as James G. 
Blaine; others were G. F. Hoar, John Sherman and Gar- 
field. 3 

Blaine had entered Congress at about the same time as 
Conkling. Both men were able, ambitious and intolerant, 
and a struggle between them for leadership was inevitable. 
An open break occurred in 1866 when they expressed 
reciprocally uncomplimentary opinions of each other on the 
floor of the House, after which time they never had personal 
relations of any kind with each other. 4 In the opinion of 

1 Conkling, Life of Roscoe Conkling, pp. 538, 551. 

* Schurz, Works, vol. iii, p. 232. 

3 «Hoar, Autobiog., vol. i, p. 379; Foulke, Life of O. P. Morton, vol. ii, 
p. 396; Hamilton (Dodge), Life of James G. Blaine, p. 490. 

4 Stanwood, Life of J. G. Blaine, p. 66; Cong. Globe, 39 Cong., 1 s., 
pp. 2180, 2298. 



34 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [214 

several writers this enmity was the main cause of the lack 
cf harmony in the party. 1 

The line between Stalwarts, Half-Breecls and Independ- 
ents was, of course, not closely drawn. The groups were 
continually changing and at any given time it would be 
difficult to classify many men prominent in the party in any 
of these three categories. The strength of each varied with 
the fortunes of the leaders. There was no definite body of 
political beliefs which made one who held them either a 
Stalwart or a Half-Breed. Each group was made up of in- 
dividuals with widely divergent views and abilities who 
merely acted together for partisan purposes. These three 
groups can be distinguished, however, throughout the period 
from Grant to Cleveland and they were the contending fac- 
tions in the Republican national conventions of 1876, 1880 
and 1884. 

In 1876 Grant was in a receptive mood for a third term 2 
but the cry of " Caesarism " raised by the Democratic poli- 
ticians, and echoed by some of the Half-Breeds and all 
the Independents, made his candidacy impossible. Grant 
favored Conkling as his successor and the betting was in his 
favor. 3 The other Stalwart candidate was Morton of In- 
diana, who controlled a majority of the delegates from the 
South. 4 The foremost Half-Breed candidate was Blaine. 

Blaine, who was decidedly out of favor with the admin- 
istration, 5 seemed likely at first to get Independent support. 
He had been in the House since 1863 and had been Speaker 
from 1869 to 1875. He had made a reputation as a bril- 

1 Julian, Recollections, p. 277; Sherman, Autobiography, vol. i, p. 55° '? 
Rogers, Development of the North Since the Civil War, pp. 23, 39. 

2 Appleton's Annual Cyclopedia, 1875, p. 743. 
3 Foulke, Morton, vol. ii, p. 397. 

4 Ibid., p. 389. 

5 Stanwood, Blaine, p. 224. 



2 1 5] REPUBLICAN DISSENSIONS 35 

liant and hard-working representative. He was an excellent 
speaker and possessed in a high degree that intangible qual- 
ity so essential to a successful politician, personal magnet- 
ism. Although he was a strong party man and identified 
closely with the organization, he had worked to moderate 
the policy of the radicals toward the South and, in spite of 
some poor committee appointments in the forty-third Con- 
gress, he was looked on with favor by the Independents. 
As the Nation put it, " He has his faults, no doubt, but, 
compared with Morton, Logan and the present leaders of 
the Republicans, he seems like an ancient Roman for vir- 
tue." * His name had been mentioned in connection with 
the Credit Mobilier scandal but he had been completely ab- 
solved by the investigating committee. 2 He " killed him- 
self " with the Independents, however, by " too much 
smartness." 3 Not relishing the idea of a defensive cam- 
paign, he made a bold attempt to discomfit the Democrat 
and at the same time steal the Stalwart thunder by prop 
ing in an impassioned speech in the House, to exclude Jef- 
ferson Davis from the benefits of a bill removing all dis- 
abilities remaining under the Fourteenth Amendment, on 
the ground that Davis was responsible for the horrors of 
Andersonville. 4 This gave a new angle to the " bloody 
shirt " issue and was a shrewd move, but it did not help 
Blaine's reputation among the thinking men of the country. 
It was good politics but it was not statesmanship. 

On top of this there came a rumor that bonds of the 
bankrupt Little Rock and Fort Smith Railroad which the 
Union Pacific Railroad had bought in 1871, at a price far 
above their market value, had belonged to Blaine. Blaine 

1 March 11, 1875. 

2 House Report, 42 C, 3 S., no. 17, p. v. 

3 Schurz, Works, vol. iii, p. 218. 
* Cong. Rec, 44 C, I S., p. 324. 



36 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [ 2 i6 

denied this in a speech in the House, 1 but the rumor per- 
sisted and the whole matter was referred to the judiciary 
committee. In the hearing before the sub-committee much 
conflicting testimony was brought out, but Blaine seemed to 
be having the better of it until the arrival of Warren Fisher 
and James Mulligan of Boston. Fisher was a business man 
who had been interested in the promotion of various project, 
and Blaine had had a long series of financial transactions 
with him. .Mulligan was Fisher's confidential clerk. Mul- 
ligan in his testimony declared that he had been told by 
a director of the Union Pacific that the bonds had belonged 
to Blaine. In the course of his testimony he mentioned 
that he had several letters written by Blaine to Fisher. 
Blaine, on hearing this, secured an adjournment of the 
hearing, 2 and that night went to Mulligan's hotel and g t 
possession of the letters, promising to give them back after 
reading them. He then refused to return them or to de- 
liver them to the committee, presenting a statement by his 
attorneys that he was entirely within his rights in refusing 
nrrender them/" 
Blaine was too shrewd a politician, however, not to real- 
i that, whatever his rights in the matter might be, the 
c untry would demand some further explanation. On June 
", after attacking the judicial*)'- committee for their political 
motives in a dramatic speech, he read the letters and closed 
with an accusation that the committee had suppressed an 
important telegram. 4 This was a clever stroke, for although 
telegram was of little importance and the chairman had 
been holding it only to verify its authenticity, 5 it put Blaine 

1 Cong. Rec, 44 C, 1 S., p. 2724. 2 Ibid., p. 361 1. 

s The Proceedings of the committee are in House Misc. Doc, 44 C, 
1 S., no. 176. 
4 Cong. Rec, 44 C, 1 S.. p. 3602. 
; Ibid., p. 5126. 



217] REPUBLICAN DISSENSIONS 

before the country in the light of being a persecuted man. 
The hearings before the sub-committee dragged on for a 
few days but were interrupted by Blaine's sudden illness, 
and before they were resumed Blaine had been appointed to 
complete Morrill's term in the Senate. The hearings were 
dropped for lack of jurisdiction and no report was ever- 
made. 

The Republican newspapers treated the matter as though 
Blaine were the grossly maligned victim of a Democratic 
plot and as though he had satisfactorily answered all charges. 
As a matter of fact, Blaine had indulged in a great deal of 
oratory but had really answered nothing. Although actual 

nipt ion was not proven, no one can doubt that Blaine 
guilty of conduct unbecoming a Congressman. 
Speaker of the House in 1869 he made a ruling which 
tended the life of the land grant to the Little Rock Rail- 
road. Although this was quite proper at the time, as he had 
then no interest in the road, a little later we find him send- 
ing a copy of the Congressional Globe containing this ruling 
to Fisher to be used by Fisher to secure him an interest in 
the enterprise. 1 Acting under contract with Fisher, he sold 
bonds of the Little Rock and Fort Smith Railroad to his 
friends in Maine and took, as his commission, bonuses which 
would have gone ordinarily to the purchasers of the bonds. 
When the road fell into financial difficulties and was unable 
to pay the interest on its bonds, Blaine took these bonds off 
the hands of the investors, acting, as he said, purely from 
a feeling of moral responsibility. We can realize how acute 
this feeling must have been when we consider the probable 
effect on his political career of the publication of 'the fact 
that he had been acting as a broker, and especially of the 
terms on which he had sold the bonds. He paid back 
$168,150 to his friends in Maine between the spring of 1871 
1 .V. Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1884. 



38 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [ 2 l8 

and the spring of 1872, although he made it clear in his 
correspondence that he did not have the means to pay any- 
where near this sum out of his own pocket. He had at that 
time over $275,000 worth of Little Rock bonds which he 
had received as commission or taken back from his friends. 
He turned in $67,000 worth of these bonds at the reorgan- 
ization of the road but he never explained what became of 
the balance. At the same time the Union Pacific, the At- 
lantic and Pacific and the Missouri, Kansas and Texas 
Railroads bought from some one approximately $200,000 
worth of Little Rock bonds, paying for them at par although 
they were practically worthless in the market. There may 
be an explanation of these transactions other than the ob- 
vious one, but the damning fact for Blaine is that it was 
never made. 1 

In spite of the proven corruption of Grant's administra- 
tion few of the Liberals had allied themselves with the 
Democratic party. Grant's veto of the inflation bill of 1874 
encouraged them to believe that the Republican party, in 
spite of its shortcomings, was more favorable to hard 
money than the Democratic. Then, too, the return of many 
>f the old-line politicians to power in the Democratic party 
made it seem hopeless to accomplish anything in civil ser- 
vice reform through that organization. 2 Although there 
was always in the background the possibility of a third 
party, 3 the best policy seemed to be to try first what could 

'The question of Blame's financial dealings played an important part 
in the campaign of 1884. My authorities are the government records 
cited supra; the files of the Nation, N. Y. Times, A r . V. Tribune, for 
~v6 and 1884; Stanvvood, Life of Blaine; Hamilton, Blaine; pamphlets 
published during the campaign of 1884, e. g. Storey, Blaine's Record, 
liainc's Railroad Transactions, The Mulligan Letters, The Charges 
. [gainst Mr. Blaine Examined by a Republican ; and the excellent ac- 
1 ount in Rhodes, vol. vii, p. 194 et seq. 

- Bancroft and Dunning, Schws's Political Career, p. 362. 

* Ibid., pp. 361-364. 



jig] REPUBLICAN DISSENSIONS 39 

be done with the Republican party. On the initiative of 
Schurz a conference was held at the Fifth Avenue Hotel 
in New York, May 15 and 16, " to consider what may be 
done to prevent the National Election of the Centennial 
year from becoming a mere choice of evils.'' 1 The con- 
ference published an address laying down the qualifications 
which a candidate must have to gain their support. The 
address made it evident that Blaine was no more in favor 
than was Conkling or Morton. The favorite of the Inde- 
pendents was Bristow of Kentucky, who had recommended 
himself by his able and non-partisan management of the 
affairs of the Treasury department. 2 

In the Republican conventi< n of ]<S7 r > the radicals and the 
Blaine men combined to adopt a platform the dominant note 
which was the declaration that the Democratic party had 
been and still was the party of treason and rebellion. " When 
it came to the selection of a candidate it was plain that the 
factions could not be brought t< gether to support any of the 
men who had been prominently mentioned. Blaine received 
285 votes on the first ballot and 308 on the sixth. 4 He could 
have been nominated at any time that either the Stalwarts 
►r the Independents were willing. There was considerable 
Blaine sentiment in Pennsylvania, and to counteract this 
Cameron had put forward as a candidate Governor Hart- 
ranft, who had no chance of being nominated, and secured 
the passage of a resolution in the state convention that the 
Pennsylvania delegation should vote solidly for Hartranft 
as long as his vote kept increasing. 5 An arrangement was 

1 Schurz, Works, vol. iii, pp. 155, 228. 

2 Haworth, The Disputed Election of 1876, p. 15. 

3 Stanwood, Presidency, p. 369. 

4 Proceedings of the Rep. Com: of 1876, p. 44. 

& Rogers, Development of the North, p. 92; Blaine, Twenty Years, 
vol. ii, p. 568. 



4 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [220 

then made with Morton's managers whereby a few of Mor- 
ton's votes should be transferred to Hartranft on each 
ballot in order to keep him in the field. 1 

Governor Hayes of Ohio had been proposed and re- 
ceived sixty-one votes on the first ballot, the forty- four of 
Ohio and seventeen scattered. The previous year Hayes 
had carried Ohio for Governor on a hard-money platform. 
He had a good record but was not well known outside his 
own state. He seemed the best that the Independents could 
hope for, and after Morton had been withdrawn on the 
seventh ballot and twenty-five of his votes given to Hayes, 
Bristow's name was withdrawn and the solid vote of Ken- 
tucky was cast for Hayes. Cameron brought Pennsylvania 
into line with twenty-eight votes for Hayes and Conkling 
furnished sixty-one from New York. 2 It was evident that 
the Stalwarts preferred taking their chances with the un- 
known Hayes rather than with Blaine, whom they knew 
too well. 

The Democrats had their issue ready made for them in 
the record of Republican misgovernment and they made the 
Hi' >st of it. That Samuel J. Tilden should be the candidate 
was almost a foregone conclusion. Tilden was one of the 
foremost corporation lawyers of the country and had made 
a large fortune as the reorganizer of bankrupt railroads. 
He had had a long training in New York state politics, hav- 
ing- been chairman of the Democratic state committee from 
1866 to 1874, the period when Tammany under the leader- 
ship of Tweed was at its worst. When the movement 
against Tweed was started, however, Tilden had aided in 
his overthrow and was elected governor in 1874 on a re- 
form platform. His efficient and economical administration 
and his campaign against the canal ring gave him a wide 

1 Foulke, Morton, vol. ii, p. 400. 

2 Proceedings of Coin'., pp. 107, 108. 



22I -j REPUBLIC AX DISSENSIONS 41 

reputation as a reformer. He was a strong supporter of 
hard money and was acceptable to the business interests. 1 
His chief opponent was Hendricks of Indiana, a politician 
of the old school and a soft-money man. Tilden was a 
much more fitting candidate for a reform platform and he 
was nominated on the second ballot in spite of the protest 
of John Kelly of Tammany Hall. 2 

With Hayes' nomination the struggle began between the 
Stalwarts and the Independents to control him. Schurz 
was in constant communication with him, advising him as 
to his letter of acceptance and his campaign policy, insist- 
ing that the support of the Independents was necessary for 
his election and that it could be gained only by a he 
endorsement of civil service reform and of a policy of con- 
ciliation toward the South. 8 Haves' anxiously awaited 
letter of acceptance was a triumph for the Independents, 
• he came out with a strong declaration for reform in the 
civil service and E r making an end of the Southern ques- 
tii >n.* The Stalwarts were determined, however, that Hayes 
should not be eliminated by the reformers. Zachariah 
Chandler, a notorious spoilsman, was made chairman of the 
national committee and all the Stalwarts fell into line. 
Hayes, being too good a politician to refuse support from 
any quarter, urged the Stalwarts to support him, and in 
the later part of the campaign even urged the use of the 
bloody-shirt issue." 

1 Haworth, op. cit., p. 27; Merriam, Bowles, vol. ii. p. 245; Bigelow.. 
Life of S. J. Tilden, vol. i, pp. 241-295. 
•Proceedings of Nat. Dent. Conv. of 1876, p. 131. 

* Schurz, Works, vol. iii, pp. 248, 260 et passim. 

* Proceedings of Com:, p. 115. 

5 Vide letters of Hayes to Conkling and Blaine in Conkling, Life of 
Conkling, p. 508; Hamilton. Blaine, p. 422; ride also Bancroft and 
Dunning, op. cit., pp. 372. 394- 



42 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURX TO POWER [222 

With both candidates committed to reform, the Fifth 
Avenue conferees might well congratulate themselves. 
Most of them, and the great majority of the Independents, 
decided to support Hayes, feeling that the Republican party 
was safer on the financial question and that Tilden was too 
much of a politician to be trusted. Hendricks, the Demo- 
cratic candidate for Vice-President, did not add to the 
strength of the ticket in the minds of the hard-money Inde- 
pendents. 1 A few, who were normally Republicans, fear- 
ing the influence of the Stalwarts over Hayes, supported 
Tilden. Among them were the two Charles Francis 
Adamses and Parke Godwin, who had signed the address of 
the Fifth Avenue conference. 2 

in the violent and dangerous conflict that arose over the 
result of the election, the Stalwarts continued their stren- 
uous efforts of the campaign to secure the necessary electoral 
votes for Hayes," and their surprise and disgust were 
supreme when his cabinet appointments were announced. 
Hayes' cabinet was not all that the Independents might have 
desired, 4 but from the Stalwart point of view it was hope- 
less. It included the Half-Breed, John Sherman, as Secre- 
tary of the Treasury, a former officer of the Confederate 
army, David M. Key of Tennessee, as Postmaster-General, 
and what was still worse from a partisan point of view, 
Carl Schurz, the bolter, as Secretary of the Interior. When, 
after an investigation of affairs in Louisiana by a special 
committee and a conference at Washington with the rival 
claimants to the governorship of South Carolina, Hayes 

1 Schurz, Works, vol. iii, pp. 259, 261 ; Eaton. Independent Movement, 
p. 24; Bigelow, Tilden, vol. i, pp. 302, 305. 

2 Bigelow, op. cit., i, p. 299; Bancroft and Dunning, op. cit., p. 369; 
.V. Y. Tribune, July 22, 1876. 

* For an account of the disputed election vide Haworth, op. cit. 
4 Schurz, Works, vol. iii, pp. 366, 376, 384. 



_._>3J REPUBLICAX DISSENSIONS 43 

proceeded to withdraw the troops from these two states, the 
break with the organization was complete. 1 Blaine declared 
in the Senate that Hayes' desertion of Packard in Louisiana 
an admission that his own claim to the electoral votes 
of that state was fraudulent, since the same returning board 
passed on both. 2 Hayes was spoken of as a traitor and as a 
man who had climbed to his seat over the dead bodies of the 
loyal men of the South." 

The fact that Hayes had not taken an active part in 
national affairs and therefore had no factional following to 
which he must cater, had been an element of strength in 
attracting to himself the votes of many Independents. But 
when it came to the actual administration of the govern- 
ment, the lack of a definite body of supporters was a handi- 
cap to him. Many of the reformers, once Hayes was in- 
augurated, felt that their work was done and gave him no 
\iined support. 4 And finally he was handicapped in put- 
ting through any constructive legislation by a Democratic 
House throughout his term and a Democratic Senate during 
the last two years. Any gratitude which the Democrats 
might have felt toward him for his policy toward the South 
was obscured by the fact that they looked upon him as an 
usurper who had gained his office through fraud. They 
made strenuous efforts to repeal the various laws for the 
federal control of elections. Riders which would repeal or 
emasculate these laws were attached to a number of the ap- 
propriation bills during the last two years of Hayes' term. 
Hayes made liberal use of his veto power and the Democrats 
were unable to pass the acts over his veto, although they 

1 Sparks, National Development, p. 89; Piatt, Autobiog., p. 83. 

2 Cong. Rec, 45 C, 2 S., p. 2047. 

3 Nation, July 12, 1877, Speech of Chandler at Woodstock, Conn. : 
Speech of Piatt at N. Y. Rep. Conv. 1877, in Piatt, Autobiog., p. 85. 

* Nation, Aug. 21, 1879. 



44 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [224 

forced him to call two special sessions of Congress to make 
up deficiencies in the appropriations. 1 This Democratic 
attack necessarily solidified the Republicans in opposition 
and partially quieted the criticisms of Hayes from members 
of his own party. 

Although he disappointed the radical civil service re- 
formers, yet, in the opinion of George W. Curtis, Hayes, by 
a practical demonstration in the New York Post Office and 
Custom House of what might be accomplished, did more 
for the reform than any previous President. 2 Hayes him- 
self considered the pacification of the South and the settle- 
ment of the urgent questions of the currency to be the most 
important problems of his administration, 3 and his solid 
achievements along those lines in the face of a hostile Con- 
gress must guarantee him an honorable place among our 
Presidents. From any but a narrow partisan view the 
Republican party was much stronger in 1880 than in 1876. 

1 Sparks, op. cit., chap. viii. passim. 

-Harper's Weekly, Feb. 26, 1S81. 

3 Williams. Life of R. B. Hayes, vol. ii, p. no. 



CHAPTER III 
Stalwarts and Half-Breeds 

The candidates of the two main factions of the Repub- 
lican party for the Presidential nomination in 1880 were 
early in the field. Hayes had announced in his speech of 
acceptance his determination not to be a candidate for re- 
election 1 and the various enmities that he had aroused 
made any reconsideration on his part impossible. The 
Stalwart leaders realized that Grant was a stronger candi- 
date than any one else of their group and therefore united 
him, maintaining that the valid arguments against a 
third term applied only to a third consecutive term. The 

publicans had been claiming for two years that the 
attempts of the Democrats to repeal the election laws were 
nothing less than attempts to break up the Union. 2 The 
Stalwarts turned all this to their own advantage by claim- 
ing that the crying need of the times was for a " strong- 
man " at Washington, and of course the ideal " strong 
man " was Grant. :; That distinguished warrior and ex- 
President, who had just returned from a triumphal trip 
around the world, was easily persuaded to be a candidate. 4 
Blaine had maintained his leadership among the Half- 

1 McPherson, 1876, p. 212. 

2 Vide N. Y. Tribune editorials, Aug., Nov., 1879, Jan., March, 1880, 
also speeches of Sherman and Evarts in Tribune, Oct. 10, 22, 1879, 
March 3, 1880. 

3 N. Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1879; Nation, Oct. 16. 
♦Garland, U. S. Grant, p. 481. 

225] 45 



46 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [ 22 6 

Breeds and his candidacy was taken as a matter of course. 
The New York Tribune had been carefully nursing Blaine's 
boom by showing the deficiencies of every other candidate. 
Another Half-Breed candidate was John Sherman. Sher- 
man favored Blaine but had hopes that he might be turned 
to in case of a deadlock between Blaine and Grant. * 

The Democrats had developed no pre-eminent leader dur- 
ing their period of control in Congress. The main question 
with them was whether Tilden would be able either to get 
another nomination for himself or to dictate that of one of 
his friends. The Democrats lost no opportunity to assert 
that the election of 1876 had been stolen and the Republican 
newspapers, realizing that Tilden, now regarded as a mar- 
tyr, was the Democrats' strongest candidate, never ceased 
their attacks on him. 2 

Both parties were keenly interested in the election of a 
governor in New York in 1879 because of its bearings on 
both the nominations and election of 1880. The faction in 
either party that could nominate and elect its candidate in 
1879 would have, it was believed, a good chance of repeat- 
ing the feat in the national election of the following year. 3 
The contest for the Republican nomination had its prelude 
in Hayes' struggle to put the merit system into effect in the 
New York custom house, where gross inefficiency and waste 
had been reported by a special commission. Chester A. 
Arthur, collector of the port, was Conkling's chief lieuten- 
ant in New York state and refused to cooperate in any re- 
form. Alonzo Cornell, the naval officer of the port, was 
also treasurer of the Republican state committee and was 

1 Sherman Autobiog., vol. ii, p. 766; Blaine. Twenty Years, vol. ii, p. 
660. 

2 Alexander, Political History of New York, vol. iii, p. 180; Bigelow, 
Tilden, vol. ii, pp. 254, 264. 

3 Sherman, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 748; Nation, Aug. 24, 1879; N. Y. Trib 
Aug. 25, Nov. 1, 4, 1879. 



227] STALWARTS AXD HALF-BREEDS 47 

using the custom house as Republican headquarters^ Hayes, 
after suggesting that Arthur resign and offering Cornell the 
choice of resigning his position either in the federal service 
or on the state committee without result, sent the nomina- 
tions of their successors to the Senate. Through the influ- 
ence of Conkling and Piatt the Senate refused to ratify the 
appointments. After the adjournment of Congress Hayes 
suspended Arthur and Cornell and appointed Edwin A. 
Merritt as collector and Silas W. Burt as naval officer in 
their places. In the next session of Congress they were 
confirmed after a two months struggle. 1 

In the New York state Republican convention of 1879 
Conkling, to show his own power and his contempt for 
Hayes, backed Cornell for nomination as governor. The 
Half-Breeds, convinced that they could not nominate one 
of their own group, supported Cornell against the Inde- 
pendents' choice, George \V. Curtis, and the former was 
nominated. The Indep refused to support Cornell 

and formed an Independent Republican Committee which 
issued an address to the Republicans of the state calling on 
them to scratch Cornell and Soule, the candidate for state 
engineer, who was identified with the canal ring. 2 

In the Democratic party Tilden and his friends were en- 
gaged in a factional fight with Tammany Hall under the 
leadership of John Kelly. Lucius P. Robinson, who had suc- 
ceeded Tilden as governor in 1876, was a Tildeti man and 
Tilden was anxious, for the sake of his own prestige in the 
party, to have him renominated in 1879. Kelly, however, 
had quarreled with Robinson over a question of patronage 
and announced that he would not support him for a second 

'Sparks, op. cit., p. 157; Sherman, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 673; Conkling, 
op. cit., p. 555; Nation, Dec. 13, 1877; Williams, Hayes, vol. ii, p. 77- 

1 Appleton's Annual Cyclopedia, 1879, p.^.6^; Eaton, Independent 
Movement, p. 38; Alexander, op. tit., vol. iii, p. 412; Nation, Sept. 11, 
18, 1879. 



4 8 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [ 22 8 

term under any circumstances. When it became apparent 
that the Tilden men controlled the convention by a narrow 
margin and that Robinson was to be nominated, the Tam- 
many men withdrew in a body and held a convention of 
their own. The regular convention proceeded to nominate 
Robinson while the bolters nominated Kelly. 1 The Demo- 
crats and the " scratchers/' that is these Republicans who 
opposed Cornell, charged that Kelly had sold out to the 
Republicans. 2 

Under these circumstances the campaign was closely and 
bitterly fought. To counteract the influence of the scratch- 
ers, Stalwarts and Half-Breeds forgot their differences and 
worked together for Cornell. Two members of Hayes' 
cabinet, Evarts and Sherman, went to New York and made 
speeches for Cornell in which they entirely neglected state 
issues and waved the bloody shirt in the best Stalwart style. 3 
Sherman in a letter to Silas B. Dutcher, a custom-house 
employee, " cordially approved " of his taking part in the 
campaign and declared that he had no objections to govern- 
ment employees making contributions to the campaign 
fund. 4 Sherman justified his disregard of Hayes' famous 
executive order 5 and his willingness to support a man whom 
he had removed from office for inefficiency and neglect of 
duty by citing the overwhelming necessity for the victory of 
the Republicans in 1879 if they wished to win in 1880 and 
" not see all the results of the war overthrown and the 
constitutional amendments absolutely nullified." c For a 

: Ann. Cyc, p. 680; Breen, Thirty Years of New York Politics, pp. 
581, 622 et passim. 

2 Nation, Sept. 25. Oct. 2, 1879; N. Y. World, Oct. 17, 20, 24, 1879. 

N. Y. papers, Oct., 1879. 
* Nation, Oct. 16, 1879. 
■ Vide infra, p. 83. 
6 Sherman, Autobiog., vol. ii, p. 748. 



229] STALWARTS AND HALF-BREEDS 49 

man who had hopes of being a compromise candidate in 
1880, it was important not to alienate entirely so powerful 
a person as Conkling. Cornell's plurality over Robinson 
was about 40,000 but Kelly polled 77,000 votes that would 
normally have gone to Robinson. The other Republican 
candidates were elected by majorities of less than 5,000, 
excepting Soule, who was defeated by the Democratic can- 
didate for state engineer. 1 The scratchers asserted that 
they had polled about 20,000 votes and claimed credit for 
S( -ale's defeat. 

Considering that the campaign had been fought almost 
entirely on national lines, these results were not particularly 
encouraging to either party. The Stalwarts, however, made 
the best of such prestige as their victory gave them and 
were able to dominate the Xew York state Republican con- 
vention of 1880. In spite of Half-Breed and Independent 
protests, they forced through a resolution heartily endors- 
ing Grant and instructing all delegates for him. 2 Cameron 
in Pennsylvania and Logan in Illinois did similar yeoman 
work and, despite bitter opposition from the Blaine men, 
sent delegations to Chicago solidly pledged for Grant." 

In spite of these reverses the Blaine men found much to 
encourage them. State conventions showed that Blaine had 
great strength in the states where the Republican party was 
strongest. W. H. Robertson, Blaine's chief lieutenant in 
Xew York, who had been elected a delegate to the conven- 
tion, announced in a letter to the Albany Evening Journal 
that he would not be bound by the instructions of the state 
convention inasmuch as they were contrary to the rulings 
of the national convention of 1876. Three other delegates 
followed his lead with statements in the state senate that 
they would not support Grant. 4 

1 Ann. Cyc, 1879, p. 681. 2 Ibid., 1880, p. 573- 

1 Ibid., pp. 382, 616. 4 Ibid., p. 575. 



-O THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [230. 

Hayes' administration had not been bad enough or good 
enough to keep the Independents united. Edmunds of Ver- 
mont was their candidate but he never developed sufficient 
strength to make him a real contender for the nomination. 
The most that the Independents could hope to do was to 
prevent the nomination of any one entirely unacceptable to 
them. They early recognized the dangers of the Grant 
boom 1 and soon, to the great disgust of the Blaine men 
who had been forming anti-third-term leagues of their own, 
added Blaine to their list of undesirables. The Independent 
Republican Committee of New York sent a circular to all 
delegates to the Republican state convention, pointing out 
their strength as shown in the campaign of 1879 an( ^ an ~ 
nouncing that they would support neither Grant nor 
Blaine. 2 The Massachusetts Young Republicans and the 
National Republican League of Philadelphia adopted sim- 
ilar resolutions." An anti-third-term convention was held 
in St. Louis May 6 which was attended by several prominent 
independent Republicans and which received messages of 
endorsement from independent groups and individuals in all 
parts of the country. This convention, presided over by 
ex-Senator John B. Henderson, adopted resolutions de- 
manding " from a party without a master the nomination 
of a candidate without a stain " and appointed a committee 
of 100 which was instructed to meet in New York if Grant 
were nominated and take such action as seemed best. 4 

The Republicans assembled in Chicago with both Grant 
and Blaine men claiming victory. The Blaine men gained 
an important point in the adoption of a rule, reported by 

1 Schurz, Works, vol. iii, p. 494- 

2 Nation, March 4, 1880. 
*Ibid., March 4, 1 1. 

* Official Proceedings of the Anti-Third Term Republican Convention ;. 
Ann. Cyc. 1880, p. 694. 



231] STALWARTS AND HALF-BREEDS 51 

the committee of which Garfield was chairman, which pro- 
vided that on the roll call of states any delegate might de- 
mand that his delegation vote as individuals and have the 
vote so recorded. 1 This meant that the unit rule was not 
to be applied and that the convention would not attempt to 
enforce instructions given by state conventions. It cost 
Grant seventeen votes from New York, twenty-three from 
Pennsylvania and ten from Illinois. On the first ballot 
Grant received a total of 304 votes, of which 107 came 
from Xew York, Pennsylvania and Illinois, nineteen from 
other northern states and the balance from the South. 
Blaine received 284, of which but fifty-nine came from the 
South and the rest mainly from strong Republican states. 
Sherman had the thirty-four votes of Ohio, ten from other 
northern states and forty-nine from the South. Edmunds 
received the ten votes of Vermont and twenty from Massa- 
chusetts. Thirty-four ballots were taken without material 
change. Sherman's votes would have nominated Blaine a1 
any time and he would have been glad to deliver them but 
was unable to do so. 2 On the other hand, Sherman felt that 
Governor Foster, the chairman of the Ohio delegation, 
who, although he was pledged to Sherman, was known to 
favor Blaine, had not done all that he might have to push 
Sherman, when it became evident that Blaine could not be 
nominated. 3 Garfield, who made the speech nominating- 
Sherman, has also been charged with being half-hearted in 
his support, not being able to put the idea of his own nomi- 
nation out of his mind, 4 but Sherman himself later ab- 
solved Garfield from any charge of double dealing. 5 

1 Proceedings of the Rep. Nat. Com: of 1880, pp. 43, 159. 

2 Sherman, Autobiog., vol. ii, pp. 771. 773', Stanwood, Blaine, p. 226. 
'Sherman, Autobiog., vol. ii, p. 776. 

* McClure, Our Presidents, p. 271. 
6 Sherman, Autobiog., vol. ii, p. 77& 



^2 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [232 

It finally became evident that neither of the leading can- 
didates could be nominated. Garfield had received one or 
two votes on most of the ballots, although he had announced 
in the convention that he was not a candidate. 1 On the 
thirty-fourth ballot Wisconsin gave him sixteen votes, on 
the thirty-fifth Indiana transferred twenty-seven from 
Blaine to him, and on the thirty-sixth he received all of the 
Edmunds votes and the greater part of the Blaine votes, 
thus securing the nomination. 2 Grant's Stalwarts never 
wavered, giving him 306 votes on the final ballot. Conk- 
ling was furious, the nomination of Arthur for Vice-Presi- 
dent, which was looked upon as a peace offering, doing 
little to pacify him. a 

Garfield was one of the better sort of Half -Breeds. He 
had been prominent in Congress and was well-informed on 
most public questions. The report of the Poland committee 
in the Credit Mobilier scandal had implicated him, but his 
explanations convinced most of his friends at least that his 
action had been the result of ignorance rather than of evil 
intention. 4 The Independents were favorably inclined 
toward him. The Nation said that although he had had 
moments of weakness, " he is most honorably associated 
with every question of importance that has come up in Con- 
gress during the past twelve years." Garfield's great 
weakness was his willingness to let party expediency rather 
than his own judgment of what was right dictate his 
actions. 6 He had a reputation within the party of being 

1 Proc. of Conv., p. 269. 

2 Ibid., passim; Ann. Cyc, 1880, p. 694. 

s McClure, Recollections of Half a Century, p. no; Hudson, Random 
Recollections of an Old Political Reporter, p. 97. 

* Rhodes, vol. vii, p. 16. 

* June 17, 1880; znde also Schurz, Works, vol. iii, p. 507. 

' Vide c. g. his letter to Hayes March 2, 1876, in Williams, Hayes, vol. 
i, p. 428. 



2$$] STALWARTS AND HALF-BREEDS ^ 

weak and vacillating, which his friends declared was due to 
his desire to be fair to all sides, while his enemies attributed 
it to his devotion to his own selfish interests. 1 

The Democratic convention assembled with the question 
of what was to be done with Tilden still unsettled. Many 
felt that the strongest issue would be the charge of fraud 
in 1876 and that Tilden was the only logical nominee. 2, 
Tilden controlled the delegation from New York, but Tam- 
many had refused to attend the state convention, had held 
one of their own and had sent a contesting delegation to 
Cincinnati instructed to fight Tilden to a finish. 3 After a 
struggle before the committee on credentials, where Kelly 
declared that Tammany would not support Tilden if nomi- 
nated, and on the floor of the convention, the Tammany 
delegates were given seats on the floor but were not allowed 
to vote. 4 Tilden's manager announced to the convention 
that Tilden was not a candidate and that he requested his 
friends to vote for Payne of Ohio. This was thought to be 
a trick to feel out Tilden's strength in the convention. After 
the first ballot had shown that there was no strong demand 
for him, a letter was read from him to the convention in 
which he positively declined to run on account of his health 
and recommended the nomination of Randall of Pennsyl- 
vania. 5 On the first ballot opportunity was taken to honor 
favorite sons, nineteen different men receiving votes, but 
on the second all factions united to nominate General Han- 
cock. 

After the nomination John Kelly took the platform, 

'Hoar, Autobiog., vol. i, chap, xxviii ; Sherman, Autobiog., vol. ii, p. 
807; Piatt, Autobiog., p. 125. 
3 Bigelow, Tilden, vol. ii, p. 271 ; N. Y. Sun, June 22, 1880. 

• Alexander, op. cit., vol. iii, p. 449; Ann. Cyc, 1880, p. 573. 

* Official Proceedings of the Nat. Dem. Conv., pp. 43, 49, 51. 

5 Breen, op. cit., p. 595 ; Bigelow, Letters and Literary Memorials of 
S. J. Tilden, vol. ii, p. 599; Proc. of Conv., p. 103. 



- 4 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [234 

announced Tammany's complete satisfaction and promised 
its loyal support. John R. Fellows, the anti-Tammany 
leader, then mounted the platform and wrung Kelly's hand 
while the convention roared its approval. 1 The reconcilia- 
tion resulted in but one Democratic ticket being nominated 
for the New York city offices. The nomination of a Roman 
Catholic for mayor caused complications, however, which 
resulted in an unexpectedly small vote for Hancock in New- 
York and Kelly was charged with having betrayed him. 2 

The nomination of Hancock was an attempt to answer 
the Republican charge of disloyalty and at the same time 
to capitalize the popularity of a military hero. Hancock's 
record as a soldier was excellent, not the slightest flaw 
could be found in his private character, but he had had 
absolutely no experience in politics and possessed but little 
knowledge of the problems of government. 3 

The platforms of both parties were vague and evasive. 
The choice offered Independents and others who put actual 
accomplishment along progressive lines above getting office, 
was a difficult one. Most of the Independents, having had 
enough of a military hero in the White House, chose Gar- 
field, although his conduct of the campaign made that choice 
increasingly difficult. His letter of acceptance was a dis- 
appointment. In it he gave but perfunctory approval to 
civil sendee reform, practically repudiating what Hayes 
had done. On other issues left unsettled in the platform he 
was equally vague. 4 

It was Blaine votes that nominated Garfield and it was 

1 Proc. ofConv., p. 121; Breen, op. cit., p. 599; Alexander, op. cit.. vol. 
iii, p. 454; Ann. Cyc, 1880, p. 697. 

2 Breen. op. cit, p. 620; McClure, Our Presidents, p. 278; N. Y. 
Herald, Nov. 5. 1880. 

s Nation, July 1. 1880. 

* Ann. Cyc, 1880, p. 700; Bancroft and Dunning, op. cit., p. 395; 
Schurz, Works, vol. iv, p. I, et passim. 



-35] STALWARTS AND HALT-BREEDS 55 

Blaine who was Garfield's chief adviser throughout the 
campaign. 1 The Stalwarts were at first inclined to sulk 
and Garfield made strenuous efforts to placate them. 2 In 
\ugust a conference between Garfield and the Stalwart 
leaders was called at the Fifth Avenue Hotel in New York. 
fr m which Conkling was conspicuously absent. According 
to Stalwart accounts Garfield pledged in return for Stalwart 
support that their wishes " should be paramount with him 
touching all questions of patronage." He is also said to 
have offered Levi P. Morton his choice of an appointment 
as either Secretary of the Treasury or Ambassador to Eng- 
land in return for his services in taking charge of the 
finances of the campaign/ 1 Whatever the bargain, the Stal- 
warts from that time on took an active part in the campaign. 
Even Grant, in spite of his antipathy to 1 ratory, was per- 
iod to take the stump for Garfield. Conkling spoke in 
Xew York and then made a tour of the Middle West, in 
the course of which a meeting was arranged between him 
and Garfield at Garfield's home. At this meeting Garfield 
is reputed to have said, " Conkling, you have saved me. 
Whatever man can do for man, that will I do for you." 4 

In the campaign there was little discussion of any real 
issues. The Republicans started out by painting in lurid 
colors the dangers of southern domination; out of seventy 
documents published by the Republican Congressional Com- 
mittee, twenty-six dealt with some phase of the southern 
question. This i^sue soon lagging, Blaine advised that it be 
dropped. 5 Garfield himself recommended that the tariff 
aid receive more attention, and during the latter part 

1 Hamilton, Blaine, p. 486; Sherman, Autobiog., vol. ii, p. 807. 

2 Conkling, Conkling, p. 278: Andrews. Last Quarter Century, p. 314. 
;! Piatt, Autobiog., p. 127; Conkling, Conkling, p. 623. 

4 Piatt. Autobiog., p. 135; Conkling, Conkling, p. 623. 

5 Hudson, op. cit., p. 212. 

erman, Autobiog., vol. ii, p. 787. 



56 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [236 

of the campaign it received much more than the circum- 
stances warranted. 1 The Democrats, after an attempt to 
stir up excitement with the old cry of fraud, turned a large 
part of their fire on Garfield's Credit Mobilier record, and 
as a last-minute argument the celebrated " Morey " letter 
appeared. This letter, later proven to be a forgery, was 
supposed to have been written by Garfield and to show his 
desire to allow the immigration of Chinese laborers for the 
sake of providing employers with cheap labor. " 

Jn the election Garfield received a plurality over Han- 
cock of less than 10,000 in the popular vote, but in the elec- 
toral college he had 214 votes to 155 for Hancock. Han- 
cock carried every former slave state and California, Ne- 
vada and New Jersey. In the Congressional elections the 
Republicans gained control of the House for the first time 
since 1873. ^ s a result of elections by state legislatures, 
each party had thirty-seven Senators, with Mahone of Vir- 
ginia classified as a Readjuster and David Davis of Illinois 
as an Independent. Mahone voted with the Republicans, 
and this with the vote of the Vice-President assured Re- 
publican control.' 5 

Garfield's cabinet was an evident attempt to please every- 
body, and at first he seemed to have succeeded. 4 Blaine as 
was expected was Secretary of State. Windom of Minne- 
sota, the Secretary of the Treasury, was another Half- 
Breed, prominent in the West, who had flirted with the soft- 
money men enough to be acceptable to them, but who had 
given assurances of the soundness of his present financial 
views sufficient to satisfv the East. 5 Wavne MacVeajrh of 

1 Cf. infra, p. no. 

a Sparks, op- cit., pp. 176,244; A r . Y, Times, N, Y. Tribune, July 16, 1884. 

3 McPherson, Handbook, 1882, pp. 115, 186. 

4 Vide comment of N. Y. papers, March 6-8 and Nation, March 10. 
9 Sherman, Autobiog., vol. ii, p. 815. 



237] STALWARTS AND HALF-BREEDS 57 

Pennsylvania as Attorney-General was a concession to the 
Independents. James of New York, who was made Post- 
master-General, was a Conkling man whose conduct of the 
New York post office had been such as to make him accept- 
able to all factions. 1 Robert T. Lincoln of Illinois, the Sec- 
retary of War, was also classed as a Stalwart, but his ap- 
pointment was generally approved out of respect for his 
name if nothing more. Neither James nor Lincoln was a 
man whom Conkling personally would have favored. Kirk- 
wood of Iowa, as Secretary of the Interior, and Hunt of 
Louisiana, as Secretary of the Navy, were unknown and 
unobjectionable. 

The harmony brought about by these early appointments 
was, however, to be short-lived. With Blaine in the cab- 
inet and looked upon as " premier,*' and with Conkling 
imperious and quarrelsome, a conflict was inevitable. It 
came over the New York appointments. Garfield claimed 
that he told Conkling in a conference that he would make 
one conspicuous appointment of a friend of Conkling for 
the sake of party harmony but that future appointments 
would be on the basis of merit alone. 2 Conkling claimed 
that Garfield had definitely promised him that he would 
consult him before making any New York appointments/' 
At any rate Garfield's early nominations included that of 
Levi P. Morton as minister to France and several other 
Stalwarts as federal marshals and district attorneys. 
Among these were a number whom Hayes had refused to 
reappoint because they were inefficient or hostile to civil 
service reform. 4 These nominations were supposedly made 

1 Nation, March 10, 1881 ; A r . Y. Tribune, March 6. 
' Hoar, Autobiog., vol. ii, p. 56. 

3 Vide Conkling's and Piatt's letter of resignation in Ann, Cyc, 1881, 
p. 644; article by Boutwell in McClure's Magazine, vol. xiv, p. 86. 
*N. Y. Times, March 30, 1881. 



^S THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [238 

with the approval of the New York Senators, but it devel- 
oped later that they had not been consulted and were in fact 
opposed to at least two of them. Before these were con- 
firmed the nominations of Edwin A. Merritt, who had been 
collector of the port of New York, for consul-general to 
Ion, and of William H. Robertson, Blaine's lieutenant 
in Xew York and the man who had led the revolt against 
Grant in the New York delegation, as Merritt's successor, 
were sent to the Senate. It has been claimed that Blaine 
had no hand in this nomination and was opposed to it on 
grounds of policy, 1 but this is difficult to believe and was 
contrary to the general opinion at the time. 2 

The Republicans and Democrats in the Senate were 
wrangling over organization and adjourning from day to 
day wthout doing anything, so immediate action was im- 
possible. Conkling, Piatt, Arthur, and James united in a 
letter, which was later endorsed by Governor Cornell, pro- 
testing, on grounds of devotion to civil service reform, 
against Merritt's removal and " earnestly and respectfully " 
asking that the nomination of Robertson be withdrawn. 
The Half -Breeds and Democrats in the New York legisla- 
ture combined to pass a resolution urging the consent of the 
Senate to Robertson's appointment. Conkling did his be.~t 
to make a deal with the Democrats to refuse consent, offer- 
ing, it was reported, to help defeat W. E. Chandler's ap- 
pointment as Solicitor-General, an appointment which, evi- 
dently dictated by Blaine without the approval of Mac- 
Veagh, was distasteful to the Democrats because of Chand- 
ler's reputation as one of the most conspicuous wavers 
of the bloody shirt. After nearly two months Garfield, in 
order to make the issue a clear one and prevent adjournment 

Rogers, Development of ike North, p. 142; Boutwell, Reminiscences 
of Sixty Years, vol. ii. p. 274 ; Alexander, op. cit., vol. iii, p. 469. 

2 Vide Nation, Harper's Weekly, Independent, N. Y. papers for March 
and April, 1881. 



• 2 39] STALWARTS AND HALF-BREEDS 59 

without action, withdrew all nominations except that of 
Robertson. Conkling and Piatt thereupon resigned, stating 
their position in a long public letter to Governor Cornell. 
After their resignation Robertson's nomination was con- 
firmed. 

The struggle was then transferred to Albany, where the 
legislature proceeded to the electon of Senators to fill the 
vacancies. Both Conkling and Piatt announced their in- 
tention of standing for re-election as a vindication. The 
Democrats in the state legislature voted for their own can- 
didates and neither faction of the Republicans had enough 
votes to control the election. The balloting began on May 
31 and continued until July 1 without result. Then Piatt 
withdrew, seven Stalwarts deserted and Warner Miller was 
chosen as Piatt's successor. A few days later Elbridge G. 
Lapham was elected in Conkling's place. 1 

President Garfield was shot by Guiteau on July 2 and 
died September 19. The assassin declared that he removed 
the President as a public necessity in order to unite the two 
factions of the Republican party." No one believed that 
any responsible person had any connection with the crime, 
but the evident fact that it was the result of the bitterness 
of partisan feeling reacted against the Stalwarts. It doubt- 
less hastened the settlement at Albany and furnished an 
additional reason for Conkling's permanent retirement as a 
national leader. Conkling took up the practice of law in 
New York city and never again took an active part in 
politics. His retirement was another step in that disintegra- 
tion of the Stalwarts which had begun with their defeat in 
the convention of 1880. 

x The best account of the details of the struggle in the Senate and at 
Albany can be had from the N. Y. newspapers, the Nation and Harpers 
Weekly, March-July, 1881 ; vide also Ann. Cyc, 1881, p. 644; Piatt, 
Antobiog., p. 139; Conkling, Conkling, p. 637; Breen, Thirty Years, p. 
648; Sherman, Autobiog., vol. ii, p. 817^ SpaTks, Nat. Develop., p. 184. 

2 Sparks, op. cit., p. 192. 



CHAPTER IV 
Arthur's Administration 

The first reaction of many people to the news of Gar- 
field's death was doubtless similar to that of the man who 
exclaimed, " diet Arthur President of the United States! 
Good God !" * Arthur was known mainly as a bon vivant, 
a " good mixer " and as Conkling's chief lieutenant in New 
York. The only public office that he had ever held was that 
of collector of the port of New York, from which he had 
been removed by Hayes. ^He stood in the popular mind for 
most of the things that were objectionable in politics. Even 
at the time that Garfield was shot, he was with Conkling 
and Piatt at Albany working for their re-election. 2 To 
those, however, who had expected that he would be merely 
a partisan as President, his administration was a disappoint- 
ment. His opponents, whether Democrats or Republicans, 
could find few grounds for legitimate criticism. The Nation 
declared in 1884 that his administration " will not suffer by 
comparison with any of its predecessors since Lincoln's. 
Indeed it is above the average of post-bellum administra- 
tions in point of respectability." 3 

Arthur's cabinet appointments were such as to allay party 
prejudice and gain general approval. Although the only 
member of Garfield's cabinet to be finally retained was Lin- 

1 A. D. White, Autobiography, vol. i, p. 193. 

a Piatt, Autobiog., p. 163; Alexander, op. cit., vol. Hi, p. 445; Peck, 
Twenty Years of the Republic, p. 4 ; Nation, July 7, 1881. 
3 April 24. 

60 [240 



24 1 ] ARTHUR'S ADMINISTRATION 6l 

coin, the changes were made gradually and with evident 
care. Most of the appointees were from the Stalwart wing 
of the party but they were not prominent politicians. None 
of them was objectionable and most of them were highly 
creditable. The poorest appointment was that of W. E. 
Chandler, a prominent supporter of Blaine, as Secretary of 
the Navy. Chandler was a notorious spoilsman and bloody- 
^hirt waver and his nomination as Solicitor-General by Gar- 
field had failed of ratification in the Senate. 1 Arthur's record 
on removals and appointments to minor positions will stand 
comparison with that of any of his predecessors. 2 They 
did not gain him popularity, however, with any branch of 
the party. The Stalwarts were disgusted because he did 
not make a general house-cleaning of Half-Breeds, the re- 
tention of Robertson as collector of the port of New York 
l>eing particularly distasteful to them." The Half-Breeds 
felt that Blaine should have been retained and that they 
should have been given more prominent offices. 4 The In- 
dependents were repelled by a few bad appointments in the 
customs and internal revenue services. 

Arthur's first message to Congress was also reassuring to 
friends of good government, particularly the parts of it 
which dealt with the tariff and civil service reform. 6 It 
was remarkable in being the first one in fort)- years that 
made no mention of the South. 7 

1 Nation, Nov. 2, 1882. For comment on other appointments, vide 
Nation, Nov. 3, Dec. 15, 22, 1881, March 2, April 13, 1882; Wheeler, 
Sixty Years of American Life, p. 123. 

2 Vide annual message 1882; Richardson, Messages and Papers of the 
Presidents (ed. of 1898), vol. viii, p. 147. 

s Piatt, Autobiog., p. 180; Peck, op. cit., p. 7. 

1 Boutwell, Reminiscences, vol. ii, p. 275 ; Hoar, Autobiog., vol. i, p. 405. 

* Nation, April 13, June 1, 1882. 

6 Richardson, op. cit., vol. viii, p. 37; cf. also infra, pp. 91, 113. 

''Nation, Dec. 15, 1881. 



62 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [242 

The knowledge that, as a result of the elections of 1880.. 
the Senate, the House and the Presidency were all to be 
controlled by the Republicans for the first time since 1874 
had been a cause for much rejoicing by that party. 1 Good 
politics as well as statesmanship demanded that the Repub- 
licans make use of their opportunity and unite on a pro- 
gram of constructive legislation which would make an ap- 
peal to the voters strong enough to carry the party safely 
through the elections of 1882 and pave the way for victory 
in 1884. In spite of the fact that factional clamor had been 
temporarily stilled, at least on the surface, the Republicans 
failed. The prime reason for their failure was their inabil- 
ity or their unwillingness to take a stand on questions that 
w r ere important enough to become national issues. The 
Hayes administration had left no effective issue and Ar- 
thur's first Congress developed no new ones. 

The tariff question was disposed of in the first session, 
after considerable oratory, by the appointment of a com- 
mission to study the question. 2 Several bills to reform the 
civil service were introduced but were allowed to slumber 
peacefully in committee. Reagan of Texas made an un- 
successful attempt to bring his bill for the regulation of in- 
terstate commerce before the House." The nearest approach 
to a partisan vote on any question of national importance 
was that on the bill to extend the charters of national banks. 
The Democrats by dilatory motions prevented action for 
several weeks, but on its final passage it received twenty- 
two Democratic votes in the House and eight in the Senate 
while many Republicans failed to vote. 4 

1 Vide e. g. Letters of Mrs. James G. Blaine, vol. i, p. 180. 

2 Cf. infra, p. 113. 

s McPherson, Handbook, 1882, p. 128. 

4 Ibid., pp. 144, 146; Nation, May 25, 1882. 



243] ARTHUR'S ADMINISTRATION 63 

Both parties hoped to gain advantage by their attitude 
toward Chinese immigration. The Pacific coast was rabid 
against the Chinese and its sentiments were shared to a 
lesser extent by all the states west of the Mississippi. Labor 
throughout the country had been aroused to fear Chinese 
competition. Here, then, was an opportunity for some 
party to make a strong bid for western and labor support 
and at the same time offend no one except a few " doc- 
trinaires " who believed that the spirit as well as the letter 
of international treaties should be upheld. The Burlingame 
treaty of 1868 gave the Chinese full rights of immigration 
and provided that Chinese residing in the United States 
should have the same privileges as citizens of the most 
favored nation. The Democratic Congress in 1879 passed 
a bill requiring the President to notify the government of 
China that the provisions of the treaty providing for free 
immigration would be considerd null and void after July I, 
1879. Hayes vetoed this bill on the ground that it was an 
usurpation of the authority of the executive but sent a mis- 
sion to China to modify the treaty. This mission secured a 
modification of the treaty which provided that the United 
States might " regulate, limit or suspend " but might not 
absolutely prohibit the coming of Chinese, whenever it 
affected or threatened to affect the interests or endanger 
the good order of the country. It was further provided 
that this limitation was to be " reasonable " and to apply 
only to laborers. Both parties favored restriction of Chi- 
nese immigration, according to their platforms of 1880, and 
the attempt of the Democrats to show by the Morey letter 
that Garfield was secretly in favor of unlimited immigra- 
tion played a prominent part in the closing days of the 
campaign. 1 

A bill was introduced by the Republicans in Arthur's first 

1 Sparks, National Development, chap, xiv; Ann. Cyc., 1882, p. 387. 



64 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [244 

Congress prohibiting the immigration of Chinese laborers 
for twenty years after the passage of the act. The Demo- 
crats were determined that the Republicans should get no 
advantage from it, however, and quite generally supported 
it. George of Mississippi pointed out in the debate in the 
House that it was a discrimination on account of race, and 
was therefore an admission on the part of the Republicans 
of the justice of the Democratic contention, made for so 
many years in regard to the negro, that such discrimination 
was proper. 1 On its final passage the bill received seven 
Republican and twenty-two Democratic votes in the Senate, 
fifteen Republicans and one Democrat voting against it. In 
the House fifty-eight Republicans and one hundred and nine 
Democrats voted for it and sixty-two Republicans and four 
Democrats against it. 2 This bill was vetoed by President 
Arthur on the ground that twenty years was not a " reason- 
able " suspension of the privilege. A similar bill with the 
time lowered to ten years was then passed and became a law. 

In 1882 the Republican platform of California declared 
that it was a cause for congratulation that the question had 
finally been settled, " the treaty having been framed by Re- 
publican commissioners and ratified and approved by a Re- 
publican administration." The California Democrats ten- 
dered their thanks " to the Democrats of the Union for a 
long, earnest and partially successful struggle, through the 
Democratic Congressmen, with a hostile Republican admin- 
istration against Chinese immigration. 3 

The one record that the Republicans did make in the first 
session was that of being one of the most extravagant Con- 
gresses in the history of the country. With the tariff left 
at war-time heights and many of the internal revenue taxes 

1 Cong. Rec, 47 C, 1 S., p. 1637; Nation, March 16, 30, 1882. 
* McPherson, 1882, pp. 95, 96. 
3 Ann. Cyc, 1882, pp. 79, 82. 



245] ARTHUR'S ADMINISTRATION 65 

still in force, a surplus had been piling up in the treasury, 
and Congress found the reduction of this surplus by means 
of increased appropriations a pleasant duty. There were 
large increases in appropriations all along the line, especially 
in those for pensions and for rivers and harbors. 1 Presi- 
dent Arthur won the approval of the country by vetoing the 
rivers and harbors bill, asserting that many of the items in 
it were not " for the common defense or general welfare " 
and did not " promote commerce among the states." 2 Con- 
gress braved public opinion and passed the bill over the 
veto. The Republicans, being in the majority, were blamed 
for the extravagance, but votes on appropriations were 
always non-partisan when all districts were well " cared 
for." Most of the pension bills were passed without a roll 
call. Sixty-five Republicans and fifty-one Democrats voted 
against thirty Republicans and twenty-four Democrats to 
pass the rivers and harbors bill over the veto in the House, 
and in the Senate eighteen Republicans and twenty-three 
Democrats voted against twelve Republicans and three 
Democrats. 3 

The extravagance of Congress might have gone unre- 
buked by the voters had not the good times of the past few 
years abruptly ended. There had been a general failure of 
crops in 1S81, both in the United States and in Europe, 
with resulting high prices of foodstuffs, which had been 
accentuated by various attempts to corner the market. 
Labor felt the pinch and demanded higher wages. The 
crop shortage lowered exports, and gold exports reached the 
highest mark since 1876. Money was therefore scarce and 
the interest rate high. Still another effect of the crop short- 

1 Cf. infra, p. 112. 

2 Richardson, vol. viii, p. 120; Hoar, Autobiog., vol. ii, p. 112; Nation, 
Aug. 3, 10, 1882. 

5 McPherson, 1882, p. 202. 



66 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [246 

age had been to reduce the revenue of railroads and the re- 
sulting drop in railroad securities with efforts of speculators 
to unload caused a general depression in the stock market. 
More important still was the fact that the means of produc- 
tion of the country had developed faster than the means of 
consumption and the effects of overproduction were begin- 
ning to be felt. Business was poor. The depression was 
general though not acute. Manufacturers were unable to 
meet the demands for higher wages and were often glad of 
an excuse to close down or limit their output. Strikes and 
lockouts were common. Among the more important labor 
troubles was a general strike of iron workers west of the 
Alleghanies and a strike of freight-handlers in New York 
city. In both these strikes the men were unsuccessful and 
returned to work with their demands unsatisfied. 1 When 
governmental extravagance and high taxes were combined 
with economic depression and low wages the result was 
disastrous for the party in power. 

The Democrats made the most of the popular feeling in 
the campaign for the election of Congressmen and state offi- 
cials in 1882, and put resolutions condemning Republican 
extravagance into practically every state platform. The 
Michigan Democrats " denounced without distinction of 
party " all who had voted for the " iniquitous River and 
Harbor bill." The Connecticut Democrats went so far as 
to " cordially approve " Arthur's veto. The Republicans 
themselves were in some cases apologetic as to the appro- 
priations. Those of Kansas endorsed Arthur's veto and the 
action of the Kansas delegation in voting to sustain it. The 
New York Republican platform declared that Arthur's 
" courage in resisting the enactment of the River and Har- 

1 Ann. Cyc, 1882, pp. no, 453; 1883, p. 332; Paxson, The New Nation, 
p. 06; Noyes, Forty Years of American Finance, p. 83; Commercial 
ami Financial Chronicle (N. Y.), Jan. 6, 1883. 



247] ARTHUR'S ADMINISTRATION 6j 

bor bill . . . has secured for him the admiration even of 
his enemies." The California Republicans were alone in 
having a good word to say for the river and harbor bill, 
asserting that it had long been Republican policy and was 
the duty of the federal government " to maintain water- 
ways in their highest standard of usefulness ... as a con- 
stant check on the exorbitant exactions of artificial high- 
ways." 

Along with the condemnation of extravagance usually 
went demands for lower taxes, especially for a reduction of 
the tariff. Both parties demanded tariff revision in Massa- 
chusetts, Illinois, Michigan, Nebraska and Iowa, and the 
Democrats alone in Maine, New Hampshire, Connecticut, 
Pennsylvania, New York, Ohio, Kansas and Oregon. The 
tariff planks of the two parties differed in most cases in 
phraseology rather than in sense. The Republicans usually 
insisted that in reducing the tariff the protective principle be 
maintained, while a favorite Democratic formula was for a 
tariff so fixed that the revenue should not exceed the needs 
of the government economically administered, and so ad- 
justed as to protect American industry and labor without 
fostering monopolies. There were, however, a few excep- 
tions. In Maine, New Hampshire and Ohio, the Repub- 
licans praised protection with no demand for reduction. 
Oregon Democrats demanded a tariff for revenue only. 
Those of Maine did the same and added the assertion that 
the tariff commission had been packed with protectionists. 
Michigan Democrats declared themselves " unalterably op- 
posed " to a protective tariff and demanded " immediate 
and aggressive reform in the direction of free trade." The. 
Democratic platforms of Iowa and Kansas had almost iden- 
tical planks which declared that " every description of in- 
dustry should stand or fall on its own merits," and that 
" the existing protective tariff is an outrageous scheme to 



68 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURX TO POWER [248 

plunder, and in principle and detail violates every principle 
of right and justice." * 

The failure of Congress to take any definite steps toward 
a reform of the civil service was also a source of weakness 
in the Republican campaign. The evils of the spoils system 
had been brought vividly before the people by the Conkling- 
Garfield quarrel and Garfield's assassination. The assess- 
ment of officeholders, continued in spite of protests, the im- 
plication of prominent Republican politicians in the Star 
Route frauds, 2 the insolence of Stalwart leaders in New 
York and Pennsylvania in manipulating conventions and 
forcing unpopular nominations, and a few flagrant abuses 
of the power of removal and appointment on the part of 
Arthur and his subordinates had not helped to allay popular 
disapproval. Arthur's declaration for reform in his first 
message, the assertions of such men as Blaine and Harrison, 
in the course of the campaign, of their devotion to the 
principle, 3 and the general adoption of civil-service-reform 
planks in the state platforms of both parties were indica- 
tions that the politicians realized that the people had changed 
their minds about civil service reform even if they had not 
themselves. The state platform that did not announce civil 
service reform as one of the main objects of the party'? 
existence was exceptional. There was in most cases ex- 
treme vagueness as to the quality and quantity of reform 
demanded and as to just what steps should be taken to 
get it. The Massachusetts Republicans were an exception 
in that they set forth a definite program which included 
competitive tests for appointment, removals for cause only 
and promotion by merit. The California Democrats de- 

1 Platforms may be found in Ann. Cyc, 1882, articles on the several 
states. 
7 Vide infra, p. 87. 

ition, Sept 14; Harper's Weekly, Sept. 23. 1882. 



249] ARTHUR'S ADMINISTRATION 69 

clared for the principles embodied in the Pendleton bill in- 
troduced at the last session of Congress. In New York 
both parties declared for reform in their platforms, and in 
response to a letter from the Civil Service Reform Asso- 
ciation both candidates announced their devotion to the 
principle. Grover Cleveland, the Democratic candidate, defi- 
nitely endorsed the Pendleton bill. 1 In Pennsylvania grow- 
ing dissatisfaction with the high-handed conduct of the 
Cameron machine had resulted in the candidacy of an inde- 
pendent Republican for state treasurer in 1881 and the 
formation of an independent organization. This organiza- 
tion was continued in 1882 when the regulars refused to. 
recognize the claims of the independents in the state con- 
vention. The independents nominated a state ticket on a 
platform entirely devoted to civil service reform. 2 The 
following extracts from their platform, however, arouse the 
suspicion that this movement was inspired as much by the 
desire of the Half-Breeds to chastise the Stalwarts as by 
zeal for real reform. ' The election of Garfield signified 
to us the triumph of true reform in the civil service . . . 
the calamity of his assassination has been followed by the 
overthrow of these reforms in the hands of his successor. 
. . . We declare our purpose to take up the work which fell 
when Garfield fell." ° 

Another factor in the campaign of 1882 was the Irish- 
American vote. The Irish had always largely enrolled in 
the Democratic party and the Democrats made political cap- 
ital out of the attitude of the administration toward the 
Irish question. The Irish in America were in active sym- 
pathy with the efforts of the Irish Land League to over- 
throw the landlords and with the activities of Parnell in 

1 Ann. Cyc, 1882, p. 609. 

2 Cooper, American Politics, p. 307. 

3 Ann. Cyc, 1882, p. 678. 



yo THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [250 

Parliament for home rule. In the course of the trouble 
several American citizens, mostly naturalized Irishmen, 
were imprisoned in England under the Coercion act, some 
of them, it was claimed, on insufficient charges or merely 
on suspicion. James Russell Lowell, the American ambas- 
sador at London, protested in a dignified way against these 
arrests and secured the release of several against whom 
there were no definite charges. 1 His action was not vigor- 
ous enough to suit some of the Irish sympathizers in this 
country, however, and Congress received several petitions 
for Lowell's recall. The House requested that the Presi- 
dent furnish them the correspondence on the subject and 
the Democrats took the opportunity to attack the adminis- 
tration for laxness in protecting American citizens, on one 
occasion introducing a resolution for Lowell's recall. 2 The 
board of aldermen of New York city passed a similar reso- 
lution. 3 Democratic newspapers were loud in their denun- 
ciations of the administration. A large mass meeting held 
at Cooper Union in New York city on April 3 was ad- 
dressed by Mayor Grace, Congressmen Randall and Scran- 
ton of Pennsylvania, S. S. Cox of New York, Orth of In- 
diana, and Senator Jones of Florida. Letters expressing 
sympathy with the purpose of the meeting were read from 
Roscoe Conkling, Samuel J. Tilden, Governor Curtin of 
Pennsylvania and a long list of Democratic Congressmen. 
A resolution was adopted condemning Lowell's " sycophan- 
tic bearing " and declaring that the " honor of the nation 
demands his recall." 4 The Democratic platforms of New 
York, Indiana and Illinois contained condemnations of the 
administration for neglecting to protect American citizens 
in the United Kingdom. 

1 House Ex. Doc, 47 C, 1 S., no. 155. 

1 Cong. Rcc, 47 C., 1 S., pp. 765, 3277, 32Q7- 

* N. Y. World, March 27, 1882. 

*A r . Y. World, April 4; Irish World (N. Y.), April i, 15. 1882. 



251] ARTHUR'S ADMINISTRATION y 1 

In 1882 the question of the regulation or prohibition of 
the liquor traffic had become one of importance and prohibi- 
tion sentiment was noticeably increasing, especially in 
the Middle West. This was an important issue in several 
states and received general attention in the party platforms. 
The Republicans usually evaded making any statement of 
their attitude but favored submitting the question to the 
people. The Democrats, for the most part, came out strongly 
against any attempt to handle the question by legislation. 
The assertion, made in many of their state platforms, that 
sumptuary laws were an unconstitutional and improper 
infringement on the rights of the individual had the double 
advantage of being in line with the traditional policy of the 
party and also of gaining them the support of the liquor 
interests. Kansas had ratified a constitutional amendment 
in 1880 prohibiting the manufacture and sale of liquors ex- 
cept for medical, scientific and mechanical purposes, but 
poor provision had been made for its enforcement and the 
consumption of liquor in the state had increased. The Re- 
publicans of the state renominated Governor St. John on a 
platform which called for additional legislation to secure 
rigid enforcement of the act. The Democrats were opposed 
to prohibition and in a campaign which turned largely upon 
this issue St. John was defeated although the remainder of 
the Republican ticket was elected. In Iowa there was a 
question as to the legality of a recently passed prohibitive 
amendment to the constitution. The Democrats declared 
their intention of using every legal means to eliminate the 
measure from the constitution, while the Republicans made 
no statement as to prohibition but were supposed to favor it. 
In Indiana the question was whether the constitutional 
amendment adopted by the previous legislature should be 
submitted to the people at a regular or a special election. 
The Democrats carried the state on the proposition that it 



72 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [ 2 $2 

should be submitted at a regular election. In Illinois the 
refusal of the Republican convention to endorse a plank 
favoring a submission of the question to the people led to 
the formation of a state prohibition party which polled over 
11,000 votes in the election. The Illinois Democrats 
adopted a strong resolution against dealing with the ques- 
tion by law which was praised by the Illinois liquor dealers 
association as a " manly outspoken resolution." 1 In Ohio 
the question was one of licensing the liquor traffic and of 
enforcing the Sunday closing law, a law providing for 
license which had passed the previous legislature having 
been declared unconstitutional. The Republicans stood for 
license and the Democrats against. The German vote, a 
strong factor in Ohio, had been largely Republican and it 
was believed that the Republican attitude toward the liquor 
question played a large part in turning that vote to the 
Democrats and enabling them to carry the state in a close 
election. 2 

The New York election of 1882 is important not only 
because it resulted in an overwhelming Democratic victory 
but also because it had important bearing on both the Re- 
publican and Democratic nominations for the Presidency in 
1884. Factionalism had been rife in both parties since 
1880. In the elections of 1881 the Republicans elected all 
but one of their state candidates but lost the assembly as a 
result of Half-Breed and Stalwart quarrels in the various 
districts. 3 A new Democratic organization, known as the 
County Democracy, had been formed in New York city in 
an attempt to unite the Democrats into one body which 
would be free from the control of either Tammany or Irv- 

1 Ann. Cyc, 1882, articles on the several states. 
'Sherman, Autobiog., vol. ii, p. 485; Nation, Oct. 19, 1882. 
-Nation, Nov. 17, 1881 ; Ann. Cyc, 1881, p. 656; Alexander, op. cit.,. 
vol. iii, p. 486. 



253] ARTHUR'S ADMINISTRATION 73 

ing Hall. The County Democracy was recognized as the 
official organization by the Democratic convention of 1881, 
but as both the other organizations remained in the field the 
net result was three warring factions instead of two. Most 
of the legislative session was spent in wrangles between the 
factions over the patronage, but as the state convention of 
1882 approached talk of harmony was heard on all sides, 
which finally resulted in dividing the delegates from the 
city between the three factions. Each faction had its can- 
didate for the gubernatorial nomination but none of them 
was strong enough to control the convention. G rover 
Cleveland, who had served as sheriff of Erie county and 
was then mayor of Buffalo, had been mentioned but had 
little support at the beginning outside of an enthusiastic 
delegation from Erie county. It has been charged that his 
nomination was an accident brought about through a mis- 
understanding and mutual distrust between the leaders. 1 At 
any rate it was received with general approval by Democrats 
and Independents throughout the state. The Democratic 
platform contained a strong labor plank, the usual demand 
for civil service reform and a long indictment of Republican 
misrule in both state and nation. Cleveland's letter of ac- 
ceptance cleared up several of the ambiguities of the plat- 
form, notably that on civil service reform, and enhanced 
his popularity. 2 

Republican efforts for harmony were not sq successful. 
Cornell, whose nomination for governor had been forced by 
Conkling in 1879, had displeased the Stalwarts by not sup- 
porting Piatt and Conkling strongly enough in their efforts 
to vindicate themselves. The breach had been widened by 
Cornell's veto of a bill regulating the taxation of the ele- 

1 Breen, Thirty Years, p. 680. 

s Ann. Cyc, 1882, p. 607; Breen, op. cit., p. 662; Alexander, op. cit., 
vol. iii, p. 486; Hudson, Recoil., p. 134; N. Y. papers Sept. and Oct., 1882. 



74 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [254 

vated railroads of New York city, for which Conkling was 
attorney. 1 The Half-Breeds supported Cornell for renomi- 
nation in 1882; the Stalwarts endorsed Folger who had 
left the New York state bench to become Arthur's Secre- 
tary of the Treasury and was understood to be Arthur's 
candidate. There was much dissatisfaction in the party 
with the composition of the convention, which was declared 
not to be representative of the Republicans of the state be- 
cause of the " rotten borough " system of apportioning 
delegates. The ill-feeling was aggravated when the nomina- 
te n of Folger was rushed through with the aid of a forged 
proxy in the state committee. 2 So much indignation de- 
veloped at the methods of the convention that A. B. Hep- 
burn, who had been nominated for Congressman-at-large, 
refused to accept the nomination and Folger's letter of ac- 
ceptance sounded almost like an apology. 3 With only luke- 
warm support of Folger on the part even of Republican 
papers, Cleveland received a majority of more than 190,000, 
the largest majority ever given a candidate for governor in 
any state. 4 

The elections resulted in an overwhelming Democratic 
victory throughout the country. Maine, New Hampshire 
and Nebraska elected Republican governors, but in the other 
thirteen states where gubernatorial elections were held, in- 
cluding New York, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Connec- 
ticut, Michigan. Kansas, Colorado, California and Nevada, 
the Democrats were successful. In Illinois, Indiana and 
Ohio, where no governor was elected, the Democrats elected 
other state officers and gained members of Congress. 5 The 

1 Ann. Cyc, 1882, p. 600; Alexander, op. cit., vol. iii, pp. 479, 493. 

1 Nation, Sept. 28, Oct. 15, 1882. 

3 Alexander, op. cit., vol. iii, p. 492; Ann. Cyc, 1882, p. 600. 

1 Harper's Weekly, Nov. 18, 1882. 

5 Ann. Cyc., 1882, passim. 



255] ARTHUR'S ADMINISTRATION 75 

Republicans might explain the result in New York by the 
fact that it was normally a Democratic state and that the 
huge vote was a rebuke to Arthur for interference in state 
politics. 1 Pattison's 40,000 majority in Pennsylvania could 
be laid at the door of the independent movement. The 
election of a Democratic governor with the balance of the 
state ticket Republican in Massachusetts could be explained 
by Butler's personal popularity. A similar result in Kansas 
and Michigan might be due to fusion between Democrats 
and Greenbackers in Michigan and to the opposition of the 
liquor interests to St. John in Kansas. But all the expla- 
nations could not alter the fact that the Democrats had 
gained seventy-one seats in the House of Representatives. 
A large number of prominent Republican Congressmen 
were defeated. Out of fifty-seven of the Republican chair- 
men of committees appointed by Speaker Keifer in the 
forty-seventh Congress, only twenty-three were returned. 2 
Causes of political failure or success are always hard to 
isolate. Many minor issues both national and local compli- 
cated the situation in 1882 and contributed to the result. 
Hard times, disgust with Republican boss domination, Re- 
publican extravagance, their failure to reduce taxation, their 
indifference to civil service reform, the temperance ques- 
tion, the Irish trouble, all doubtless played some part. 3 
Above all these, however, was the fact that there were no 
great issues between the parties. The Republicans had no 
program on the questions before the country that would 
hold their supporters together. Platforms of the two par- 
ties were practically identical in many states. Under these 
circumstances many voters took the opportunity to rebuke 

1 A r . Y. Tribune, Nov. 18, 1882. 

1 Nation, Nov. 16, 1882. 

5 Cf. Cooper, op. cit., p. 209. 



y(y THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [256 

the Republicans on the theory that the Democrats could do 
little worse. 1 

Arthur's message to the second session of the forty- 
seventh Congress, which assembled in December, 1882, 
dealt mainly with the necessity for reform in the revenue 
and the civil service. With the results of the November 
elections fresh in their memory, the Republicans took up 
these questions, determined to forestall action by the Demo- 
crats and to make whatever political capital they could for 
themselves. Debate on these subjects and on the appropria- 
tion bills took up the greater part of the session. 2 The ap- 
propriation bills for the session dropped from the record 
total of $251,000,000 for 1883 to $187,000,000 for 1884. 
No appropriation was made for rivers and harbors. 3 Arthur 
called attention in his message to the need for legislation to 
repeal the silver coinage act, to provide for counting the 
electoral vote, to provide for the presidential succession and 
to provide a new bankruptcy law. The questions of en- 
couragement for the merchant marine, of the control of 
interstate commerce and of national aid to education were 
also recommended for the consideration of Congress. 4 Al- 
though bills were introduced dealing with all these subjects, 
nothing definite was accomplished. 

1883 was an off year politically in most states, but where 
elections were held they were on the whole encouraging to 
the Republicans. An exception was Ohio, where the Demo- 
crats, after a close and hard-fought campaign, were suc- 
cessful in electing a governor and other state officers and in 
gaining control of both houses of the legislature. There 
were in Ohio no clear-cut issues between the parties. The 

1 Nation, Nov. 9, iC, 1882. 

2 Vide infra, pp. 93, 116. 

* U. S. Stat. Abst., 1885, p. 4- 
4 Richardson, vol. viii, p. 126. 



257] ARTHUR'S ADMINISTRATION yy 

liquor question dominated the campaign. Two constitu- 
tional amendments were submitted to the voters; the first, 
which was endorsed by both parties, would give the legis- 
lature power to regulate and license the liquor traffic, the 
second provided for total prohibition. Both failed, as 
neither received a majority of all the votes cast in the elec- 
tion. The Democratic success was attributed to the strength 
of the liquor interests, which had more confidence in the 
friendliness of the Democrats. The desire of many Re- 
publicans to rebuke their party for failure to take a more 
definite stand on the question also affected the vote. 1 New 
Jersey elected a Democratic governor by a normal major- 
ity. In New York the Democrats elected their state ticket 
of minor offices with the exception of secretary of state, but 
their majorities of the previous year were greatly reduced, 
and partly due to factional fights among the Democrats, the 
Republicans gained control of both houses of the legisla- 
ture. 2 In Massachusetts, Butler was defeated for re-elec- 
tion by Robinson, the Republican candidate. In Pennsyl- 
vania the Republican factions united and elected their can- 
didates for state treasurer and auditor. The Republicans 
made large gains in Connecticut, and carried Iowa, Ne- 
braska and Minnesota by their customary majorities. In 
the campaign for the control of the Virginia legislature, the 
Democrats made strenuous efforts and defeated Mahone's 
readjusters. 3 

One reason for the Republican gains was that the ma- 
chine remained in the background, particularly in New York 
and Pennsylvania. There were no scandals about political 
assessments and no attempts at federal interference. The 

i Nation, Oct. 18, 1883; Ann. Cyc, 1883, p. 816. 

2 Breen, op. cit., p. 688. 

3 Nation, N. Y. Tunes, N. Y. Tribune, Oct. and Nov., 1883; Ann. Cyc, 
1883. passim. 



yS THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [258 

independent vote, in the main, seemed to have returned to 
the Republicans. The principal reason was, however, that 
the Democrats had no issues. They seemed determined not 
to take a definite stand on anything except that " the Re- 
publicans must go," and to trust that dissatisfaction with 
the Republicans would be sufficient to carry them into power 
and keep them there. 

In the forty-eighth Congress, which met for the first time 
in December, 1883, the Democrats had a majority of sev- 
enty-five over all opponents in the House but the Repub- 
licans still controlled the Senate. The minds of the mem- 
bers of both parties were turned toward the approaching 
Presidential election and all action was subordinated to it. 
One method of preparing for it would have been the enact- 
ment of a definite program of legislation by each house 
which, even if it failed to become law, would have made 
the issues clear. Another method, and the one adopted, was 
to avoid all partisan questions and the taking of any definite 
stand as a party, leaving the campaign to be made on party 
loyalty and attacks on the general wickedness of the op- 
posing party. 

The President in his annual message recommended that 
no further reduction be made in the tariff until the effects of 
the existing law could be determined. He urged that pro- 
vision be made for keeping up the volume of the national 
bank notes, that the trade dollar be retired from circulation, 
that the navy be enlarged, that a territorial government for 
Alaska be organized, that attention be given to the question 
of providing for federal aid to education, that the Presi- 
dential succession be provided for, that the problem of con- 
trol of interstate commerce be taken up and that some pro- 
vision be made for preserving the national forests. 1 

The only strictly partisan legislation attempted was for a 

1 Richardson, vol. viii, p. 170. 



259] ARTHUR'S ADMINISTRATTUX jg 

further reduction of the tariff. The House spent a large 
part of the session debating this question, but as the Demo- 
crats were unable to unite their own party on any pro- 
gram, nothing was accomplished. 1 The actual accomplish- 
ments of the session in legislation were confined to a 
bill providing civil government for Alaska, a bill to en- 
courage American shipping, the creation of a bureau of 
labor in the department of the interior and a bureau of ani- 
mal industry in the department of agriculture, a supplemen- 
tary Chinese exclusion act to provide for the better enforce- 
ment of the act of the previous year, and the repeal of the 
test act. All these bills were non-partisan in character, the 
votes both for and against being quite evenly distributed 
between the parties. 2 

General pension bills to provide pensions for all veterans 
of the Mexican and various Indian wars received support 
from both sides but were not passed. The House passed, 
almost unanimously, a resolution that all public lands 
" heretofore granted and subject to forfeiture because of 
non-fulfilment of conditions " be forfeited, and in accord- 
ance with this several bills were passed providing for for- 
feiture of particular grants, but the Senate took no action 
on them. 3 A bill prohibiting the importation of contract 
labor also passed the House but was not acted upon by the 
Senate.* The Senate passed a bill for federal aid to com- 
mon schools and also a bill permitting national banks to issue 
notes to the full amount of the bonds held by them, both of 
which failed through lack of action in the House. 5 Another 
bill passed by the Senate providing increases in the navy. 

1 Vide infra, p. 119. 

2 McPherson, 1884, passim; Ann. Cyc, 1884, p. 185. 
s McPherson, 1884, p. 155. 

4 Ibid., p. 193. 

5 Ibid., pp. 142, 147. 



8q THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [ 2 6o 

had support from both sides although the opposition was 
almost entirely Democratic. The House failed to agree, 
however, and finally a naval appropriation bill was passed 
appropriating fifty per cent of the amount of the previous 
year. 1 The Senate's electoral count bill also failed when 
the House refused to agree. 2 The Democrats were attacked 
by the eastern papers for their unsound financial views when 
they struck out of the bill for the redemption of the trade 
dollar the provision that the amount of silver in the re- 
deemed dollars should be deducted from the $2,000,000 per 
month provided for in the Bland- Allison act. 3 On none of 
the measures here mentioned, however, was there a strict 
party alignment, nor was there any serious effort on the 
part of party leaders to make them party issues. The most 
that can be said is that the parties showed tendencies in 
certain directions, and that certain questions, while having 
support from both parties, could expect more from one than 
from the other. 

The general feeling of the country on the adjournment 
of Congress was that it had done nothing very bad. It kept 
the appropriations within respectable limits, permitted no 
big jobs and prevented some bad legislation. 4 Although its 
accomplishments were small, the absence of scandals made 
it compare favorably with many of its predecessors. The 
action of both parties made it evident that they were deter- 
mined to go into the Presidential campaign with no big- 
issues clearly drawn. It meant that the character of the 
candidates would be the factor of greatest importance in 
determining the votes of the great majority of those who 
did not vote blindly for a party emblem. 

1 McPherson, 1884, p. 165. 

2 Ibid., p. 132. 

* Nation, March 10, 1884. 

4 N. Y. Tribune, N. Y. Times, July 8; Nation, July 10. 



CHAPTER V 
The Issues in 1884 — Civil Service Reform 

There was in 1884 no issue on which the parties were 
clearly divided., either by their records or their formal 
statements, no issue on which one party outlined a definite 
program which the other challenged with an opposite one. 
The voter who wished by his vote to register his approval 
or disapproval of a certain policy had no obvious choice, but 
must weigh many considerations where probabilities rather 
than certainties were involved. Two questions that had 
claimed a great deal of the attention of Congress and in 
which there was considerable public interest were civil ser- 
vice reform and the tariff. On neither of these was the 
issue between the parties clearly drawn. Both parties claimed 
to be the friends of civil service reform. The Republicans, 
while admitting the necessity for a reduction of the tariff, 
declared that the principle of protection was safe only in 
their hands as the Democrats were aiming at free trade, a 
statement which the Democrats emphatically denied. A 
review of the previous action of the parties on these two 
questions and of their attitude toward them will be useful 
in determining to what extent they influenced the election. 

The abuses of the spoils system which had been notorious 
before the war had been augmented by the great extension 
of governmental activities and the multiplication of civil 
servants. During the long period when the Republicans 
were in control with no effective opposition, conditions had 
growing steadily worse. The report of the Senate committee 
261] 81 



82 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [262 

on the reform bill of 1883 declared that the main evil of the 
existing system was, that with the growth and expansion of 
the country the appointing power was unable to give the 
necessary personal attention to appointments, and what at- 
tention was given was a distraction from more important 
duties. Also that political influences had come to dominate 
and subordinate all other considerations in making appoint- 
ments, and that offices had come to be sought as so many 
charities furnishing support to the needy and exacting a re- 
turn of partisan service. 1 Besides the inefficiency in the ser- 
vice that resulted from the existing method of making ap- 
pointments, the indirect effects were even more serious. By 
use of patronage the professional palitician was able to 
build up his local organization and keep himself in power, 
excluding anyone who was really interested in or capable of 
solving the problems before the country. 

Another phase of the spoils system that had attracted 
even more attention than inefficiency in the service or favor- 
itism in making appointments was the assessment of office- 
holders for campaign purposes. The system of raising 
campaign funds by contributions from office-holders, which, 
though nominally voluntary, were really made under fear 
of dismissal, had originated in the early days of the spoils 
system and had been practiced by both parties in state and 
local as well as in national politics. 2 It was left, however, 
to the Republican Congressional Committee to systematize 
thoroughly the procedure so far as concerned federal office- 
holders. To meet this evil an act was passed by Con- 
gress in 1876 which provided that " all executive officers 
or employees of the United States not appointed by the 
President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, are 

1 Sen. Rep., 47 C, 1 S., no. 576. 

5 Lalor, Cyclopedia of Political Science, vol. i, p. 153. 



263] CIVIL SERVICE REFORM 83 

prohibited from requesting, giving, or receiving from any 
other officer or employee of the government any money or 
property or other thing of value for political purposes." * 
On June 22, 1877, President Hayes issued an executive 
order forbidding officers of the government to take any 
active part in politics and adding " No assessment for 
political purposes should be allowed." 2 This order added 
to the disgust which most of the politicians of his party felt 
for Hayes. They declared it to be an infringement of the 
personal liberty and rights of citizenship of office-holders 
and it was not strictly enforced. 

The Senate in 1879 authorized a special committee to 
investigate the question of political assessments. This com- 
mittee reported that in the campaign for the Congressional 
election of 1878 the Republican Congressional Committee 
sent the following letter to every official and employee of 
the United States with a salary of $1000 or more : 3 

This committee call with confidence upon you, as a Republican, 
for such contributions in money as you may be willing to make, 
hoping that it will not be less than $ — . 

The Committee deem it proper in thus appealing to Republi- 
cans generally, to inform those who happen to be in Federal 
employ that there will be no objection in any official quarter 
to such voluntary contribution. . . . Please make prompt and 
favorable response to this letter and remit at once. 

Gorham, the secretary of the committee, testified that the 
part of the letter promising no objection from any official 
quarter had been submitted to President Hayes and ap- 
proved by him. 4 A second letter was sent as a reminder to 

1 Ann. Cyc, 1882, p. 694. 

a Richardson, vol. vii, p. 450. 

3 Sen. Rep., 46 C, 1 & 2 S., no. 427, p. 2. 

i Ibid., p. 20. 



84 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [264 

those who had not responded informing them that arrange- 
ments had been made to have a representative of the com- 
mittee at the German American National Bank after office 
hours for the convenience of those who wished to contrib- 
ute. Still a third letter was sent to those who had not paid 
up. 1 A representative of the committee was sent into the 
offices of the various departments with a letter from Jay A. 
Hubbell, the chairman of the committee, authorizing him 
to receive subscriptions and asking that " every facility be 
afforded him in the prosecution of his labors." 2 According 
to Gorham's testimony a total of $106,000 was raised by 
the committee for the campaign, of which all but $13,000 
came from office-holders. 

In 1880 similar letters were sent out by the same com- 
mittee of which Hubbell was still chairman. It is estimated 
that at least $100,000 was raised in this way. 3 Garfield's 
attitude toward this method of raising campaign funds is 
shown in a letter to Hubbell under date of Aug. 23, 1880, 
which came out in connection with Garfield's dispute with 
Conkling. In this letter he said, " Please tell Brady I hope 
he will give us all the assistance possible. I think he can help 
effectively," and asked to be told " how the departments 
are generally doing." 4 The Brady referred to was Thomas 
W. Brady, Second Assistant Postmaster-General, who had 
charge of the collections among employees of the Post 
Office department and who was later implicated in the Star 
Route frauds. 

In addition to the contributions requested by the Con- 

1 Sen. Rep., 46 C, i & 2 S.. no. 427, p. 3. 

7 Ibid., p. 33- 

s Lalor, op. cit., vol. i, p. 153. 

* Rep. Caw p. Textbook, 1882, p. 103. Other letters showing that 
Garfield was not averse to political assessments were published in the 
N. Y. Herald, Dec. n, 1882. 



265] CIVIL SERVICE REFORM 85 

gressional Committee, the federal office-holders in most of 
the states were " given an opportunity " to contribute a 
second time by their respective state committees. The New 
York state committee sent three letters, each more insistent 
than the preceding, and finally sent to each department head 
a list of those who had. not contributed, saying, " You will 
find opposite each name the amount yet due. The total un- 
paid at this date and due from the employees of your office, 

therefore, appears to be $ . Your immediate attention 

to this matter is very important." * 

In 1882 the Republican Congressional Committee sent 
out a letter similar to that of the two previous campaigns. 
State committees also again sent letters asking for contribu- 
tions from federal employees. Reformers raised a strong 
protest against these attempts to hold up office-holders, 8 and 
in the Senate, Pendleton of Ohio introduced a resolution 
for an investigation by the committee on civil service and 
retrenchment. 11 but in spite of these protests the Congres- 
sional Committee sent a second letter more importunate 
than the first. This letter expressed the surprise of the 
committee at the failure to respond to the first and c n- 
tinued: 

Great political battles can not be won in this way. This com- 
mittee can not hope to succeed in the pending struggle, if those 
most directly benefited by success are unwilling or neglect to 
aid in a substantial manner. We are on the skirmish line of 
1884. . . . Unless you think that our grand old party ought 
not to succeed help it now. ... It is hoped that by return 
mail you will send a voluntary contribution equal to 2% of your 
annual compensation, as a substantial proof of your earnest 
desire for the success of the Republican party this fall. . . .* 

1 Lalor, op. cit., vol. i, p. 154. 

2 Nation, June 15, 22, 29, 1882. 
s Ann. Cyc, 1882, p. 151. 

4 Ann. Cyc, 1882, p. 694. 



86 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [ 2 66 

The New York Civil Service Reform Association sent a 
circular letter to federal employees warning them that they 
were liable, under the act of 1876, to fine and removal if 
they contributed. Hubbell, in reply, sent a letter to G. W. 
Curtis, president of the New York association, challenging 
the association to get an opinion from the Attorney General 
as to the legality of the contributions, or to fight it out in 
the courts. Curtis in his reply declared that the contribu- 
tions were not voluntary and that the Congressional Com- 
mittee had no right to send out letters without authorization 
by the party. The New York association then offered to 
bring a test case into court, but Hubbell refused and accused 
Curtis and the association of being accomplices of the bull- 
dozers of the South. Finally, Secretary of the Treasury 
Folger in a letter to an employee of the Treasury depart- 
ment said that he had received an opinion from the Attor- 
ney General that Congressmen were not officers of the 
United States in the meaning of the statute of 1876, and 
that contributions to the committee were therefore legal. 
A statement was later given out by Arthur that no one 
should be removed or injured in any way for refusing to 
contribute. 1 

General Newton M. Curtis, an official of the United 
States Treasury department, was chairman of the New 
York state Republican committee in 1881 and had received 
contributions from federal office-holders in New York state. 
The New York Civil Service Reform Association had him 
indicted in the U. S. Circuit Court, which found him guilty 
under the statute of 1876 and fined him $1000. Curtis 
appealed to the Supreme Court on the ground that the law 
was unconstitutional, but the Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the law and sustained the decision. 2 

1 Richardson, vol. viii, p. 147; Rep. Camp. Textbook, 1882, p. 94; 
Nation, June and July, 1882. 

2 Ann. Cyc., 1882, p. 694; Wheeler, Sixty Years, p. 267. 



267] civil service reform 87 

The Republicans were quite willing to admit that con- 
tributions had been asked for, but declared that they 
were entirely voluntary and that no one had been removed 
for failing to contribute. The Democrats found it difficult 
to prove that there had been dismissals for this reason 
alone. The Republican Campaign Text-book for 1882, 
published by the Congressional Committee, attacked the law 
of 1876 as a trick of the Confederate brigadiers " to defeat 
if possible the Republican majority in the approaching 
Presidential campaign by depriving them of the sinews of 
war . . ." and declared that any attempt to limit a man's 
right to contribute was an intolerable infringement of his 
personal liberty. It then proceeded to give a history of 
campaign contributions, showing that all the prominent men 
in the party, including Hayes and Garfield, had favored con- 
tributions, but that all Republicans, particularly the mem- 
bers of the Congressional Committee, were aghast at the 
idea that there was anything compulsory about them. After 
devoting several pages to proving that contributions were 
quite proper, it went on to show that they had " their rise 
in the corrupt party practice of the Democratic party." x 

Another thing that helped to arouse the country to the 
need for reform was the disclosure of frauds in the Post 
Office department. On certain routes mail was carried by 
private contract. These routes were known as the " Star 
Routes." James as Postmaster General began an investi- 
gation as to the method of letting these contracts and dis- 
closed what appeared to be a conspiracy between Brady, the 
Second Assistant Postmaster-General, ex-Senator Dorsey of 
Arkansas and various subordinates in the executive depart- 
ments, to increase the number of star routes and increase the 
compensation for old ones, the profits being divided between 
the members of the ring. Brady resigned and several sub- 

1 Pp. 94-114. 



88 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [ 2 68 

ordinates either resigned or were removed. Indictments 
against Brady, Dorsey and several others were found by 
the grand jury of the District of Columbia. The defend- 
ants took advantage of every technicality to obstruct the 
trial, attempts to bribe the jury were charged, and after 
one disagreement all except one minor defendant were dis- 
charged. 1 

The assessment of office-holders, the inefficiency and cor- 
ruption of many civil servants and the generally low moral 
tone of political life convinced a considerable group that 
the main issue in American politics was reform of the civil 
service. As is likely to be the case with reformers, many of 
them overestimated the efficacy of a statute to regenerate 
the country. The more moderate ones realized that it 
would take something more than the passage of a law to 
correct such a state of affairs as was shown to exist by the 
investigations of the Sanborn contracts, the whiskey ring 
and the other scandals of the Grant administration. They 
believed, however, that a law which would prohibit the levy 
of political assessments, provide competitive examinations 
for entrance to the service and provide for promotion by 
merit, would go a long way toward improving the conduct 
of the nation's business by breaking the hold of the poli- 
ticians. These reformers included a few of the men of 
both parties who were prominent in national affairs and a 
larger number of educated, able and patriotic private 
citizens. They were the nucleus of the Independents in the 
Republican party. 

The general public was but little interested in the ques- 
tion. The voters had grown up knowing of no other way 
of appointing public officers except the spoils system and 
were slow to appreciate its evils. The politicians of both 
parties realized that a real reform of the civil service would 

1 Ann. Cyc, 1882, p. 753, 1883, p. 777; Sparks, Nat. Develop., p. 188. 



269] CIVIL SERVICE REFORM 89 

be a blow at their power. At first, knowing that the public 
had little interest in the reform, they were frankly hostile 
and ridiculed it openly. As the reformers by constant prop- 
aganda began to arouse public interest, most of the politicians 
found it expedient to do a certain amount of lip service to 
the principle while doing all in their power to prevent any 
reform in practice. When at last public sentiment became 
too strong to be ignored and the reform bill was passed, 
the parties vied with each other in claiming credit for it. 

The first step toward reform was the excellent report on 
the civil service from the joint select committee on re- 
trenchment of the fortieth Congress, written by Jenckes of 
Rhode Island, published in 1868. 1 Thanks to the activities 
of the reformers and to the favorable attitude of Grant, a 
commission was created in 1871 which established rules 
providing for competitive examinations for entrance to the 
service. These rules were applied to the departments at 
Washington and to the federal offices in New York city. 
The commission, however, encountered much opposition 
from the politicians and was not always given the support 
which it should have had from Grant. After two years 
Congress failed to make any appropriations for the com- 
mission, and Grant, after putting the responsibility up to 
Congress, 2 allowed the whole system of competitive exami- 
nations to lapse. 3 

In the campaign of 1876 civil service reform was given 
attention in the platforms of both parties and both candi- 
dates were committed to it by their records and their state- 
ments during the campaign. 4 Although the actual accom- 

1 House Rep., 40 C, 2 S., no. 47. 
i Richardson, vol. vii, p. 301. 

3 Fish, The Civil Service and the Patronage, p. 212; Dunning, Reconst. 
Pol. and Econ., p. 243; Report on Pendleton bill, Sen. Rep., 47 C, 
2 S., no. 576, p. v. 

4 Vide supra, pp. 40, 41. 



g THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [270 

plishments of the Hayes administration in this respect were 
small, a valuable demonstration of the practicability of the 
reform was made in the New York custom house and post 
office and in the Interior department. The quarrel over the 
changes in the New York custom house 1 attracted consid- 
erable attention to the movement and various societies were 
formed to study the reform and work for its adoption. 
The New York association, one of the strongest and most 
active, was formed in 1877 and others sprang up in Boston, 
Philadelphia, Milwaukee and San Francisco. In August, 
1881, a national league of civil service reform associations 
was formed at Newport with George W. Curtis as Presi- 
dent. 2 The membership in these associations was rela- 
tively small but it included many men of ability and influ- 
ence. Several newspapers and magazines, notably Harper's 
Weekly and the Nation, endorsed the movement and hun- 
dreds of articles were printed in these magazines and sep- 
arately as pamphlets. 

Garfield's record in Congress on civil service reform and 
his expressed attitude toward it 3 were important factors in 
turning the Independents to him in the convention of 
1 880. His later lukewarmness in his letter of accept- 
ance and his statements during the campaign were dis- 
appointing. 4 As practical a politician as John Sherman 
found it necessary to warn him that he could not afford to 
ignore the question. In his inaugural address Garfield 
declared that he would at the proper time ask Congress to 
fix the tenure of the minor offices and also to prescribe the 
grounds on which removals might be made. 6 It was evi- 

1 Vide supra, p. 46. 

2 Wheeler, op. cit., p. 264; Fish, op. cit., p. 217. 

8 Vide article by Garfield in Atlantic Monthly, July. 1877. 
4 Schurz, Works, vol. iv, p. 1, letter of Schurz to Garfield. 
■' Sherman, Autobiog., vol. ii, p. 779. 
e Richardson, vol. viii, p. 6. 



27 i] CIVIL SERVICE REFORM 91 

dently his intention to shift the burden to Congress and 
let the reformers get what they might there. 1 Befc re his 
first Congress assembled, however, Garfield had fallen, a 
victim, many believed, to the spoils system. 2 

Arthur's remarks on the civil service in his first message 
were an agreeable surprise to friends of reform. He de- 
clared that he was " impressed with the grave importance 
of correcting the evils which inhere in the present methods 
of appointment." He pointed out certain features of the 
English system which he did not think were adaptable to the 
United States but declared that he would feel bound to 
give his approval " to a statute incorporating all the essen- 
tial features of the English system." He recommended 
that at least an appropriation of $25,000 be made to enable 
him to carry out the law of 1871 which was still on the 
statute books. 3 

In spite of Arthur's recommendations nothing was ac- 
complished during the first session of the forty-seventh 
Congress. Pendleton of Ohio introduced a reform bill in 
the Senate drafted by Dorman B. Eaton and other mem- 
bers of the New York Civil Service Reform Association. 4 
Hearings were held by the committee and the bill was re- 
ported favorably, but no action was taken. 5 The House in 
committee of the whole voted down the proposition to 
appropriate $25,000 for the enforcement of the act of 
1871, but later had a partial change of heart and voted to 
appropriate $15,000.° Considerable attention was devoted 
to the reform in the state platforms of 1882 7 and the re- 

1 Vide letter of Garfield to Blaine, Hamilton, Blaine, p. 493. 

3 Vide speech of Pendleton in Senate Cong. Rec, 47 C, 1 S., p. 79. 
s Richardson, vol. viii, p. 60. 

4 Wheeler, op. cit., p. 276. 

'Cong. Rec, 47 C, 1 S., pp. 20, 23, 57, 4/1- 

6 Nation, July 13, 20, 1882. 

7 Vide supra, p. 68. 



g 2 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [ 2 ~2 

formers declared that the Republicans were defeated be- 
cause of their lack of action on the question. 

In his message to Congress in December, 1882, Arthur 
showed that he, in part at least, shared this view. " The 
people of the country," he said, " apparently without dis- 
tinction of party, have in various ways and upon frequent 
occasions given expression to their earnest wish for prompt 
and definite action. In my judgment such action should 
no longer be postponed." Assuring Congress of his hearty 
cooperation in any measures for the correction of the evils 
in the existing method of appointment, he specifically rec- 
ommended the Pendleton bill then before the Senate. As 
to details, he said that the term for all officials should be 
definite and the tenure stable and that " neither should be 
regulated by zeal in the service of party or fidelity to the 
fortunes of an individual." He also felt called upon to 
defend himself from the charge of making an unusual num- 
ber of removals for partisan reasons and gave a summary 
of appointments and removals made by Hayes, Garfield and 
himself. As to political assessments, he said, referring to 
his announcement of the previous summer that giving or 
refusing to give to campaign funds would not affect the 
status of any office-holder : 

I acted upon the view . . . that a public officer should be as 
absolutely free as any other citizen to give or withhold a 
contribution for the aid of the political party of his choice. 
It has, however, been urged, and doubtless not without foun- 
dation in fact, that by solicitation of official superiors and by 
other modes such contributions have at times been obtained 
from persons whose only motive for giving them has been the 
fear of what might befall them if they refused. It goes with- 
out saying that such contributions are not voluntary, and in my 
judgment their collection should be prohibited by law. A bill 
which will suppress them will receive my cordial approval. 1 

1 Richardson, vol. viii, p. 145. 



2 7 3] CIVIL SERVICE REFORM 93 

Senator Beck introduced a resolution to refer the ques- 
ion of political assessments to the judiciary committee with 
instructions to investigate and bring in a bill. Hale of 
Maine offered an amendment to the resolution that would 
widen the scope of the investigation to take in the campaign 
funds of both parties and especially the amounts contributed 
by liquor dealers and brewers. After considerable partisan 
debate the resolution with the amendment was referred to 
the judiciary committee, which, however, took no action, as 
the Pendleton bill contained a section prohibiting political 
assessments. 1 

The first week of the session Pendleton called up his bill 
which had been reported the previous session and it was 
discussed nearly every day until its passage on December 
27. The committee in its report on the bill summed up the 
evils in the existing system and declared that, " The spec- 
tacle exhibited of the Chief Magistrate of this great 
nation, feeding, like a keeper, his flock, the hungry, clamor- 
ous, crowding, jostling multitude which daily gathers 
around the dispenser of patronage, is humiliating to the 
patriotic citizen interested alone in national progress and 
grandeur." 2 

The Pendleton bill as originally reported to the Senate 
provided for a commission of five to be appointed by the 
President, two of whom were to be persons holding other 
positions in the government service, and no more than 
three of whom were to be members of the same political 
party. The duties of the commission were to aid the Presi- 
dent by formulating rules which were, as far as possible, 
to provide for open competitive examinations for entrance 
to the public services classified in the bill, for appointment 
from those passing with the highest grade, for apportion- 

1 Cong. Rec, 47 C, 2 S., pp. 23, 72. 

2 Sen. Rep., 47 C, 1 S., no. 576. 



94 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [274 

ment of appointments as nearly as practicable among the 
states according to population, for entrance to the service 
at the lowest grade only and for promotion from lower to 
higher grades on merit. No one was to be under any obli- 
gation to contribute to campaign funds and no coercion was 
to be used. The act was to apply only to classified lists of 
clerks in the executive departments at Washington and in 
custom houses and post offices where their number was 
more than fifty, but the President was given power to add 
other classes of employees. The provision that entrance 
was to be at the lowest grade only, the higher being filled 
by promotion, immediately drew the attack of the Demo- 
crats, who declared that it was a scheme to keep the Demo- 
crats out of the higher offices, and it was dropped. The 
number of commissioners was changed from five to three, 
none of whom was to hold other government position. In 
considering the section on political assessments, an amend- 
ment providing that no employee of the government might 
either solicit or give mone) r for any political purpose was 
voted down by a strictly partisan vote — eighteen Democrats 
against twenty-four Republicans — but an amendment was 
unanimously adopted which provided that no government 
employee of any kind should either solicit or receive polit- 
ical contributions, that no person should solicit or receive 
such contributions in a room in use by the government and 
that no one was to be favored or injured for giving or fail- 
ing to give. Various other amendments were introduced 
by the Democrats with the purpose of displacing Repub- 
licans already in the service but they failed of adoption. 
Among them was one to declare vacant all positions in the 
services affected by the law and to compel those holding 
these positions to compete with new applicants for appoint- 
ment. Another provided that if two or more persons were 
equally qualified for a position, until there was approxi- 



27 -] CIVIL SERVICE REFORM 95 

mately an equal share of offices between the parties, all ap- 
pointments should be made from the party having fewer 
offices. 1 

The bill had supporters on both sides of the Senate. 
Pendleton introduced it with a vigorous attack on the 
spoils system, charging that the existing civil service was 
inefficient, extravagant and corrupt. He admitted that the 
bill was not perfect and applied to but few offices, but justi- 
fied it as an experiment. 2 Other Democrats who spoke for 
the bill were Jones of Florida, Morgan of Alabama, George 
of Mississippi and Bayard of Delaware." Prominent 
among the Republicans who spoke for the bill were Haw- 
ley of Connecticut, the chairman of the committee, Hoar 
of Massachusetts, Miller of New York and Sherman of 
Ohio. 4 The open opposition was mainly from the Demo- 
cratic side. Maxey of Texas, Call of Florida, Brown of 
Georgia, Vest and Cockrell of Missouri, Williams of Ken- 
tucky and Voorhees of Indiana attacked it as undemocratic, 
unnecessary, unjust to Democrats, and a fraud. 5 Many 
Republicans, especially some of the Stalwarts, were no 
more pleased with the bill than were the Democrats, but 
for the most part they maintained a discreet silence. The 
two Senators from Kansas, Plumb and Ingalls, were the 
only two Republicans to speak against the bill, and Plumb 
voted for it on its final passage. Mahone, the Virginia Re- 
adjuster, who usually voted with the Stalwarts, spoke 
against the bill, 6 but Logan, one of the Stalwart leaders, 
spoke for it. 7 

1 Cong. Rec, 47 C, 2 S.. pp. 200-867, passim ; McPherson, 1884, p. n. 

2 Cong. Rec, 47 C, 2 S., p. 204. 

3 Ibid., pp. 281, 324, 360, 468. 

4 Ibid., pp. 241, 273, 282, 362. 

i Ibid., pp. 277, 355, 359, 461, 497, 505, 597. 
6 Ibid., p. 560. 
''Ibid., pp. 246, 326. 



9 6 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [276 

.Most of the speeches, especially those against the bill, were 
frankly partisan. The Democrats assumed in their remarks 
that they were going to win in 1884 and were openly op- 
posed to any plan which would not replace with Democrats 
the Republicans who had enjoyed the spoils for more than 
twenty years. They took occasion to rake up all the old 
scandals of Republican administration and characterized 
Republican zeal for reform as death-bed repentance. The 
Republicans, they said, were not so anxious for reform as 
they were to save what they could from the wreck. Some 
of the Republicans, notably Hoar and Miller, admitted the 
justice of the Democratic attacks, but maintained that the 
spoils system was really a source of weakness to a party 
and appealed to the Democrats to be patriotic enough to 
forego their chances for spoils. 1 

Pendleton, in his opening speech, declared that the elec- 
tion of 1882 had been a Republican defeat rather than a 
Democratic victory, and that the passage of the bill would 
be the best thing that could happen to the Democratic party. 
Brown of Georgia declared that the mandate of the elec- 
tion had been to turn the Republicans out and not to pass 
a reform bill. 2 George of Mississippi answered Brown, 
saying that his (Brown's) policy would put the Democrats 
in the same position on the question in which the Repub- 
licans were and that unless the Democrats showed their 
sincere desire for reform, there would be no spoils for them 
tn distribute in 1884." Williams of Kentucky said that he 
was in favor of a clean sweep of Republican office-holders. 

I am for a house cleaning from garret to cellar. 1 am for 
ferreting out all these old rats who have been in the Treasury 

ong. Rec, 47 C. 2 S.. pp. 273, 282. 
- Ibid., pp. 277, 597. 
3 Ibid., p. 281. 



2 7 j] CIVIL SERVICE REFORM 97 

so long that they know where the ripest cheeses are, and the 
best kind of cheeses too. I am for pouring water into their 
holes and bringing the last one of them from the bottom of his 
berth. The only way to reform is to put a good honest Demo- 
cratic President in, in 1884; then turn on the hose and give 
him a good hickory broom and tell him to sweep the dirt away. 1 

The most scathing attack on the bill was made by Voor- 
hecs of Indiana. He praised the spoils system as being the 
only really democratic one. and declared that the bill was 
dishonest in design and would be useless in practice. He 
ridiculed the whole idea of competitive examinations and 
proposed the following amendment, which he assured the 
Senate was not an attempt to burlesque the bill, as the bill 
was " in itself so complete a burlesque that nothing could 
add to it in that respect." 2 

That all applicants for appointment as commissioners under 
this act, shall as a prerequisite to their appointment, undergo 
a public examination before a committee composed of five 
practical school teachers, not more than three of whom shall 
be males, who shall be selected for that purpose by the Com- 
missioner of Education, and the object of such examination 
shall be to ascertain, first, the competency of said applicants 
to make a sensible and suitable examination of other appli- 
cants for office touching their qualifications in reading, writ- 
ing, arithmetic, and English grammar; second, the business 
habits and associations of such applicants for appointment 
as commissioners, and whether they consider a knowledge of 
the interior of Africa, the headwaters of the Amazon, the 
isothermal line, the Monroe doctrine, and the momentum of 
a body of known weight moving with a given velocity, neces- 
sary to the proper discharge of clerical work in the civil ser- 
vice of the Government; and provided further, that such 

1 Cong. Rec, 47 C. 2 S., p. 505. 
1 Ibid., p. 611. 



9 8 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [278 

Senators and Members of Congress as desire to avoid the 
trouble and responsibility of recommending their constituents 
for appointment in the civil service of the Government shall 
be permitted to be present and propound questions at the 
examinations provided for in this amendment. 1 

The bill passed the Senate by a vote of thirty-eight to 
five. The affirmative vote included thirteen Democrats, 
while those voting in the negative were all Democrats. 
Thirteen Republicans and nineteen Democrats failed to 
vote. 2 

In the House the bill was reported by unanimous consent 
and the previous question was carried, in spite of some 
Democratic opposition, without the usual discussion in com- 
mittee of the whole. In the one-hour debate that was al- 
lowed, Reagan of Texas, a Democrat, attacked the bill as 
a sham, asserting that it would accomplish no real reform. 
Herbert of Alabama, a Democrat, said that the bill was of 
little account but was a step in the right direction. He 
charged that the Republicans had shut off debate to avoid 
having their record shown. 3 On its final passage the bill 
received the votes of one hundred and two Republicans, 
forty-nine Democrats and four Nationals. Seven Repub- 
licans, thirty-nine Democrats and one National voted 
against it. The eighty-seven not voting in the House in- 
cluded forty- three Republicans and forty-one Democrats. 4 

Arthur's appointment of Dorman B. Eaton of New York, 
John M. Gregory of Illinois and Leroy D. Thoman of 
Ohio as the first civil service commission was received with 
approval by the friends of the reform. Silas D. Burt, who 

1 Cong. Rec, 47 C, 2 S., p. 497. 

* McPherson, 1884, p. 15. 

3 Cong. Rec, 47 C, 2 S., p. 862. 

*lbid., p. 867; McPherson, 1884, p. 16. 



279] CIVIL SERVICE REFORM 99 

as naval officer of the port of New York had installed re- 
forms, was appointed to the position of chief examiner, 
but refused. It was charged that the appointment had been 
offered him as a means of putting a spoilsman in his place 
in the New York custom house. 1 E. O. Graves of the 
Treasury department also refused the appointment, which 
was finally accepted by Charles Lyman. The commission 
immediately proceeded to draft rules, which were approved 
by the President. In his annual message of December.. 
1883, Arthur reported that eleven customs districts and 
twenty-three postoffices had been put under the operation 
of the statute and said that he was persuaded that the 
effects of the act had " thus far proved beneficial." - The 
first report of the commission was submitted to Congress 
by the President in February, 1884, with the statement that 
Congress and the people were to be congratulated on the 
good results which the law had already accomplished, and a 
recommendation that adequate appropriations be allowed 
to continue the work. The report further stated that about 
14,000 employees had been classified according to the law 
and contained reports from the various places where the 
law was in effect that were almost unanimous in approval. 
It closed with the statement that the commission " in every 
stage of its work has had the constant and unwavering sup- 
port of the President." 3 . . 

The provisions of the law checked but did not entirely 
eradicate the attempts to make office-holders contribute to 
campaign funds. In the campaign of 1884 the Republican 
Congressional Committee evaded the spirit of the law by 
appointing a sub-committee of five who were not office- 
holders to act as a finance committee and receive contribu- 

1 Nation, March 8, 15, 1882. 

'Richardson, vol. viii, p. 187. 

3 House Ex. Doc, 48 C, 1 S., no. 105. 



IO o THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [ 2 8o 

tions from government employees. 1 Several state commit- 
tees asked for contributions as usual. The Indiana Repub- 
lican committee announced that a list of those who con- 
tributed and of those who did not would be sent to the 
national committee." 

The passage of the civil service reform law is an excel- 
lent example of a reform forced on politicians against their 
will by the pressure of public opinion aroused by a few 
earnest advocates. The politicians of neither party really 
wanted the reform, but few of them dared attack it openly. 
In the Republican national convention of 1880 the com- 
mittee on resolutions cut out the plank on civil service re- 
form and it was put back by the convention only after a 
warm debate. In the course of the debate what many Re- 
publicans probably really thought of the reform was naively 
expressed by delegate Flanagan of Texas. ' Texas," he 
said, " has had quite enough of civil service reform . . . 
We are not here for the purpose of providing offices for 
the Democrats. There is one plank in the Democratic party 
that I have ever admired and that is ' To the victor be- 
longs the spoils.' What are we up here for?" '■ The Re- 
publican Congressional Committee, in the Republican cam- 
paign textbook for 1882, characterized George W. Curtis 
and the New York Civil Service Reform Association as 
" bogus reformers " and as a " combination of unprin- 
cipled yclept reformers." 4 

What many Democrats really thought of the reform 
was expressed by some of their number in their speeches 
against the Pendleton bill. It also might be guessed from 

1 .V. Y. Times, Aug 1, Nation, Aug. 7, 1884. 
S .V. Y. Times, Oct. 26; Nation, Oct. 30, 1884. 
* Proc. of the Coin'., p. 168. 
4 P. 114. 



2 8l] CIVIL SERVICE REFORM IO i 

the fact that they, while attacking the Republicans for 
abuses, had made no attempt to force the issue in all their 
period of control of the House. In the next session of 
Congress, after the passage of the reform act, the House 
committee on civil service brought in a report unanimously 
favoring the abolition of the four-year limit for the tenure 
of federal officials. This was a logical extension of the 
idea of reform, but it was rejected by a vote of 146 to 99, 
121 of the 146 being Democrats. 1 A bill for the repeal of 
the civil service act was introduced in the same Congress 
by a Kentucky Democrat but no action was taken on it. 2 
The attitude of Democrats toward the reform was further 
shown by the action of the Ohio legislature in refusing a 
re-election to Pendleton and electing in his place Oliver 
Payne, who, as one Ohio paper expressed it, had not had 
his head turned with the " buzzing of the Presidential bee. 
thereby un-Americanizing him into the originating, cham- 
pioning, and passage of a bastard British Civil Service class 
law". 3 

The classic speech of the period, however, was made by 
Benjamin Butler in the Democratic convention of 1884. 
Butler said : 

You start off in your platform at one point and say that you 
are for an honest Civil Service reform. Now I will venture 
to say that there is not a man in this Convention that is in 
favor of Civil Service reform unless he is a schoolmaster. 
One of the first statesmen of Ohio, one who had a right to 
be brought here, brought by his Delegation and put before 
you for your suffrages as President, an able and learned man, 
got carried away by the doctrinaires and started once more a 
Civil Service reform. And it carried him so far out of sight 

1 McPherson, 1884, p. 187. 

1 Nation, Jan. 17, 1884. 

S AT. Y. Tribune, Jan. 8; N. Y. Times, Jan. 10; Nation, Jan. 17, 1884. 



,02 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [282 

with the Ohio Democracy that he never has been heard of 
since. What is this Civil Service reform? It is to give the 
man the preference who shall appear to have the most learn- 
ing. He signs a paper containing questions, and if he can 
answer the questions, he is said to be " selected." Now, what 
I want is that men from the people, honest and earnest men, 
men of purity and integrity, shall have the offices ; and you 
cannot learn that by any schoolmaster examination. 

Oh, what is this above my head? The portrait of George 
Washington ! And he could not have passed examinations 
for a clerkship. Let me repeat. George Washington could 
not have passed a Civil Service examination in the capital 
named for him for a $1200 clerkship. His early education 
had been neglected, and in his will, written by his own hand, 
he spells " clothes ", c-1-o-a-t-h-e-s. Therefore I have said 
that the offices belong to the' people. And there ought to be 
frequent change of officers, in order to look over the books 
and see who are defaulters. And they want to be all turned 
out, or else when you try to punish them they will all protect 
one another, as they did in the star route trial. 

Again, I want frequent change of officers in order to 
counteract the great tendency of these times to a caste of 
aristocratic life officers. If an office is a good thing, then I 
want all the people to have a shot — have a chance at it. If it 
is a bad thing, it is too hard to put it onto a poor fellow for 
iiis whole life. 1 

The New York Sun in commenting on this speech said: 
" In these days of sentimentality and humbug it is delight- 
ful to find a fellow cool-headed enough and manly enough 
to declare the old-fashioned doctrine." " 

Both parties endorsed the reform in their platforms of 
1884. The Democrats rather casually included a statement 
that they favored " honest civil service reform and the 

1 Proc. of Dew. ( 'onv., 1884, p. 209. 
8 July 24, 1884. 



283] CIVIL SERVICE REFORM i0 ^ 

compensation of all United States officers by fixed salaries " 
in the same paragraph in which they announced that they 
favored the separation of church and state and the diffusion 
of free education. The Republican statement was more 
definite and complete. It asserted that the reform, " aus- 
piciously begun under Republican administration " should 
be extended to " all the grades of the service to which it is 
applicable," that the spirit and purpose of the reform 
should be observed in all appointments and that all laws at 
variance with it should be repealed. 1 

The friends of the reform realized that, in spite of plat- 
forms, the great majority of the politicians of both parties 
were hostile to it and that it was necessary, therefore, to 
elect a President who was really in sympathy with it. The 
Pendleton law was not mandatory upon the President, and 
although it was hardly probable that any President would 
be bold enough to disregard the law entirely, he could make 
it practically a dead letter by not extending it to other ser- 
vices or by appointing a commission not actively interested 
in it and not likely to enforce it faithfully. The attitude 
of the nominees was, then, all-important. No matter how 
strongly either party might endorse the reform in its plat- 
form, unless the candidate was believed to be sincerely in 
favor of it, the reformers would not support him. 

Blaine, as chairman of the Maine Republican committee 
and as a leader of his party in Congress, had been for years 
in a position where he might have done a great deal for the 
reform. Neither by word nor by deed, however, had he done 
anything to promote it and, in fact, his influence had been 
against it. As Speaker of the House in the forty-third 
Congress he had prevented the idea from getting any con- 
sideration by the appointment of a committee on the re- 
form, of which Benjamin Butler was the most prominent 

1 Stanwood, Presidency, pp. 430, 437. 



IG 4 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [284 

member, 1 which in the language of the New York Tribune, 
" strangled the reform, and scalped it, and then executed a 
war dance over it." 2 A series of articles by Gail Hamil- 
ton appeared in the New York Tribune from April to 
August, 1877, ridiculing the reform in general and the 
attempts of the Hayes administration at reform in partic- 
ular; and these articles were supposed, because of the 
author's close relations with the Blaine family, to reflect 
Blaine's views on the subject. 3 In the campaign it was 
pretty well proven that these articles were inspired by 
Blaine himself. 4 According to his opponents, Blaine, while 
Secretary of State " wallowed in spoils." 5 His declara- 
tions in favor of the reform in the campaign of 1882 and 
his subsequent assertions of his devotion to the principle 
were looked upon as the " traditional tribute paid to 
virtue." 6 

Perhaps it was Cleveland's good fortune that he came 
into prominence when the reform was already popular. At 
any rate his record was a contrast to that of Blaine. 
Throughout his public career he had consistently favored 
the reform and worked for it. In his letter accepting the 
nomination for governor he gave it a prominent place, and 
in reply to a letter of the civil service reform association he 
declared that he fully approved the principles embodied in 
the Pendleton bill. 7 In his message to his first legislature 
he strongly urged the enactment of a law to establish the 

1 House Journal, 43 C, 1 S., p. 65; Harper's Weekly, Oct. 25, 1884; 
Fish, op. cit., p. 217. 

2 June 19, 1874. 

1 Eaton, Indep. Movement, p. 162. 

4 Report of Ex. Com. of Independents, p. 15. 

5 Nation, Sept. 14, 1882. 
<N. Y. Times, July 21, 1884. 

7 Parker, Writings of Grovcr Cleveland, p. 38. 



285] CIVIL SERVICE REFORM IC >5 

merit system in appointments, 1 and when the legislature 
enacted such a law, he appointed a commission actively in- 
terested in its success. 2 

Although the Republican party probably contained a 
larger proportion of men interested in civil service reform 
than the Democratic, and although their platform declara- 
tion was more definite and outspoken, it seemed to the In- 
dependents that the Democrats with Cleveland as President 
offered more promise of a continuance and extension of the 
reform than did the Republicans with Blaine. The desire 
to promote reform of the civil service was one of the 
main reasons for the " Mugwump " revolt, and must 
therefore be given a prominent place among the real issues 
of the election. 

1 Public Papers of Grovcr Cleveland, 1883, p. 25. 

2 Nation, May 5, 1883. 



CHAPTER VI 
The Issues in 1884 — The Tariff 

The tariff has been widely discussed in practically every 
Presidential campaign since the Civil War. In some of 
them it has been a real issue, but more often it has been 
brought forward as a device for distracting attention from 
other issues which politicians have not wished to have dis- 
cussed. The tariff has lent itself to this sort of handling 
for various reasons. The whole question of a protective 
tariff involves many complicated technical details which the 
average citizen has neither the time nor the inclination to 
master. The effects of a tariff are hard to isolate. The 
manufacturer with capital invested in a protected industry 
has a selfish reason for desiring protection and has not 
shown himself to be overscrupulous in the methods used t< • 
get it. The voter employed in a protected industry, being 
anxious to safeguard his own interests and not being a 
trained economist, is likely to accept at their face value 
arguments advanced for protection, especially when they 
emanate from his employer. For example, a comparison 
of wages in protectionist United States with those of free- 
trade England is often accepted without stopping to compare 
wages in protectionist Germany and free-trade England. 
Tariff discussion played an important part in the campaign 
of 1884. A brief survey of the history of the tariff since 
the war will be useful in determining whether or not it was 
a real issue in that campaign. 

One of the most pressing problems before Congress at 
106 [286 



287] THE TARIFF I07 

the close of the war was a general reorganization of 
finances. During the war the exigencies of the treasury 
had compelled recourse to every known means of raising 
revenue. Manufacturers were compelled to pay a tax on 
their raw material and on the finished product, a license tax 
for doing business and an income tax on their profits. At 
the same time, because it was desired to stimulate manu- 
factures, tariff duties were raised to counteract the effect 
of these internal taxes. In the bustle of war-time when 
little discrimination could be made as to what were proper 
rates of duty, the manufacturers received practically any 
rate that they asked. 1 These war tariffs were avowedly 
temporary, 2 but when the time came for reducing taxes, 
although the internal taxes were taken off, the tariff re- 
mained practically the same. The average citizen was too 
much distracted by the spectacular features of reconstruc- 
tion to pay much attention to complicated questions of 
finance. The manufacturers, however, were interested in 
the tariff, even if the public was not, and were able to resist 
any attempt to reduce the. rates. The producers of raw 
materials were brought into line by increased duties on their 
products, and efforts fairly successful were made to con- 
vince labor that protection was in its interest. In time these 
high rates, which were to have been temporary, came to be 
looked upon as the results of a definite economic policy and 
their maintenance became the main aim of a large group of 
influential citizens. 3 

The tariff was always more of a sectional than a party 
issue. Sections in which manufacturing interests predomi- 
nated were usually for protection whether they elected Re- 
publican or Democratic Congressmen, while those sections 

1 Stanwood, American Tariff Controversies, vol. ii, p. 129. 

2 Ibid., p. 127. 

8 Taussig, Tariff History of the U. S., p. 171. 



io 8 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [288 

in which the main interest was agriculture or shipping were 
usually either only moderately for protection or against it 
entirely. 1 So we see in the Democratic party a growing 
element that favored protection and in the Republican a 
considerable group of moderate protectionists and even a 
few free-traders. As has been mentioned, 2 these " tariff 
reformers " in the Republican party played a considerable 
part in the Liberal movement of 1872. 

The reductions in the tariff bill of that year were an 
attempt to allay the growing dissatisfaction with the atti- 
tude of the administration toward the tariff. 3 This bill, 
beside repealing the duties on tea and coffee and making a 
few additions to the free list, provided for a horizontal re- 
duction of ten percent on all rates. 4 This reduction was 
short-lived. The falling off of the foreign trade, due to the 
panic of 1873, together with the reduction in duties, caused 
the income from import duties to fall from $216,000,000 in 
1872 to $163,000,000 in 1874, 5 a fact which gave an excel- 
lent excuse to the protectionists to countermand the ten per- 
cent reduction and also to add twenty-five percent to the 
duties on molasses and sugar. Although this bill was nomi- 
nally for the purpose of safeguarding the treasury, the pro- 
tectionists uniformly supported and the revenue reformers 
opposed it. c The bill became a law on March 3, 1875, the 
day before the Republicans went out of power in the house 
for the first time in fourteen years. 

For the next six years neither party had control of both 
houses of Congress and the Presidency at the same time. 

1 Cf. supra, p. 23. 

2 Vide supra, p. 28. 

5 Stan wood, Tariff, p. 177. 
4 Dewey, Financial History, p. 398. 
5 U. S. Stat. Abst., 1885, p. 2. 
' Stanwood, Tariff, p. 189. 



2 8 9 ] THE TARIFF iog 

During this period no tariff legislation of importance was 
passed, although there was a great deal of discussion. It 
was a situation dear to the hearts of politicians, where they 
might promise great things without any danger of being 
held responsible for not making good their promises. Al- 
though the tariff was not made much of in the campaign of 
1876, 1 it occupied a prominent place in the platforms of 
both parties. The Republicans declared that the revenue 
should be " largely drawn " from duties on imports " so 
adjusted as to promote the interests of American labor and 
advance the prosperity of the whole country." The Demo- 
crats denounced the existing tariff in a long paragraph that 
began by calling it " a masterpiece of injustice, inequality, 
and false pretence," and closed with a demand that " all 
custom-house taxation shall be only for revenue." 2 In 
spite of this unequivocal declaration a resolution introduced 
into the House December 1, 1877, to instruct the committee 
on ways and means " to so revise the tariff as to make it 
purely and solely a tariff for revenue, and not for protec- 
ting one class of citizens by plundering another," failed 
through lack of Democratic support. 3 A bill introduced by 
the committee of which Fernando Wood of New York was 
chairman, providing for a reduction of rates on manufac- 
tures, failed for the same reason. Of the 134 votes against 
the bill, nineteen were Democratic, thirteen of them being 
from Pennsylvania and New Jersey; of the 120 votes for 
the bill, seven were Republican, two from " unredeemed " 
southern states and five from the Middle West. Twenty- 
two Democrats did not vote. 4 

In 1880 the tariff, quite unexpectedly, played a prominent 

1 Haworth, Disputed Election of 1876, chap. iv. 

2 Stanwood, Presidency, pp. 371, 376. 

*Cong. Rec, 45 C, 1 S., p. 811; McPherson, 1878, p. 201. 
* Cong. Rec, 45 C, 1 S., p. 4154; McPherson, 1878, p. 202. 



HO THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [290 

part in the campaign. In their platform the Republicans 
briefly affirmed " the belief avowed in 1876, that the duties 
levied for the purpose of revenue should so discriminate as 
to favor American labor." The Democrats in a brief plat- 
form merely mentioned " a tariff for revenue only " as one 
of the doctrines and traditions of the party, the same doc- 
trine, be it noted, though not so strongly worded, as that 
contained in the platform of 1876, to which no particular 
attention was paid in the campaign by their opponents, or 
in Congress by themselves. 1 As a matter of fact, " tariff 
for revenue only " was merely a phrase. The Democrats, 
even if they had wished to, could not have united the party 
in support of such a policy. 2 The Republicans, however, in 
their search for an issue in a campaign practically devoid 
of issues, seized upon these words as of gigantic import 
and spent the closing weeks of the campaign in picturing 
the woes that would follow an attempt to reverse " the tra- 
ditional policy of the country." General Hancock's naive 
remarks on the subject did not strengthen the position of 
his party. 3 

The Republicans might have accepted the vote of the 
country as a vindication of the existing tariff and have felt 
under no compulsion to change had not the question of 
protection become complicated with the broader one of 
revenue. With the general revival of business that began 
in 1879 the income from both internal and tariff taxes in- 
creased enormously. Customs receipts grew from $130,- 
000,000 in 1878 to $220,000,000 in 1882 and internal rev- 
enue receipts from $110,000,000 to $146,000,000 in the 
same period. This resulted in a surplus of receipts over 

1 Stanwood, Presidency, pp. 405, 413. 

2 Cf. Nation, Oct. 21, 1880. 

1 Stanwood, Tariff, p. 190; vide also N. Y. Times, Tribune and 
Nation, Oct. and Nov., 1880. 



291] THE TARIFF lll 

expenditures of $65,000,000 in 1880, $100,000,000 in 1881 
and $145,000,000 in 1882, with an unexpended balance for 
the same years respectively of $386,000,000, $231,000,000 
and $280,000,000/ 

A governmental surplus is never a thing to be desired, as 
it encourages extravagance and withdraws money from 
circulation. From a purely political point of view also it is 
undesirable, as the argument that more taxes than are 
necessary are being taken from the people is likely to be a 
disastrous one for the party in power. What should be 
done, then, with these huge balances ? Pay off the national 
debt, some said. True, the debt in 1882 amounted to nearly 
two billions, but the larger part of this amount would not 
come due until 1891 and 1907. Experience had shown 
that an attempt to cancel this long-time debt by buying 
bonds in the open market would raise their price so high 
that it would be poor policy to purchase them. There was, 
besides, some doubt as to whether the Secretary of the 
Treasury had the legal power to purchase bonds at a pre- 
mium. $414,000,000 of the debt was due and payable at 
the time, but the Secretary did not consider it wise to pay 
all this off, as there would then be no outlet for the surplus 
in case of a sudden financial stringency in which the coun- 
try needed currency. At the best, such action would afford 
but temporary relief. 2 As to reduction of internal taxes, 
those taxes still in force were mainly on liquors and tobaccos 
and their retention was urged for moral reasons. 

The protectionists were therefore faced by the problem 
of either reducing the tariff or finding new ways of spend- 
ing money. One of the most obvious methods of getting 
rid of the surplus was to increase the expenditure for pen- 
sions. This method offered an almost unlimited field for 

1 U. S. Stat. Abst., 1885, pp. 1 and 2. 

2 Report of Sec. of Treas., 1882, pp. xxv-xxvii. 



H2 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [292 

expenditure and at the same time an opportunity to a Con- 
gressman to make himself popular by securing appropria- 
tions for an ostensibly worthy and patriotic purpose. Ap- 
propriations for pensions had decreased between 1874 and 
1879, but the arrears act of 1879 caused large increases, not 
only by payment of arrears but also by stimulating new 
claims. In 1879 appropriations amounted to but $29,000,- 
000; in 1883 they were $11 6, 000,000. 1 Another form of 
extravagance, which grew into an abuse then and which 
still exists, was in the appropriations for rivers and harbors. 
This expenditure, also useful in strengthening a Congress- 
man in his home district, increased from a negligible amount 
before the war to $8,000,000 in 1879 and $18,000,000 in 
1883, the later bill being passed over the veto of President 
Arthur. 

The surplus and the resulting extravagance of Congress 
played an important part in the political overturn of 1882. 2 
When the new Congress assembled a Democratic House 
shared the responsibility for expenditures, and appropria- 
tions for 1884 showed a decrease of $21,000,000. The 
Republican Senate was still busy with plans for spending 
money. Many schemes were advocated and some actually 
passed which would have extended the pension system to 
ridiculous limits. 3 Another plan, which gained the support 
of many on account of its real merit but whose main pur- 
pose was to use up the surplus, was the Blair bill, passed by 
the Senate in 1884, which provided for the distribution of 
$77,000,000 among the states in aid of education. 4 

1 U. S. Stat. Abst., 1885, p. 4; Glasson, Hist, of Military Pension 
Legislation, p. 90. 

- Vide supra, p. 65. 

3 McPherson, 1884, p. 169; N. Y. Times, March 24, 25, 1884 

*Sen. Rep., 48 C. 1 S., no. 101 ; McPherson, 1884, p. 147; Nation, 
March 10, 1884. 



293] THE TARIFF 113 

The moderate protectionists had realized all along that, in 
spite of the attempts to reduce the surplus, eventually the 
tariff must be reduced. In his message of 1881 President 
Arthur declared that the time had arrived when the people 
might " justly demand some relief from their present oner- 
ous burden of taxation." He recommended the abolition 
of all internal revenue taxes except those on tobaccos and 
liquors, but added that the tariff also needed revision, and 
suggested a commission to aid Congress in this work. 1 A 
tariff commission had been suggested several times in Con- 
gress by both Republicans and Democrats, 2 but when it was 
proposed in 1882, it was attacked by the Democrats as 
being merely a protectionist ruse to delay revision. 3 It 
passed the House with but thirty Democratic votes and the 
Senate with only six. 4 The bill provided for the appoint- 
ment of nine commissioners from civil life who were to 
conduct an investigation of all industries affected by the 
tariff with a view to a revision " that would be just to all 
interests." All of the members appointed were favorable 
to protection and four of them were directly connected 
with protected industries. The chairman was John L. 
Hayes of Massachusetts, secretary of the National Associa- 
tion of Wool Manufacturers." 

The commission traveled over the country taking testi- 
mony for three months. Its itinerary included Boston, New 
York, St. Paul, Des Moines, St. Louis, Savannah, Pitts- 
burgh and Philadelphia. xA.nybody who chose was allowed 
to appear before the commission and state his views, which 

1 Richardson, vol. viii, p. 49. 

2 Cong. Rec, 45 C, 2 S., pp. 3252, 4*55; 46 C, 2 S., pp. 4102-4116. 

3 Ibid., 47 C, 1 S., p. 3668. 

4 McPherson, 1882, p. no; Stanwood, Tariff, p. 203. 

5 Report of Tariff Com., House Misc. Doc., 47 C, 2 S., no. 6 ; Stan- 
wood, p. 204. 



H 4 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [094 

were fully embodied in the report. Only public officials 
were summoned to appear. Naturally of the 604 witnesses 
examined the majority were representatives of protected 
interests, although there was a liberal sprinkling of free- 
traders. It was noticeable that the representatives of each 
industry were willing to subscribe to the doctrine of tariff 
reform as a general proposition but were sure that a reduc- 
tion in their own particular industry would be disastrous. 
The commission declared that the aim of its members was 
" to divest themselves of political bias, sectional prejudice, 
or consideration of personal interest " and to " serve no 
particular party, class, section, or school of political econ- 
omy." Without doubt they accomplished this so far as 
they w^ere consciously able. Considering the economic 
background of the members, their report was a surprise. 5 
They reported that, 

early in its deliberations the Committee became convinced that 
a substantial reduction of tariff duties is demanded, not by a 
mere indiscriminate popular clamor, but by the best conserva- 
tive opinion of the country . - . such a reduction of the exist- 
ing tariff the Committee regards not only as a due recognition 
of public sentiment and a measure of justice to consumer-, 
but one conducive to the general industrial prosperity. . . . 
No rates of defensive duties, except for the establishment 
new industries, which more than equalize the conditions of 
labor and capital with those of foreign competitors, can be 
justified. 

Some tariff reformers, however, were disappointed when 
they came to the details recommended, insisting that the 
commission had failed to put their conclusions into prac- 
tice. 2 The reductions recommended, the commission esti- 

1 H. C. Baird, The Tariff of the Tariff Com. 
1 Nation, Feb. 6, 1883. 



295] THE TARIFF US 

mated, would average from twenty to twenty-five per- 
cent. 1 

The bare fact of the creation of the commission, to say 
nothing of its report, is important as marking a distinct 
recognition by the Republican party that the scheme of high 
protective duties had been carried too far and continued too 
long. Some industries felt that they had outgrown protec- 
tion and were ready to compete for the world market. 2 
The attitude of others was well expressed by Mr. Hayes., 
the chairman of the commission, in the Wool Manufac- 
turers' Bulletin: 

Reduction in itself was by no means desirable to us; it was 
a concession to public sentiment, a bending of the top and 
branches to the wind of public opinion to save the trunk of 
the protective system. In a word, the object was protection 
through reduction. We were willing to concede only to save 
the essentials both of the wool and woolens tariff. . . . We 
wanted tbe tariff to be made by our friends. 3 

Secretary Folger, in his report for 1882, recommended 
" a careful revision of the tariff, with a view to substantial 
reductions." 4 President Arthur in his annual message 
commended the report of the Commission and declared that 
the best interests of the country demanded large reductions 
in the tariff. He specifically urged an enlarged free list 
with " the simplification of the complex and inconsistent 
schedule of duties upon certain manufactures, particularly 
those of cotton, iron and steel, and a substantial reduction 
of duties upon those articles, and upon sugar, molasses, 
silk, wool and woolen goods." He expressed the hope that 
if a general revision was impossible, " at least some of the 
more conspicuous inequalities of the present law " might 

1 Report, p. 6. 2 A r . Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1884. 

3 Quoted in Taussig, Tariff Hist., p. 249. 

4 House Misc. Doc., 47 C, 2 S., p. xxxii. 



n6 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [ 2 g6 

be remedied. 1 The report was taken up in both houses and 
bills introduced. The Senate, to avoid the constitutional 
restriction against the origination of the revenue bills in 
that body, tacked their bill on to a bill to reduce the internal 
taxes that had passed the House at the previous session. 
The Senate bill provided for rates considerably lower than 
those of the House bill but higher than those recommended 
by the Commission. The House had a large protectionist 
majority, but the reformers were obstructive and were able 
to prevent the passage of the House bill. By a bit of par- 
liamentary legerdemain the Republican leaders secured a 
disagreement to the Senate bill and a reference of the bill 
to a conference committee made up of strong protection- 
ists. 2 The conference committee " compromised " by rais- 
ing the rates higher than those of either house 3 and the 
report was forced through on the next to the last day of 
the session. The tariff had indeed been revised by its 
friends. 

The conference committee had so mutilated the Senate 
bill that it barely passed the Senate by a vote of thirty-two 
to thirty-one. Only one Democrat, McPherson of New 
Jersey, voted for it, while the original bill had received ten 
Democratic votes. In the House the bill passed by a vote 
>f 152 to 116. Sixteen eastern Democrats, led by Randall 
►f Pennsylvania, were included in the majority, while 
twelve Republicans, ten of whom came from Pennsylvania 
and Ohio, voted against the bill. The Republicans who 
voted against the bill did so for the most part because the 
rates were not high enough, especially those on raw wool. 
The bill made reductions on most articles but raised the 
rates on certain classes of woolen and cotton goods and 

' Richardson, vol. viii, p. 135. 

1 Stan wood, op. cit., p. 211 et seq. 

% Cong. Rec, 47 C, 2 S., p. 3724, appendix, p. 278. 



297] THE TARIFF I1? 

manufactures of steel. The increases were put in most 
cases on classes of goods of which there were large impor- 
tations. Some increases were made to appear as decree 
by changes in classification. The bill contained many dis- 
crepancies and as a whole was satisfactory to no large fac- 
tion of either party. Besides the changes in the tariff, sub- 
stantial reductions in the internal revenue were made bv 
the abolition of the taxes on friction matches and patent 
medicines, the removal of various banking taxes and a re- 
duction of the rates on tobaccos. 1 

The election of 1882 which changed a Republican major- 
ity of thirteen in the House to a Democratic one of seventy- 
six 2 was the result as much of disgust with the Republican> 
as of any real promise that the Democrats held forth. No 
partisan legislation could be expected, as the Senate re- 
mained Republican, but the country looked to the Demo- 
cratic House to see whether the Democrats would have a 
real program to offer in 1S84 or would offer Dem ;crati : 
inefficiency and selfish local bickerings as an alternative to 
those of the Republicans. It was obvious from their vote- 
in the previous Congress that the party was not a unit on 
the question of the tariff. The newspapers that leaned 
toward free trade or tariff reform declared that the great 
opportunity for the Democrats lay in making reform of the 
tariff the issue in 1884, and showing their sincerity by pass- 
ing a bill for equalization and reduction at the present ses- 
sion and putting the responsibility for killing it squarely up 
to the Republican Senate. 3 The Republican papers and the 

'Dewey, Fin. Hist., p. 419; Noyes, Forty Years of Am. Fin., p. 92; 
McPherson, 1884, PP- 18-71 ; Sherman, Autobiog., vol. ii, p. 851 ; McKin- 
ley, The Tariff ', p. 64; Cong. Rec., 47 C, 2 S., p. 3742. 

2 McPherson, 1884, pp. 1, 129. The majorities mentioned are those 
over all other parties combined. 

3 N. Y. Times, May 7, 1884; Nation, March 27, 18S4; Louisville 
Courier-Journal, March 17, 1884, quoted in the N. Y. Tribune of 
April 18. 



1 1$ THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [298 

protectionist papers of the Democrats urged that the Demo- 
crats must maintain harmony within the party at all costs, 
and that harmony could be maintained only by leaving the 
tariff question severely alone. 1 

The tariff was the main issue involved in the contest over 
the speakership at the organization of the House in De- 
cember, 1883. The candidate of the " no agitation on the 
tariff" group was Randall of Pennsylvania, who favored 
reducing the surplus by abolishing the tax on liquor and 
tobacco. The tariff-reform, or as the Republicans insisted, 
the free-trade candidate was Carlisle of Kentucky, who 
favored unrestricted discussion of the tariff question with 
the ultimate object of reducing duties and preparing the 
way for free trade and who was opposed to abolishing the 
internal taxes." Carlisle was elected, and agreeably disap- 
pointed the protectionists by his moderate speech on taking 
the chair. He declared that " sudden and radical changes 
in the laws and regulations affecting the commercial and 
industrial interests of the people . . . would not be favor- 
ably received by any considerable number of those who 
have given serious attention to the subject." 

The Secretary of the Treasury in his report for 1883 
stated that the income for the first three months under the 
new revenue law indicated that the annual reduction in rev- 
enue from internal taxes would be $10,000,000 less than 
aiated by the Senate committee, and the reduction in 
the tariff $20,000,000 less. He thought that it might be too 
.^oon to reduce the tariff again but that " ultimately the 
just and expedient method of relief from taxation, and of 
limiting the revenues to the needs of an economical govern- 

' A". Y. World, Dec. 13, 1883, March 3, May 7, 1884; N. Y. Tribune, 
May 7, 8, 1884. 
* Nation, N T ov. 22, 1883. 
' Covg. Rec, 48 C, 1 S., p. 5. 



2 9 9] THE TARIFF II9 

merit must be found in a reduction in the duties on im- 
ports." : President Arthur in his annual message declared 
that he had " no doubt that further reductions may be 
wisely made," but urged that no " radical revision or sweep- 
ing reduction "• be made until the results of the act passed 
by the last Congress were more apparent." 

Morrison of Illinois was made chairman of the ways and 
means committee, which was equally divided between high 
and low tariff men, with Abraham S. Hewitt of Xew York, 
a revenue reformer and at the same time an iron manufac- 
turer with large interests, holding the balance of power. 
This committee reported a bill which provided for a twenty 
percent horizontal reduction with a maximum rate of forty 
percent on cotton goods, sixty percent on woolens and 
fifty percent on metal-. No rate was to be lower than that 
levied by the Morrill ac ' and lumber 

were added to the free list. The estimated reduction in the 
revenue was 8^0,000,000. The committee pointed out that 
the proposed reducti -ether with those of the bill of 

1883, did not equal the reductions proposed by the tariff 
commission. They also laid the blame for the existing in- 
dustrial depression, especially that in the iron trades, at the 
door of the protective system, declaring that such depres- 
sions were inseparable from the enormities of that system. 
The line which the Republican opposition was to take was 
disclosed in the minority report, which asserted that it was 
too soon to know the effects of the bill of the previous 
session, that no one had asked for a change, that only free- 
traders favored a change which was to be an entering 
wedge, that the reported bill would disturb business, lower 
wages, increase revenues by increasing foreign imports and 
that the bill was unscientific and poorly drawn. 3 

1 House Ex. Doc, 48 C, 1 S., no. 2. 

* Richardson, vol. viii, p. 179. 

8 House Report, 48 C, 1 S., no. 792. 



I2 o THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [300 

At a caucus of the House Democrats, held March 25, it 
was voted, 114 to 57, that the Morrison bill be taken up as 
soon as possible and passed, but with the proviso that the 
action of the caucus should be binding on individuals only 
to the extent " that each member may feel that he ought to 
be influenced by the expressed opinion of the majority of 
his associates." A resolution introduced by Carlisle also 
passed which provided for the abolition of all taxes on 
tobacco, snuff and cigars and a reduction of the tax on 
brandy distilled from fruits to ten cents per gallon, " pro- 
vided that such repeal and reduction shall not be made 
except in connection with a reduction of tariff duties." * 
Converse, a Democrat from Ohio, on April 7, moved to 
suspend the rules and restore the duties of the bill of 1867 
on wool. The Democrats refused to stultify themselves by 
accepting this chance to gain the support of the Ohio Demo- 
crats for the tariff bill, and the motion was lost 119 to 126, 
although 39 Democrats voted with the Republicans to re- 
store the rates. 2 On April 15 the Morrison bill was taken 
up in committee of the whole and occupied most of the 
time of the House until May 6, when the enacting clause 
was struck out on the motion of Converse. Randall made 
the principal speech against the bill. 3 Of the 159 votes 
against the bill, forty-one were Democratic, the New Eng- 
land states furnishing one, the Middle Atlantic twenty- 
three, the South two, the West eleven and the Pacific four. 
Pennsylvania alone furnished twelve Democratic votes 
against the bill and Ohio ten. Four Republicans, all from 
Minnesota, voted with the 151 Democrats who favored the 
bill. 4 On May 12 a new tariff bill was introduced by A. S. 

1 Nation, March 27, 1883. 
'McPherson, 1884, p. 137. 

3 Cong. Rec, 48 C, 1 S., pp. 3872-3908. 

4 McPherson, pp. 135-13"; A'. Y. Times, May 7, 1884. 



301 ] THE TARIFF 121 

Hewitt of New York, which provided for an enlarged free 
list and reductions averaging from ten to twenty percent. 
This bill was less objectionable to the protectionists than the 
Morrison bill and met the valid objection to a horizontal 
reduction. It was reported favorably by the ways and 
means committee but the adjournment of Congress on July 
7 prevented any action. 1 

So for better or worse ended the Democratic attempts at 
tariff revision. Instead of seizing the opportunity to take 
a much-needed step toward reducing the burden of unneces- 
sary taxation and wiping out the surplus, the necessity for 
which the Republicans had on various occasions admitted, 
the Democrats forced upon their party a share of the re- 
sponsibility for the existing duties. Randall and his cohort 
had really done a great service for the Republicans by 
forcing the Democrats to drop one of their strongest issues. 
When the Republicans unexpectedly attempted to make the 
tariff one of the main issues of the Presidential campaign 
of 1884, the Democrats found themselves on the defensive, 
giving arguments to show that they were not hostile to 
protection. 

A circumstance that not only influenced tariff discussion 
in the campaign but also undoubtedly had a broader bear- 
ing on its outcome was the general business depression that 
had existed in the country for over two years. The recov- 
ery from the panic of 1873 was slow, but the reaction was 
at its height in 1880 and helped materially in the Republican 
victory. The boom times continued through 1881 and into 
1882, when the effects of the crop failure of the previous 
year, and the inevitable consequence of overproduction and 
overextension of credit, both in the United States and 
abroad, began to be felt. 2 Among the first to be affected 

1 House Reports, 48 C, 1 S., no. 1971. 

2 Cf. supra, p. 65. 



I2 2 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [302 

was the railroad industry, which had been extended far 
beyond what conditions warranted. From 1879 through 
1882 the annual increase in agricultural acreage had been 
two percent, and in population two percent, but the annual 
increase in railroad mileage had been nine percent. 1 In 

1882 there were 11,596 miles of railroad constructed; in 

1883 but 6,753. ~ This check in the railroad industry was 
immediately felt in other lines, particularly in those de- 
pendent upon railroad construction. There was a contin- 
uous decline in the value of securities. A general liquida- 
tion, starting in railroad stocks and others dependent on 
them and spreading to those of all other industries, began 
in the fall of 1882 and continued throughout the next two 
years. Although there was no crisis so severe as that of 
1857 or 1873, it was a period of continually declining 
prices, reduction of wages and general stagnation of in- 
dustry."' 

The financial crisis came in May, 1884, with the failure 
of several prominent New York banks and brokerage 
houses. Clearing-house certificates were resorted to. For 
a few days the panic threatened to reach the dimensions of 
that of 1873, but thanks to the long period of liquidation, 
its effects were confined largely to New York city and it 
was mainly a " stock-brokers' panic." Many of the fail- 
ures were attributable to dishonest speculations and em- 
bezzlements by officials of the firms concerned. 4 The Re- 
publicans were quick to lay the blame for the whole affair on 
the Democratic attempt to lower the tariff, in spite of the 

1 Railroad Gazette, Sept. 21, 1883; Nation, Sept. 2~, 1883. 

2 U. S. Stat. Abst., 1885, p. 195; N. Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1884. 

3 Noyes, op. cit., p. 85; Ann. Cyc., 1883, p. 332; Commercial and 
Financial Chronicle, Jan. 5, 1884, Jan. 3, 1885 ; Nation, Jan. to, 1884. 

*N. Y. Times, May 15, 17; Nation, May 8, 15, 22; Bradstrcct's, May 
22, 31, 1884. 



303] THE TARIFF 123 

fact that the Morrison bill had been killed a week before 
the main crisis occurred. 1 

Although the market soon rallied, industry did not re- 
cover for some time. An idea of the extent of the business 
depression may be had from an examination of some of the 
indices of business prosperity. Business failures increased 
from 4.350 in 1880 to ] in 1883 and 11,620 in 1884, 

while the total liabilities of the failures of the respective 
years were $57,000,000, $175,000,000, and $248,000,000.-' 
The total exchanges at the Xew York clearing house fell 
from $48,000,000,000 in 188 1 to $40,000,000,000 in 1883 
and $34,000,000,000 in l8£ The value ( f all imports 

was $667,000,000 in 1880, rising to $724,000,000 in 1882 
and falling back to the figure of 1880 in 1884, in spite of 
the supposed encouragement of imports by the reduced 
tariff. The value of exports fell from $835,000,000 in 
1880 to $740,000,000 in 1884. 4 There was a noticeable 
falling off in the amount of practically all manufactures, 
notably of thirty percent in the production of steel and 
iron rails and of twenty-live percent in the production of 
crude petroleum, comparing the calendar years 1882 and 
1884/' Due partly to the disorder in the financial markets 
but probably more to the increased production, both for- 
eign and domestic, grain prices fell to a new low level. Al- 
though there was an increase in the total cereal production 
of the United States from 2718 million bushels in the 
bumper year 1880 to 2992 in 1884, and an increase in the 
acreage from 120 millions to 136, the total value of the 

1 A'. Y. Tribune, May 19. 

2 Bradstreet's, Jan. 3, 1S85. 

3 U. S. Stat- Abst., 1885, p. 25, for years ending Oct. 1. 

4 Ibid., p. 34. Figures for years ending June 1. For statistics given 
in terms of money value, allowance should be made for declining prices. 

5 Ibid., 1886, pp. 142. 144. 



[24 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [304 

crops for the same years fell from $1,361,000,000 to $1,- 
184,000,000/ 

In 1880 the Republicans had based their tariff arguments 
on the existing prosperity, claiming for the protective policy 
the credit for the existing conditions. Now, in 1884, al- 
though few changes had been made in the tariff, and those 
few by the Republicans themselves, the country was suffer- 
ing from a severe and far-reaching industrial and financial 
depression. Logically, it would seem that under the circum- 
stances the Republicans would find it difficult to urge a 
continuance of the protective system, but political exigen- 
cies are superior to all logic. The hard times and the re- 
sulting decrease in revenue also robbed the Democrats of an 
issue. The income from customs fell from $220,000,000 
for the year ending June 30, 1882, to $214,000,000 for 1883 
and $195,000,000 in 1884. The income from internal rev- 
enue was for the same years respectively $146,000,000, 
$144,000,000 and $121,000,000. The report for the three 
months ending September 30, 1884, showed a decrease of 
$4,000,000 from the corresponding three months of the 
previous year. 2 Under these circumstances the surplus, 
while still large, did not appear so alarming to the popular 
mind. 

In the campaign for the Presidential nominations the 
tariff played but a minor part. Arthur, in showing himself 
to be favorable to tariff reform, had incurred the enmity of 
the ardent protectionists. The Tribune charged him with 
being too much in sympathy with a group of New York im- 
porters who were really free-traders.'" Blaine's record on 
protection was satisfactory and he was entirely acceptable 
to the most radical protectionists. In November, 1883, he 

1 U. S. Stat. Abst., 1885, p. 200. 

2 Ibid., p. 2; Report of Sec. of Treas., 1885, p. v. 
s May 12, 31, 1884. 



305] THE TARIFF 125 

wrote a letter to the editor of the Philadelphia Press in 
which he outlined an ingenious scheme for getting rid of 
the surplus and at the same time increasing the tariff duties, 
namely, that the existing excise taxes should be continued 
and that all income from them be turned over to the states 
according to population. He submitted figures to show that 
this plan would do away with the necessity for state taxes 
in all but three of the states and county taxes in about half 
of them. The Tribune hailed the proposal, in an editorial 
headed " Free Homes or Free Whiskey," as being the most 
statesmanlike suggestion of a generation. 1 Various forms 
of this plan had been advocated by high protectionists be- 
fore, notably by the Pennsylvania State Republican Con- 
vention of 1883, but it was never seriously considered. 2 

Many of the state conventions ignored the tariff alto- 
gether, others adopted colorless resolutions. The Repub- 
licans, where they took any stand at all, demanded protec- 
tion. It was noticeable that the outspoken declarations by 
the Democrats for tariff for revenue only came from those 
states that were solidly Democratic, while most of the doubt- 
ful states avoided the subject." In Illinois a faction led by 
Morrison secured the adoption of a platform demanding 
that all custom-house taxation be for revenue only and in- 
structing the delegates to the national convention to vote for 
such a plank. Later, however, the protectionist element 
secured a reversal of this vote and the delegates were sent 
uninstructed. 4 The Ohio Democratic convention adopted a 
platform that any Republican might endorse. 5 The Penn- 
sylvania Democrats, the leaders of the protectionist faction 

1 N. Y. Tribune, Nov. 29, 30, 1883. 

' Nation, July 7, 1883. 

8 N. Y. World, June 19, 26 ; Bradstreet's, June 28. 

4 N. Y. World, July 3. 

5 Ibid., June 26. 



126 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [306 

in the party, adopted a platform which favored a tariff for 
revenue but " so adjusted as to prevent unequal burdens, 
encourage productive industries at home, and afford just 
compensation to labor." They placed Randall in nomina- 
tion for the Presidency. 1 

The action of the Democratic House having made it clear 
that the party could not unite on a tariff policy, the 
nomination of a man prominently identified with either fac- 
tion was plainly inexpedient. The protectionists were not 
strong enough to overthrow the traditions of the party and 
nominate so pronounced a protectionist as Randall, but 
they were able to make the nomination of anyone who had 
a definite leaning toward free trade, such as Carlisle or 
Morrison, out of the question. Part of the opposition to 
Bayard was due to his supposedly friendly attitude toward 
free trade. 2 The assertion of the Republican press that 
the Democrats did not dare to take a stand on the tariff and 
that Cleveland was chosen because his attitude on the ques- 
tion was unknown, undoubtedly was largely true. 3 

The Democratic convention, after considerable wrangling 
in the committee on resolutions and on the floor of the con- 
vention, adopted a tariff plank which was plainly an attempt 
to please everyone and to avoid an issue rather than to make 
one. After the nomination of Cleveland, a Texas delegate 
introduced a resolution endorsing the Morrison bill and 
declaring that opposition to it on the part of Democrats 
was due to considerations of policy rather than of prin- 
ciple. The resolution was declared out of order by the 
chairman and sent to the committee on resolutions. 4 The 
platform started out boldly by condemning the Republicans 

1 A". Y. Times, April 10. 

2 N. Y. World, June 14, 24. 1884. 

1 N. Y. Tribune, June 12, 13, 17, 1884. 
*Proc. of Dcm. Conv., 1884, p. 252. 



307] THE TARIFF 12J 

for having created and continued the irregularities of the 
tariff, and for falsely pretending to protect American in- 
terests while taxing raw materials. It declared that the 
Republican policy had impoverished many industries to 
subsidize a few, that " unnecessary taxation is unjust taxa- 
tion," and that the existing surplus was sufficient evidence 
of Republican injustice and incompetence. While denounc- 
ing the existing tariff and demanding that " federal taxa- 
tion shall be exclusively for public purposes and shall not 
exceed the needs of the government economically admin- 
istered," they admitted a large part of the protectionist con- 
tention by pledging themselves to revise the tariff " in a 
spirit of fairness to all interests," in a way that would not 
" injure any domestic industries " or " deprive American 
labor of the ability to compete successfully with foreign 
labor," and in a way which should be " regardful " of the 
labor and capital involved in the " many industries [that] 
have come to rely upon legislation for successful contin- 
uance." The nearest that the platform approached a defi- 
nite program was in the statement that there should be 
" taxes on fewer imported articles, bearing heaviest on 
articles of luxury, and bearing lightest on articles of neces- 
sity." x 

The Republican platform while not quite so verbose was 
equally evasive as to just what the party proposed to do. 
It pledged the party to correct the irregularities of the 
tariff, " not by the vicious and indiscriminate process of 
horizontal reduction," but by some unstated method which 
would " relieve the taxpayer without injuring the laborer 
or the great productive interests of the country." It de- 
clared that duties should be levied " not for revenue only " 
but so " as to afford security to our diversified industries 

^tanwood, Hist, of the Pres., p. 435. 



128 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [308 

and protection to the rights and wages of the laborers." 
The single definite proposal was that the duties on foreign 
wool should be raised. 1 

The two parties were evidently agreed that the tariff 
should be reformed and that the surplus should be done 
away with — although neither of them had done anything to 
accomplish this. In brief, the Republicans proposed that 
" requisite " duties should be levied in such a way as to 
protect capital and labor; the Democrats insisted that duties 
" not to exceed the needs of the government economically 
administered " should be levied in such a way as to have 
the same effect. To experts in platform-making the differ- 
ence here may be obvious but to the lay mind it is not easily 
apparent. 

: Stanwood, Hist, of the Prcs., p. 429. 



CHAPTER VII 
The Issues in 1884 — Minor Issues and Minor Parties 

Although there was little difference between the parties 
in their attitude toward civil service reform and the tariff, 
there was even less on other questions. The southern 
question, while still useful for Republican politicians, was 
no longer a live issue. Upon the withdrawal of federal 
troops from the southern states by Hayes, the whites had 
regained control of the state governments and were able to 
make ineffective the attempts at federal interference in 
elections. The attack by the Democrats on the election laws 
during Hayes' administration was caused more by a desire 
to strike at the power of the Republican party in the South 
than by any real oppression resulting from those laws, and 
the desire to safeguard patronage rather than a belief that 
the laws were any great aid to the negroes was the reason 
for the stubborn defense of them made by the Republicans. 
The Supreme Court had helped to take the southern ques- 
tion out of politics by declaring unconstitutional important 
sections of the Force Acts, thereby considerably limiting the 
sphere of federal action in the control of conditions in the 
South. 1 

John Sherman made an attempt to revive the sectional 
issue in 1884 by the introduction of a resolution in the 
Senate on January 25, instructing the committee on privi- 
leges and elections to investigate the outbreak of violence 

1 Dunning, Essays o)i the Civil War and Reconstruction (ed. of 
'910), p. 364- 

309] 129 



130 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER ^ IO 

onnection with the elections of 1883 in Copiah county, 
Mississippi, and at Danville, Virginia. 1 It was charged 
that in Copiah county there had been an attempt by organ- 
ized groups of night riders to intimidate the negroes and on 
election day a prominent Republican leader had been mur- 
ed in the act of casting his ballot. At Danville there 
had occurred, a few days before the election, a riot between 
blacks and whites in which four negroes were killed and 
several others wounded. The Democrats in caucus decided 
to oppose the investigation, as any opposition would 
react unfavorably up< n themselves, and the resolution was 
passed. 2 The committee, which was composed of Cameron, 
Frye, i toar, Lapham and Sherman, Republicans, and Sauls- 
bury, Jonas, Pugh and Vance, Democrats, took some 2,000 
pages of testimony, a sub-committee going to New Orleans 
for the purpose of examining witnesses about the occur- 
rences in Copiah. Much of the testimony, as was usual in 
the case of such investigations, was flatly contradictory. 
The partisan character of the whole affair was shown by 
the attitude of the committee members during the investi- 
gation and by the frankly partisan character of the reports, 
a majority report signed by all the Republicans and a 
minority report signed by all the Democrats, being sub- 
mitted in each case/ 1 Although there were several trained 
lawyers of both parties on the committee, there was no 
attempt at a careful analysis of the testimony, each side 
accepting that which served its own purpose and drawing 
conclusions accordingly. 

The majority reports declared that the evidence showed 
widespread conspiracies to deprive the negro of his vote, 
and recommended another investigation after the election 

1 Cong. Rec, 48 G, 1 S., p. 588. 

2 N. Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1884. 

:; Sen. Reps., 48 C, 1 S., nos. 521, 579. 



3 1 1 ] MIX OR ISSUES AXD MINOR PARTIES T 3 j 

of 1884, with the threat of a reduction of representation in 
case the conditions continued. The minority asserted that 
the evidence showed no grounds for interference by Con- 
gress and that the disturbances were only such as might- 
occur, and in fact were constantly occurring, in any north- 
ern state. They cited as an illustration the riot which had 
taken place in Cincinnati at the very time that the com- 
mittee was holding its hearings, when an armed mob at- 
tempting to remove prisoners from the jail had been over- 
powered by state troops after several days' street fighting 
with considerable loss of life. 1 

Some of the Republican newspapers, notably the Nezu 
York Tribune, devoted a good deal of space to the commit- 
tee hearings, 2 but the public was not greatly interested. 
The investigation was generally recognized for what it was 
— an attempt to make campaign material for the Repub- 
licans. 3 

Both parties expressed in their platforms some high 
sounding and quite indisputable sentiments as to the south- 
ern question, but both w r ere rather indefinite as to what they 
proposed to do. The Republicans declared that the people 
of the United States " constitute a nation and not a mere 
confederacy of states," but that the rights of the states 
" should be faithfully maintained." They further declared 
that the " perpetuity of our institutions rests upon the main- 
tenance of a free ballot, an honest count, and correct re- 
turn," and denounced the Democratic party as being the 
guilty recipient of the fruit of fraud and violence in the 
southern states. They pledged themselves to the passage 
of such legislation as would " secure to every citizen, o! 
whatever race and color, the full and complete recognition; 

1 Ann. Cyc, 1884, p. 630. 

2 N. Y. Tribune, Feb. 17, 18, 19, et passim, 1884. 
s Nation, Jan. 31, 1884. 



j 32 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [ 3I2 

possession, and exercise of all civil and political rights." 
Similarly the Democrats declared it to be the duty of the 
government " to mete out equal and exact justice to all 
citizens of whatever nativity, race, color, or persuasion, re- 
ligious or political." They also asserted their belief in " a 
free ballot and a fair count " and, as a proof that a Demo- 
cratic administration would "preserve liberty with order." 1 
recalled their efforts to make illegal the presence of troops 
at the polls. 

It was reasonably certain that if the Republicans gained 
full control of the government they would, for partisan 
purposes, attempt to extend the system of federal control: 
and that the Democrats, given the same opportunity, would, 
for the same reason, do away with what was left of it. 
Although the voters were not greatly interested in this 
proposition, the memory of the past record of the Demo- 
crats still lingered to weaken them, especially in the minds 
of the older generation. The feeling that the Democrats 
were not entirely worthy of confidence was present, al- 
though it would have been difficult to justify it by showing 
any specific way in which they were dangerous. This dis- 
trust of the Democrats could not be entirely eradicated 
until they had been returned to power and given an oppor- 
tunity to do their worst. The occasional revival of stories 
of southern outrages was well calculated to keep this vague 
prejudice alive. 

The currency question was not an issue in 1884. The 
great increase in the amount of currency in circulation, due 
to the coinage of silver and the decreased demand for it re- 
sulting from business depression, 2 had quieted the demands 
of the greenbackers. Both parties were quite content to 

l Stanwood, Presidency, pp. 431, 437. 

2 U. S. Treasurer's Rep., 1884, pp. xxx-xxxv ; Com. & Fin. Chronicle, 
Jan. 17, 1 88s. 



313] MINOR ISSUES AND MINOR PARTIES ^3 

leave the greenback situation as it was. Although the coin- 
age of silver under the Bland-Allison act threatened diffi- 
culties, opinion on the silver question had not yet crystal- 
lized, and such opinion as there was did not run along party 
lines. President Arthur had in his first and second annual 
messages urged the repeal of the Bland-Allison act but no 
action had resulted. 1 While the Democrats could be 
counted on to furnish more votes than the Republicans for 
any proposition to increase the amount of silver coin, votes 
in Congress on the silver question had been mainly non- 
partisan. 2 Of a similar nature was the attitude of the 
Democrats toward the national banking- system. Hostility 
to the national banks on the part of some Democrats, 
especially those from the West and South, cropped out at 
different times but it did not extend to all members of the 
party. 2 The currency planks in the platforms of both par- 
ties were practically the same. The Republicans urged an 
international standard to fix the relative value of gold and 
silver. The Democrats asserted their belief in " honest 
money, the gold and silver coinage of the constitution." 4 
Except at rare intervals when some international crisis 
has overshadowed all other issues, the conduct of foreign 
affairs has played but little part as an issue in Presidential 
campaigns. The campaign of 1884 was no exception to the 
general rule. The questions of American control of a canal 
across the isthmus and of building up closer relations with 
South America were beginning to be of general interest 
and on these both parties were agreed. Both in their plat- 

1 Richardson, vol. viii, pp. 46, 133. 

2 Sparks, op. cit., p. 143 et seq. ; McPherson, 1880, pp. 46, 145, 1882. 
p. 28, 1884, p. 143. 

8 McPherson, 1882, p. 134, 1884, p. 143; Sherman, Autobiog.. vol. ii. 
P. 877- 
4 Stanwood, Presidency, pp. 430, 437. 



THE DEMOCRATIC RETURX TO POWER [3^ 

forms announced their purpose to refrain from any inter- 
dict in foreign affairs and to cultivate closer relations 

with the nations of the western hemisphere. 1 Such interest 
•here was in foreign relations in the campaign centered 

in Blaine's record as Secretary of State. 2 

The old parties were slow to take up the questions raised 

I he new economic conditions that had developed. 3 There 

little well-informed public opinion on them and there 

were powerful interests opposed to any action. Neither 
ty, however, could afford to ignore the elements of dis- 
tent, and each posed as the friend of the farmer and the 
rkingman. The Republicans based their claim on the 

tact that they were the originators of the homestead laws 
1 that the system of protection had been developed mainly 
I he interest of labor. The Democrats declared that they 
■e traditionally the party of the common people while 

the Republicans had always been the party of special privi- 
The record of party action in Congress did not bear 
the claim of either party. Neither party had any den- 
ate policy toward the problems of either the farmer or the 

laborer and such bills as were passed dealing with these 

questions were passed by non-partisan votes. 4 

rhe failure of the old parties to meet the new issues 

caused the formation of several new parties in the two dec- 
is following the war. As the purchasing power of the 
lar continued to grow and to bear more and more heavily 
1 he debtor West the demand for greenbacks became in- 
sistent Many communities in the Middle West formed 
irate political organizations to promote the greenback 
l. Various farmers' organizations in the same region 

1 Stauwood, Presidency, pp. 431, 437, 438. 
* ; Vide infra, p. 149. 
3 Vide supra, p. 16. 
McPherson, 1876-1884, passim. 



3 1 5 ] MINOR ISS UES AND MINOR PARTIES 1 3 5 

formed local or state parties in the seventies, mainly to de- 
mand government regulation of railroads and forfeiture of 
land grants to corporations. These anti-monopoly parties, 
as they were ca!led, were usually in their origin distinct 
from the greenback parties, although fusion between them 
was common. 1 

Labor for the most part had kept aloof from politics, 
preferring straight trade-union methods. This was the 
traditional policy of the Knights of Labor, the strongest 
labor organization of the period." There was always, how- 
ever, a minority which was anxious to use political methods 
and form a national labor party. A group of labor leaders 
and intellectuals held a convention in 1872 and under the 
name of the National Labor Reform party nominated 
David Davis for the Presidency. Davis declined the nomi- 
nation and Charles O'Conor was substituted. His vote was 
negligible and discouraged further attempts to form a sep- 
arate labor party. s 

There was a tendency for these various elements of dis- 
content to unite in one party. The hard times following the 
panic of 1873 increased dissatisfaction with the old parties 
and in 1876 a national greenback convention was held. 
This convention was attended both by representatives of 
farmers' anti-monopoly organizations and by labor leaders, 
but the currency question was the main issue and it was 
from the greenbackers that Peter Cooper, the nominee for 
the Presidency, drew most of his support. 4 The labor 
trouble of 1877 turned labor more strongly to the Green- 

1 Buck, The Granger Movement, pp. 80-101. 

2 Powderly, Thirty Years of Labor, p. 239. 

5 Commons (and associates), History of Labor in the U. S\, vol. ii, 
pp. 43, 96, 115, 124, 151-155; Ely, Labor Movement in America, pp. 61-69. 

4 Commons, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 168-240; Lalor, Cyc. of Pol. Sci-, p. 
418; Ann. Cyc., 1876, p. 781. 



^6 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [316 

back party and were partly responsible for the 1.000,000 
votes polled by the party in 1878. In 1880, however, the 
accomplishment of resumption, the increase in the volume 
of currency due to coinage of silver and the renewed indus- 
trial prosperity lessened the force of the appeal of the 
greenbackers. Their convention was made up of green- 
backers, anti-monopolists, labor leaders, socialists and vari- 
ous other reformers with special hobbies. Their platform 
devoted less attention to the currency and advocated a long 
list of reforms in an evident attempt to appeal to all the 
elements of discontent in the country. In spite of this fact, 
the party polled less than a third of the vote it had received 
in 1878. 1 

After 1880 two opposite tendencies developed in the labor 
movement. One was that toward a growing class con- 
sciousness and a semi-socialistic program which was greatly 
strengthened by the wide dissemination of Henry George's 
book, Progress and Poverty, and which became more 
noticeable in the period of business depression starting in 
1882. 2 The other was the tendency of the skilled workers 
organized in trades unions toward a closer federation and a 
policy of refraining from independent political action while 
attempting to bring pressure to bear on the existing parties. 
The Federation of Organized Trade and Labor Unions of 
the United States and Canada, the immediate predecessor 
of the present American Federation of Labor, was formed 
in 1881. 3 

The business depression which had started in 1882 and 
grown steadily worse 4 had seriously affected labor engaged 

1 Commons, op. cit., pp. 246, 269-200 ; Hillquit. History of Socialism 
in the U. S., p. 266; Stanwood, Presidency, p. 419. 
s Ely, Recent American Socialism, p. 16. 
s Commons, op. cit., pp. 319-330. 
* Vide supra, p. 121. 



317] MINOR ISSUES AND MINOR PARTIES i$y 

in manufacturing. Bradstreefs estimated that during the 
year 1883 wages had been reduced from ten to twenty per- 
cent in most of the important industries of the country and 
that there had been a reduction of ten percent in the num- 
ber of men employed in these industries. 1 Conditions grew 
still worse in 1884. After a careful inquiry conducted in 
the twenty-two most important manufacturing states and a 
comparison with the census reports of 1880, with due allow- 
ance for the increase that had taken place up to 1882, Brad- 
streefs reported that there had been an average reduction 
in wages of from twenty to twenty-five percent, and in cer- 
tain industries as much as thirty-five percent. The reduction 
in working force varied from thirty-three to twenty percent 
in different industries. Not counting the large reduction of 
clerical forces in mercantile establishments, it was estimated 
that there were at least 350,000 fewer persons employed in 
manufacturing than there had been in 1882. The number 
of these who had found employment in other lines was not 
known. 2 Under these circumstances it was felt that the 
labor vote would play an unusually important part in the 
Presidential campaign. 

An Anti-Monopoly convention was held in Chicago, May 
14, 1884. Only 138 delegates, representing farmers' or- 
ganizations for the most part, were in attendance from 
twenty-one states, and the convention attracted but little 
attention in the East. 3 It adopted a platform which con- 
tained a comprehensive plan for the protection of " the 
rights of all against privileges of the few." Regulation of 
interstate commerce was declared to be the immediate and 
imperative duty of Congress. Forfeiture of land grants to 
corporations, labor legislation, payment of the debt as it 

1 Bradstreefs, Feb. 23, 1884. 

2 Ibid., Dec. 20, 1884. 

3 N. Y. Sun, May 15, 1884; Commons, op. cit., p. 440. 



1 38 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [ 3I g 

came due, direct election of U. S. Senators, a graduated 
income tax and a revision of the tariff in the interests of 
labor instead of capital were advocated. The platform 
closed with a demand that agriculture be given the " fos- 
tering care of the government " and an appeal to farmers 
to unite with the party for the overthrow of monopoly. 1 

The Greenback convention held in Indianapolis on May 
28 of the same year was made up of all sorts of reformers 
and their platform covered a wide range of subjects. It 
declared the recent decision of the Supreme Court 2 to be a 
full vindication of their theory of money and demanded the 
issue of greenbacks in " sufficient quantities to supply the 
actual demands of trade," and the substitution of green- 
backs for national bank notes. The larger part of the plat- 
form, however, was devoted to plans for improving the 
condition of the workers and limiting special privilege. It 
demanded government regulation of all monopolies, espec- 
ially of railroads, and a graduated income tax. It declared 
in favor of submitting the questions of woman suffrage 
and prohibition to popular vote. While favoring a revision 
of the tariff, it declared that the tariff was of secondary 
importance to the financial question and that it was used by 
the old parties to distract attention from the main issue. 3 

Both the Anti-Monopoly and the Greenback parties 
showed their poverty of leadership and their willingness to 
subordinate principle to temporary advantage by the nomi- 
nation of Benjamin F. Butler for the Presidency. Butler 
had had a variegated career. For more than a quarter of a 
century he had been a national figure as a bourbon Demo- 
crat before the war, a major-general in the war charged 

1 Stanwood, Presidency, p. 422. 

* Juilliard v. Greenman, no U. S., p. 421. 

8 Stanwood, Presidency, p. 423. 



319] MINOR ISSUES AND MINOR PARTIES 139 

with inefficiency and dishonesty, and a leader of the radical 
Republicans in the days of reconstruction. After several 
attempts to get the Republican nomination for governor of 
Massachusetts, he had run as an independent, had secured 
Democratic endorsement and had finally been elected in 
1882 as a Democrat. Although he had long proclaimed 
himself the friend of the workingman and the foe of special 
privilege, there was little in his record as Congressman, 
governor or employer that would indicate that his real in- 
terest in labor went farther than a desire to gain its favor 
for his own ends. His main claim to the support of the 
workingman, as given by one of his supporters in the cam- 
paign of 1884, was that " all the snobs and all the dilet- 
tantes hate him, and Harvard College won't make him a 
doctor of laws." x 

Butler's nomination by both parties was a foregone con- 
clusion and was evidently the result of careful planning by 
his lieutenants. 2 It was brought about without difficulty, 
but several delegates withdrew from the Anti-Monopoly 
convention, declaring that it had been packed for Butler, 3 
and a considerable minority among the Greenbackers op- 
posed him and refused to make his nomination unanimous. 4 
He did not definitely accept either nomination until August. 
in response to an inquiry as to whether he would accept the 
Greenback nomination, he refused to commit himself but 
gave the impression that he would. 5 His plan was evi- 

1 Address of H. J. Clark, campaign document of Peoples Party 1884; 
for accounts of Butler vide Butler's Book; Hoar, Autobiog., vol. i, 
p. 363; Rhodes, Hist, of U. S., vol. v, p. 312; The Record of B. F. 
Butler (campaign pamphlet) ; N. Y. Times. Jan. 3, July 19, Nov. 4, 1884. 

s A". Y. Sun, May 26, 28, 1884. 

*N. Y. Times, May 19. 

* A r . Y. Sun, May 30. 

5 Ibid., May 29. 



I4 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [320 

dently to work with Tammany to defeat Cleveland 1 and to 
bully the Democrats into nominating him by threatening 
them with the loss of the labor vote. 2 

The Knights of Labor had representatives at the Repub- 
lican convention to urge the claims of labor. 3 There was 
also present a delegation from Typographical Union No. 6 
of New York city to urge the convention to repudiate White- 
law Reid and the New York Tribune, on w T hom the union 
had declared a boycott because of the discharge of union 
printers in violation, the union claimed, of an agreement 
between Reid and itself. When neither group received 
much attention from the convention, the New York union 
voted to fight Blaine in the campaign. 4 

Both the major parties devoted considerable space in their 
platforms to the questions with which the minor parties 
were mainly concerned, but both w T ere vague in their posi- 
tive recommendations and there was no distinct issue be- 
tween them. Both declared for the policy of preserving the 
public lands for actual settlers and of revoking where pos- 
sible existing grants to corporations. The Democrats 
declared that they favored all legislation which would 
tend " to the prevention of monopoly, and to the strict 
enforcement of individual rights against corporate abuses," 
but that " the welfare of society depends upon a scrupulous 
regard for the rights of property as defined by law." The 
Republicans more definitely declared in favor of federal 
regulation of railroads in such a way as to " secure to the 
people and to the railways alike the fair and equal protec- 
tion of the laws." Both asserted at length their devotion 

1 Schurz, Works, vol. iv, p. .213. 

2 Cf. infra, p. 184. 

3 Nation, June 5. 

* Hist, of Typo. Union No. 6. p. 388— in Report of N. Y. Stale Dept. 
of Labor, 1912. 



£2l] MINOR ISSUES AND MINOR PARTIES I4 i 

to labor, their intention to revise the revenue laws with the 
welfare of labor chiefly in mind, and their opposition to the 
importation of Chinese labor or other labor under contract. 
The Republicans came out definitely in favor of the estab- 
lishment of a national bureau of labor and the enforcement 
of the eight-hour law. The Democrats declared that labor 
should be " fostered and cherished " and favored laws by 
which labor organizations might be incorporated. 

Another issue that had an important bearing on the result 
of the campaign, although not an issue between the major 
parties, was that of prohibition. The question of control 
of the liquor traffic had become a vital one in several states 
and had played an important part in the elections of 1882. 
In the election of 1883 in Ohio it was generally considered 
to have been the main factor in the Democratic victory. 1 
The Democratic party had consistently taken the position in 
their state platforms that control of the liquor traffic was 
not a proper subject for legislation. The Republicans, 
while not taking a definite stand for prohibition, had not 
opposed it, their usual tactics being to favor the submission 
of the question to the voters. The question had come up 
in Congress at different times, mainly in the form of 
attempts to have special or standing committees appointed 
to deal with the question. The support for these motions 
came mainly from the Republicans and the opposition from 
the Democrats. 2 The Republicans ignored the question in 
their platform for 1884, but the Democrats put in a plank 
announcing their opposition to " sumptuary laws which vex 
the citizens and interfere with personal liberty." 

The first national party on the temperance question was 
formed in 1872 under the name of the National Prohibition 
Party and polled 5608 votes in the Presidential election of 

1 Vide supra, pp. 71, yy. 

2 McPherson, 1876, p. 199, 1882, p. 118, 1884, p. 190. 



142 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [322 

that year. Their vote in 1876 was 9522, and in 1880, 
1 0,306.* The convention of 1884 was held in Pittsburgh, 
July 23, and nominated John P. St. John, formerly Repub- 
lican governor of Kansas, who had been defeated in 1882 
on the prohibition issue. 2 St. John had made a good record 
as governor and was a forceful speaker and a good cam- 
paigner. The Prohibition platform was a well-written 
document presenting a definite program. It pictured the 
evils of intemperance and demanded, as first steps in its 
abolition, that the government abandon the taxes on liquor 
and tobacco, that Congress prohibit the manufacture and 
sale of liquor in the District of Columbia and the territories 
and that no state be admitted to the union until its consti- 
tution prohibited the manufacture and sale of liquor. It 
condemned the Republican party for not having done any- 
thing to check the liquor traffic in all the years of its power 
and condemned its nominees for having shown their friend- 
liness to the liquor interests by propositions for such a use 
of revenue as would necessitate the perpetuati ~>n of the 
tax on liquors. 3 The Democratic party was condemned as 
a matter of course for its declared opposition to sumptuary 
laws. In addition to the planks on prohibition, the plat- 
form declared for civil service reform, retention of public 
lands for the people, a liberal pension system and woman 
suffrage. It repudiated as un-American the doctrine that 
any " person or people shall or may be excluded from resi- 
dence or citizenship." 4 

1 Stanwood, Presidency, pp. 352, 383, 417; Black, History of the 
National Prohibition Party. 
2 N. Y. Times, July 25. 

3 Blaine had suggested the distribution of the surplus among the 
states. Vide supra, p. 124. Logan had introduced a bill providing 
that the revenue from the liquor taxes be used for the support of 
schools. Cong. Rec., 47 C, 1 S., pp. 266, 401. 

4 Stanwood, Presidency, p. 442. 



323] MINOR ISSUES AND MINOR PARTIES ^3 

As has been previously indicated, the platform declara- 
tions of the two major parties on the tariff, civil service 
reform, the currency, foreign policy, labor problems, con- 
trol of interstate commerce, public lands, and the Southern 
question, although different in phraseology, when reduced 
to programs of action were practically the same. There 
was no real issue between them on other questions. Both 
declared in favor of pensions, of choosing territorial offi- 
cials from actual residents of the territories, and for the 
building up of the merchant marine. An increased navy 
and the suppression of polygamy in the territories were 
demanded by the Republicans and not mentioned by the 
Democrats, while the question of improvement of internal 
waterways was dealt with only by the Democrats. None 
of these questions was important enough, however, to be 
called an issue. It was only in praise of itself or in the 
arraignment of its opponents that either party was definite 
and positive. The Democrats gave a long and detailed 
table of the sins of omission and commission of the Repub- 
licans, ending with the declaration that " honey-combed 
with corruption, outbreaking exposures no longer shock its 
moral sense. Its honest members, its independent journals, 
no longer maintain a successful contest for authority in its 
canvasses or a veto upon bad nominations." The Repub- 
licans, as usual, " pointed with pride " to their record and 
endorsed the administrations of both Garfield and Arthur. 
The Nation declared that the platforms " draw no dividing 
line of principle or policy upon either side of which the 
voter may be sure that he is casting his influence in favor 
of one set of ideas as opposed to another. . . . ' The Re- 
publican party,' says the Democratic platform, ' so far as 
principle is concerned, is a reminiscence.' Quite true. The 
Democratic party is another." * The Independent said, 

^uly 17. 



J44 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [324 

" Their platforms are in both cases mere political speeches, 
differing only in the skill with which they praise them- 
selves, abuse the other party, throw out bait to catch selfish 
votes, and juggle with terms to evade a statement of prin- 
ciple, when they have none to state." 1 

'July 17. 



CHAPTER VIII 
The Republican Nomination 

The two leading candidates for the Republican nomina- 
tion in 1884 were Arthur and Blaine. Although the fac- 
tions within the party were not as clear-cut or as well or- 
ganized as in 1880, these two men stood out as the leaders 
respectively of the Stalwarts and the Half-Breeds. The 
dispute between Garfield and Conkling which ended in 
Conkling's retirement from politics, the stigma which at- 
tached to the Stalwarts of partial responsibility for the state 
of affairs that led to Garfield's death, the uprising against 
the Camerons in Pennsylvania in 1882, and finally Arthur's 
refusal to use his office to build up one faction of the party, 
all combined to leave the Stalwarts without strong leader- 
ship or organization. Garfield's untimely death had also 
deprived the Half-Breeds of an opportunity to use the 
patronage to build up their organization. The Independ- 
ents had developed no leader among their own number who 
was popular enough to be seriously considered, but results 
in 1882 had shown that they were a force to be reckoned 
with. 

Various candidates were discussed and favorite sons 
brought forward, but none of them except Arthur and 
Blaine developed strength enough to be a real contender for 
the nomination. Senator Edmunds of Vermont was the 
Independent's choice but he was from a small state and was 
not widely known or popular. The same objections held 
against Senator Hawley of Connecticut. John Sherman 
325] 145 



I4 6 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [326 

was strong in Ohio but made no great impression outside. 
Logan of Illinois likewise had considerable local strength 
but little national. Gresham of Indiana, Arthur's Postmas- 
ter-General, was spoken of but was not widely known. 
General W. T. Sherman was objectionable because of the 
fact that his wife was a Roman Catholic and he positively 
refused to be considered. 1 Practical politicians were will- 
ing to admit the weaknesses of either Blaine or Arthur but 
could see no other available candidate. 2 

It was the general consensus of opinion that Arthur's 
record as President would compare favorably with those 
of the great majority of his predecessors. He refused to 
use his office for partisan purposes although under strong 
pressure to do so. His appointments in the main were good. 
His utterances on matters of public policy were intelligent 
and courageous. His conduct at all times was dignified. 
His administration was free from scandal. 3 Every Repub- 
lican state convention held in 1884 endorsed his administra- 
tion. 4 Although 196 of his 278 votes on the first ballot at 
the national convention came from the southern states whose 
delegates were named by Republican office-holders, there is 
no evidence that Arthur used his office to force his renomi- 
nation. 5 Robertson, collector of the port of New York, 
was an active supporter of Blaine and was present at the 
convention working for Blaine. 

Arthur was especially strong with business men, who felt 
that they should leave well enough alone. A meeting of 

1 Hamilton, Blaine, p. 625. 

J Schurz, Works, vol. iv. p. 202, letter of Plumb. 

3 McCulloch, Men and Measures of Half a Century, p. 484; Peck, 
Twenty Years, p. 4; Rhodes, article in Scribner's, Sept. 1911. 

* Official Proceedings of the Eighth Rep. Nat. Conv. (Chicago, li. 
pp. in, 114. 

5 Rhodes, op. cit. 



327] THE REPUBLICAN NOMINATION T47 

business men of New York city, held at Cooper Union, May 
20, adopted resolutions commending his administration and 
urging his renomination. A delegation of New York busi- 
ness men went to the convention to further his candidacy. 1 
His strength with the business interests was turned against 
him at the convention, where the Blaine supporters charged 
that his candidacy had a " flavor of Wall St. about it." 2 

Arthur's great weakness as a candidate was that he was 
not a good self-advertiser. There had been nothing spec- 
tacular in his administration. His lack of partisanship, 
whether it was due, as his friends said, to a desire to be fair 
to all factions whatever the cost, or as his enemies said, to 
his attempts to please everybody, was a source of weakness. 
Admirers of Garfield could never quite forgive Arthur for 
having gained the Presidency through Garfield's assassina- 
tion. 3 Only by leaving the administration entirely under 
Blaine's control could Arthur have satisfied the Half- 
Breeds. They declared that he failed to measure up to the 
standard set by Garfield and that his re-election was im- 
possible. 4 His failure to make a complete sweep of Half- 
Breed office-holders alienated the Stalwart leaders. 5 Prac- 
tical politicians pointed to the overwhelming defeat of Fol- 
ger, his candidate in New York in 1882, as evidence of his 
weakness. The Independents, while conceding many of 
Arthur's good points, were not enthusiastic about him. G. 
W. Curtis, president of the National Civil Service Reform 
League, said in his address to the league, August 6, 1884, 

1 N. Y. Times, April 13, May 21, 31, 1884; Schurz, Works, vol. iv, p. 202. 

2 Leslie's History of the Rep. Party, vol. i, p. 432. 

3 Schurz, Works, vol. iv, p. 202. 

* Sherman, Antobiog., vol. ii, p. 886; Hoar, Autobiog., vol. i, p. 405; 
N. Y. Tribune, Jan. 28, et passim. 

5 Piatt, Autobiog., p. 180; Boutwell, Reminiscences, vol. i, p. 275; 
Peck, Twenty Years, p. 11. 



I 4 8 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [328 

" his honorable treatment of the new policy [civil service 
reform] is one of his chief titles to public regard . . . his 
candor and good faith secured the fair trial of the new 
system." : Many could not forget, however, that he had 
been a machine politician and had stood for years for all 
the things that they were opposed to. There was always 
in their minds the suspicion that in endorsing reform he 
was merely making a virtue of necessity and that his con- 
version might not be lasting. His general good record in 
appointments was marred by a few conspicuously bad ones. 
The effect of his refusal to play politics in most cases was 
spoiled by a few isolated acts such as his aid to the Mahone 
machine in Virginia and his interference in the New York- 
election of 1882. 2 The Independents, although they were 
hostile to Arthur early in the campaign, greatly preferred 
him to Blaine, and as Blaine's strength increased they 
showed inclinations to turn to Arthur. The Independent 
leaders in the convention would have been glad to unite on 
Arthur as a last resort to defeat Blaine. 3 

The candidate who figured in all calculations, and who 
everyone admitted, either gladly or with regret, was bound 
• 1 be strong, was Blaine. His arch enemy Conkling was 
no longer active and he had the support of several men who 
had opposed him formerly. The Chicago Tribune and the 
Cincinnati Commercial, two powerful middle-western news- 
papers which had formerly opposed him, now supported 
him. 4 The argument, however, which had done most to 
prevent his nomination in 1876 and 1880, his railroad trans- 
actions, although old, had never been satisfactorily an- 

1 N. Y. Times, Aug. 8. 

2 Nation, March 2, April 13, June I, 1882, Nov. 22, 1883, April 17, 24, 
May i, 1884; N. V. Times. April 8, June 9, 1884; Cary, Life of G. W. 
Curtis, p. 287. 

'■'■ Harper's Weekly, June 14. 

4 Stanwood, Blaine, p. 183. 



329] THE REPUBLICAN NOMINATION j^g 

swered and was sure to be brought up against him. Since 
1876 he had done little to add to his reputation. He had 
been elected to the Senate to fill out Morrill's term and re- 
elected to succeed himself. In the Senate he played a 
minor part, never acquiring the influence or the reputation 
that he had in the House. 1 He was Garfield's close adviser 
in the campaign of 1880 and was made Secretary of State. 

Blaine's record as Secretary of State gained him pub- 
licity but was not such as to strengthen him with students 
of public affairs. He was the leader of the group that de- 
manded what it called a vigorous foreign policy, which his 
opponents declared consisted in adopting a bullying attitude 
toward the small Latin- American states and a truculent 
attitude toward any European country that seemed inclined 
to interfere. Blaine, according to his friends, was one of 
the few men of sufficient vision to see the real destiny of 
the United States among nations and to have a plan which 
would enable her to play the part that she should as the 
leader of the western hemisphere. The declared purpose of 
Blaine's policy was to bring about peace and prevent future 
wars in North and South America and to build up friendly 
relations with the Latin-American countries which would 
greatly increase the export trade of the United States. 2 

One of Blaine's problems as Secretary of State was the 
delicate one of adjusting the trouble between Chili and 
Peru, which had been at war with each other for more 
than two years. Peru possessed lands with valuable deposits 
of nitrates and guano which Chili coveted and in which vari- 
ous individuals, including some who claimed to be citizens 
of the United States, were financially interested. Blaine's 

1 Stanwood, Blaine, pp. 188-215. 

2 Blaine, " The Foreign Policy of Garfield's Administration," in 
Chicago Weekly Magazine, Sept. 16, 1881, also published as a pamphlet ; 
Hamilton, Blaine, p. 504; Stanwood, Blaine, p. 241. 



L $ THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [330 

motives in the matter have been attacked, and while any- 
definite proof of dishonest ones is lacking, the charge that 
he forced the recognition of a government in Peru that had 
not even a de facto existence, and adopted a dictatorial atti- 
tude toward Chili which lessened the chances for peace and 
caused suspicion of the United States on the part of South 
American countries, seems to be justified. 1 When Freling- 
huysen took over the duties of Secretary of State he adopted 
a much milder tone toward Chili and revoked part of the 
instructions of Trescott, the special minister whom Blaine 
had sent to Chili. 2 

Blaine was also criticized for his interference in the 
boundary dispute between Mexico and Guatemala. Al- 
though the note which he sent to Mexico was rather dicta- 
torial, there seems to have been no serious breach of inter- 
national etiquette. 3 

Blaine's pet scheme for Latin- America was his peace con- 
gress. Invitations were sent out in November, 1881, to the 
various countries of South and Central America to partici- 
pate in a general congress to be held at Washington. The 
call for the congress announced that " its sole aim shall be 
to seek a way of permanently averting the horrors of cruel 
and blood)' combat between countries, oftenest of one blood 
and speech, or the even worse calamity of internal commo- 
tion and civil strife." 4 Blaine's opponents charged that, 
however laudable the desire to bring about peace might be, 

1 U. S. Foreign Relations, 1881, passim; Sen. Ex. Doc., 47 O, 1 S., 
no. 79; House Rep., 47 C, 1 S., no. 1790; Ann. Cyc., 1882, p. 810; 
pamphlets published during campaign of 1884 — Hurlburt, Meddling and 
Muddling, de Leon, A Specimen of Mr. Blaine's Diplomacy, Hall, Blaine 
and His Foreign Folky; Nation, Dec. 15, 1881, Feb. 2, May 5, Aug. 13, 
1882, Sept. 18, 25, Oct. 2, 1884; Independent, Oct. 30, 1884. 

2 U. S. Foreign Rels., 1882, p. 57. 

3 For. Rels., 1881, p. 766 ct seq.; also pamphlets referred to supra. 
* For. Rels., 1881, p. 14. 



33 1 ] THE REPUBLICAN NOMINA TION 1 5 1 

this was but another of his devices for self-advertising. 
They quoted the phrase about internal commotions to show 
that it was a scheme to give the United States an excuse to 
interfere in the affairs of smaller nations for the benefit of 
business interests. Blaine's continued insistence on the 
great benefits to trade to be derived from his policy give 
some force to this accusation. 

Blaine had instructed Trescott, the special minister to 
Chili, to visit other South American countries in the inter- 
est of the congress. Frelinghuysen in a note to Trescott 
on January 9, 1882, cancelled that part of his instructions, 
saying : 

The United States is at peace with all the nations of the earth 
and the President wishes hereafter to determine whether it will 
conduce to that general peace, which he would cherish and 
promote, for this government to enter into negotiation and con- 
sultation for the promotion of peace with selected friendly na- 
tionalities without extending a like confidence to other peoples 
with whom the United States is on equally friendly terms. . . . 
The principles controlling the relations of the republics of this 
hemisphere with each other and with other nationalities may, 
on investigation, be found to be so well established that little 
could be gained at this time by reopening a subject which 
is not novel. The President at all events prefers time for 
deliberation. 1 

In a special message, April 18, 1882, Arthur included a 
copy of the invitation to the proposed peace congress and, 
announcing that the differences between the South Amer- 
ican states, which he had hoped would be settled, still con- 
tinued, referred to Congress the propriety of proceeding 
with the enterprise. 2 The invitation was withdrawn by 

1 For. Rels., 1882, p. 57. 

2 Richardson, vol. viii, p. 97. 



152 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [332 

Frelinghuysen in a note to the various ministers dated 
August 9. 1 Arthur announced in his message of Decem- 
ber, 1882, that the invitation had been withdrawn because 
the war between Chili and Peru still continued and Con- 
gress had taken no action on his message of April and made 
no provision for the expenses of the congress. 2 Blaine at- 
tacked the administration for reversing his policy. In an 
open letter to President Arthur and in newspaper interviews 
he declared that the withdrawal of the invitation was a 
" voluntary humiliation of this government before Euro- 
pean powers." 3 

Blaine for some reason or other seemed to have a strong- 
bias against all things British. 4 He found an opportunity 
to give vent to his feelings against England in connection 
with the controversy over the isthmian canal. Interest in 
the canal had been revived by the activities of the De Lesseps 
company. The Clayton-Bulwer treaty with England stood 
in the way of a canal built and controlled by the United 
States. Blaine hit upon the expedient of getting around the 
Clayton-Bulwer treaty by completely ignoring it. In a note, 
June 24, 1881, sent to the envoys at the various European 
capitals to be delivered simultaneously, he said that it had 
fallen under the observation of the President that the great 
powers of Europe might possibly be considering the ques- 
tion of the joint guarantee of the neutrality of an inter- 
oceanic canal. He called attention to the treaty of 1846 
between the United States and New Grenada, and declared 
that this 

1 For. Rels., 1882, p. 4. 

3 Richardson, vol. viii, p. 130. 

3 Blaine, Foreign Policy of Garfield; Hamilton, Blaine, p. 521 ; Nation, 
Feb. 9, March 30, 1882. 

4 Vide e. g. Blaine, Twenty Years, chap, xx; House Reps., 47 C. 
1 S., no. 1790, p. 217, testimony of Blaine. 



333] THE REPUBLICAN NOMINATION 153 

guarantee, given by the United States of America, does not 
require any re-enforcement, or accession, or assent by any 
other power. . . . Any attempt to supersede that guarantee by 
an agreement between European powers . . . whose interests 
in the canal and its operation can never be so vital and supreme 
as ours would partake of the nature of an alliance against the 
United States and would be regarded by this government as 
an indication of unfriendly feeling. 1 

No mention whatever was made of the Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty in this remarkable note. Lord Granville made no 
reply for several months, and then in a curt note called 
attention to the Clayton-Bulwer treaty and said that Her 
Majesty's Government relied with confidence upon the ob- 
servation of all the obligations of that treaty. 2 In a sup- 
plementary note which was sent before Granville's was re- 
ceived, but not until five months after the first, Blaine took 
up the Clayton-Bulwer treaty and gave reasons why the 
United States wished it abrogated. He said that by reason 
of Britain's large navy the two nations were not left on a 
basis of equality in regard to the canal. The general tone 
of the note may be judged by the following extract : " The 
military power of the United States, as shown by the recent 
Civil War, is without limit and in any conflict on the Amer- 
ican continent altogether irresistible." :: Blaine's argument 
amounted to a " statement that the United States having 
found the obligations of its contract irksome, and antag- 
onistic to its new political policies, it therefore deemed it 
fitting and proper to avoid them." i It was a novel way for 
a nation to go about securing the favor of the modification 

1 For. Rels., 1881, p. 537- 
1 Ibid., p. 549- 
3 Ibid., p. 554- 

* Henderson, American Diplomatic Questions, p. 147; vide also La- 
tane, Diplomatic Relations of the U. S. and Spanish America, p. 208. 



!54 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [334 

of a treaty from a friendly power. The Economist (Lon- 
don) of December 24, 1881, said: 

It is difficult for Englishmen to read such a dispatch unmoved, 
and to repress the inclination to answer it by a definite refusal 
to modify the Clayton- Bui wer treaty, leaving the Government 
at Washington to take such steps as they may deem expedient. 
It is vain, however, for nations to give way to temper; the 
evidence that the wording of the dispatch is intended to please 
Americans rather than to displease Englishmen is very strong, 
and in the interest of both nations it is wiser to regard only the 
substance of the request thus rudely pressed upon Britain's 
attention. 1 

It is not to be wondered at that the English newspapers 
were not enthusiastic about Blaine's candidacy. His friends, 
however, attributed their hostility to " English free-trade 
spite." 2 

Another question that Blaine had to take up with England 
was that of American citizens imprisoned in Ireland. The 
Irish vote was considered to be one of the great elements in 
Blaine's strength. This was apparently due to the general 
belief that he had been particularly active while Secretary 
of State in protecting the rights of American citizens im- 
prisoned in Ireland. An examination of the records, how- 
ever, reveals no basis for this belief. The Coercion Act 
was passed by Parliament March 2, 1881, and under the 
authority of this act several persons who claimed American 
citizenship were imprisoned. Petitions for their release 
were made by them and their friends to Minister Lowell in 
London and to the State department at Washington. Steps 
were taken by the State department through Mr. Lowell to 
secure to those imprisoned their legal rights, but the doc- 

1 Quoted in Hall, Blaine and His Foreign Policy, p. 20. 

2 N. Y. Tribune, June 25, 1884. 



335] THE REPUBLICAN NOMINATION 155 

trine was laid down that every government had the right to 
administer its own municipal law to all persons within its 
jurisdiction. During Blaine's term only one person who 
claimed American citizenship was released, and he was 
released on the ground of ill-health. Blaine followed 
Lowell's advice in the matter, approved of his action and 
adopted his opinion, yet Blaine was held up as the protector 
of American citizens while Lowell was execrated as the 
tool of British interests. 1 

A few distrusted Blaine because of his record as Secre- 
tary of State and saw in his foreign policy a reckless attempt 
to cultivate popularity at the cost of the interests of his 
country. They believed that his policy would involve the 
United States in needless foreign difficulties. 2 The great 
mass of voters, however, knew little and cared less about 
what foreign policy was adopted. Foreign policy played 
but a minor part in either the nomination or the election. 

After Blaine's retirement on December 19, 1881, from 
the State department he continued to live in Washington, 
from where he gave out interviews from time to time, the 
most of them criticizing the administration for reversing 
his foreign policy. He began during this period to write his 
Tzventy Years of Congress and during the early months of 
1884 chapters of his work appeared in the newspapers. 
Rumors were started at various times that he had retired 
from politics and intended to devote himself exclusively to 
literary work. His opponents scoffed at this, declaring 
that his residence in Washington and his literary work 
were merely schemes to keep himself before the public. 3 
There is some difference of opinion as to whether Blaine 

1 For. Rels., 1881, pp. 1-43; Cong. Rec, 47 €., 1 S.. p. 1136; Hall, 
op. cit. ; Nation, Aug. 14, 1884. 
s Cary, Curtis, p. 284. 
3 Nation, April 3, 10, 17, 24, 1884; Hudson, op. cit., p. 127. 



I5 6 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [336 

wanted the nomination in 1884 or not - It has been said 
that he felt that his opportunity was past, that his public 
life was over and that he really wished to retire, also that 
he felt that because of the various enmities in the party his 
nomination in 1884 would be unwise. 1 In interviews in 
the latter part of 1883 and early in 1884 he suggested vari- 
ous other candidates, among them Allison of Iowa, Harri- 
son of Indiana, Cullom of Illinois and Miller of California. 2 
He strongly urged Gen. W. T. Sherman to be the candi- 
date. 3 His friends claimed that in doing this he was sin- 
cerely trying to find a suitable candidate and finally con- 
sented to be one himself only when he became convinced 
that no one else could save the party. Blaine wrote, April 
21, 1884, " I do not think I shall be nominated, but I am 
disturbing the calculation of others at an astonishing rate." * 
His opponents refused to believe that he was entirely altru- 
istic in booming other candidates, and insisted that he hoped 
to gain the good-will of a lot of impossibilities, who, when 
they saw they had no chance, would gratefully turn to him. 5 
One of Nast's cartoons, entitled " Blaine leans toward 
Logan," pictured Logan bound hand and foot standing on 
the steps of the White House and about to be pushed off by 
Blaine leaning against him.' 5 Just how much Blaine wanted 
the nomination or what he did to get it is difficult to decide, 
but he never publicly stated that he would not accept it or 
took steps to prevent its coming to him. 

Blaine's great stumbling-block was the opposition of the 

1 Stanwood, Blaine, p. 268; Rogers, op. cit., p. 147; Rhodes in Scrib- 
ner's, Sept. 191 1. 
2 N. Y .Tribune, Nov. 1883-Feb. 1884; Nation, Jan. 10. 1884. 
'Hamilton, Blaine, pp. 624, 625. 

4 Ibid., p. 623. 

5 Nation, January 10, April 3, 24, 1884. 

6 Harpers' Weekly, March 13, 1884. 



337] THE REPUBLICAN NOMINATION i$j 

Independents. The distrust and dislike between them was 
reciprocal. Blaine either could not or would not under- 
stand their point of view or admit that their motives were 
anything but selfish. 1 The Independents insisted that with 
public interest in reform aroused and with the people dis- 
trustful of the Republican party as shown by the elections 
of 1882, a defensive campaign was out of the question for 
the Republicans and that the nomination of Blaine would 
inevitably mean a defensive campaign. The Independents 
were especially strong in New York, 2 and the certainty of 
a solid South for the Democrats made the winning of New 
York almost a sine qua non of Republican success. 3 As 
Blaine's strength increased the efforts of his foes to show 
his unfitness were redoubled. The New York Times, the 
ening Post, the Nation and Harper's Weekly vied with 
each other in their attacks, republishing the Mulligan letters 
and raking up all the details of Blaine's record. 4 Predic- 

1 Blaine, Twenty Years, Remarks on Carl Schurz, p. 438; vide also 
articles in N. Y. Tribune, May-Aug. 1877 by Gail Hamilton, probably 
inspired by Blaine. Blaine wrote to Garfield, Dec. 10, 1880 : " The third 
section [of the Republican party] is the Reformers by profession, the 
' unco good.' They are to be treated with respect, but they are the 
worst possible political advisers — upstarts, conceited, foolish, vain, with- 
out knowledge of measures, ignorant of men, shouting a shibboleth 
which represents nothing of practical reform that you are not a thousand 
times pledged to. They are noisy but not numerous, Pharisaical but 
not practical, ambitious but not wise, pretentious but not powerful ! 
They can be easily dealt with and can be hitched to your administration 
with ease. I could handle them myself without trouble. You can do 
it more easily still." — Hamilton, Blaine, p. 490. 

* The Nation by an analysis of the votes of 1882 and 1883 estimated 
that there were at least 80,000 independent voters in N. Y. Nation, 
Nov. 29, 1883. 

3 Schurz, Works, vol. iv, pp. 200, 204. 

* Vide files of these journals March-May 1884, especially Times, April 
15, May 9; Evening Post, April 17, 27, 28; Nation, April 24, May 1, 15; 
Harper's Weekly, Feb. 23, March 29. 



I5 8 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [338 

tions of a bolt in case of Blaine's nomination were freely 
made. 1 

A dinner attended by prominent Independents from New 
York, New England, New Jersey and Pennsylvania was 
given by the Brooklyn Young Men's Republican Club on 
Washington's Birthday. The speakers included Cari 
Schurz and President Seelye of Amherst College, and a 
letter from George W. Curtis was read. The tone of the 
meeting and of the resolutions adopted was that adminis- 
trative reform should be the watchword of the campaign 
and that the nomination of a candidate bound to reform by 
his character, record and associations was indispensable to 
Republican success. A meeting was held the following day 
at which an organization was formed to be known as the 
" Conference Committee of Independent Republicans," to 
organize independent opinion throughout the country. 
This committee sent out circulars urging all Republicans 
to attend the primaries and vote for such a man as had 
been indicated in the resolutions. They neither endorsed 
nor condemned individuals, but their hostility to Blaine 
and, at first, to Arthur was clearly shown. 2 

The candidate most in favor with the Independents was 
Senator Edmunds of Vermont. Pie developed little 
strength, however, and as the time for the state conventions 
approached the efforts of the Independents were directed 
more and more toward defeating Blaine. In the New York 
state convention the Independents held the balance of power 
and the Arthur men combined with them to elect the Ed- 
munds candidates for delegates at large. 3 

An unsuccessful attempt had been made at the meeting 

1 Nation, April 24; Schurz, Works, vol. iv, p. 101. 

2 N. Y. papers, Feb. 23, 24; Ann. Cyc, 1884, P' 767; Nation, March 10, 
April 13. 

3 Nation, May 1, 1884; White, Antobiog., p. 201. 



339] THE REPUBLICAN NOMINATION i$g 

of the Republican national committee in 1883 to change the 
basis of apportionment of delegates to the national conven- 
tion so that it should have some relation to the voting 
strength of the party in the various states. The oppor- 
tunity for congressional districts to elect their own dele- 
gates was secured by a provision that district delegates 
might be elected either by district conventions or by sub- 
divisions of state conventions. State conventions were to 
be held not less than thirty nor more than sixty days be- 
fore the national convention. 1 

The convention assembled in Chicago on June 3. It was 
evident that Blaine was strong especially in the strongly 
Republican states. On the first test, however, the Blaine 
men lost. The national committee had proposed Powell 
Clayton of Arkansas a Blaine supporter, as temporary 
chairman. On motion of Lodge of Massachusetts the 
name of John R. Lynch, a negro delegate from Mississippi, 
who supported Arthur, was substituted by a vote of 424 to 
384. 2 This caused rejoicing among the anti-Blaine forces 
but was not really decisive as the issue was not strictly an 
anti-Blaine one. The Logan delegates who were later to be 
thrown to Blaine voted for Lynch as they wished to con- 
ciliate the negro vote and also possibly because they wanted 
to show the Blaine leaders the importance of Illinois. 3 

After the first day the proceedings of the convention 
were unusually harmonious. The second day John B. Hen- 
derson was chosen permanent chairman without opposition. 
The committee on credentials reported, in all cases except 
two, in favor of the delegates seated by the national com- 
mittee, and in these two, one from Kentucky and one from 
New York, the votes were divided between the contestants.* 

1 Stanwood, Presidency, p. 420. 

2 Proceedings of the Convention, p. 6. 

3 Harper's Weekly, June 14. * Proceedings, p. 50. 



!6o THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [340 

A minority report was submitted from the committee on 
rules which provided that in future conventions each con- 
gressional district should have one delegate and one addi- 
tional for each 10,000 votes or fraction thereof cast for 
the Republican electoral ticket at the previous election. 
After being attacked by the Southern delegates this was 
withdrawn and the majority report adopted without a roll 
call. 1 The platform drafted by a committee of which Mc- 
Kinley of Ohio was chairman was adopted without discus- 
sion and without a roll call. 2 A resolution was introduced 
by a delegate from Tennessee that it be the sense of the 
convention that " every member of it is bound in honor to 
support its nominee, whoever the nominee may be : and that 
no man should hold a seat here who is not ready to so 
agree.'' In support of the resolution George A. Knight, a 
Blaine delegate from California, made a direct thrust at 
Curtis and the Independents and showed the fear of a bolt 
when he said : 

No honest Republican . . . should dare to stand on the floor 
of this convention and vote down that resolution. There are 
already whisperings in the air, of men high in the Republican 
party, openly and avowedly declaring that they will not support 
one man if he be nominated by this Convention . . . and let 
all those, be they editors of newspapers or conducting great 
periodical journals, who refuse to support the nominee, let them 
be branded, that they not only come here and violate the im- 
plicit faith that was put in them, but the direct and honest 
conviction of this convention. 

After Curtis and an Edmunds delegate from Massachusetts 
had attacked the resolution it was withdrawn. 3 

1 Proceedings, p. 84. 

J Ibid., p. 91. 

:f Ibid., p. 37 et seq. 



3 4 i ] THE REPUBLICAN NOMINATION 161 

By the evening session of the third day the convention 
was ready for the nomination. Brandegee of Connecticut 
nominated Hawley, urging his availability as the friend of 
Garfield and the friend of Grant, a candidate whom all ele- 
ments could support with " nothing to be forgiven or for- 
gotten." x 

In his speech nominating John Sherman, Foraker of Ohio 
declared that Ohio was a Republican state and would cast 
her electoral vote for the nominee of the convention. He 
called attention to the existing business depression and as- 
serted that Sherman by reason of his experience and the 
" brilliancy of his common sense " was the candidate best 
fitted to allay the " distrust that disturbs the industrial in- 
terests of the country.'' 2 

Logan was nominated by Cullom of Illinois. His honor- 
able career in Congress and especially his war record and 
popularity with the veterans of the war was emphasized. 3 

Arthur was nominated by Townsend of Pennsylvania. 
Townsend pointed out that all factions were agreed that 
Arthur's adminstration had been an excellent one. He de- 
clared that to refuse him a renomination would be to fur- 
nish the Democrats, whom he characterized as " intelligent 
and tireless," with just grounds for attacking the sincerity 
of Republican desire for reform. Answering the charge 
that Arthur had been a machine politician, he said : 

^1 have, sir, to prove that Mr. Arthur has not prostituted his 
office to the purposes of faction, but to point to the fact that 
Roscoe Conkling has given his whole influence against Mr. 
Arthur ; and that Mr. Thomas C. Piatt, the man who resigned 
his office, and the man who could not sit in his seat in the Senate 
during Garfield's administration because Mr. Blaine was so 

1 Proceedings, p. ioo. 
* Ibid., p. 122. 
3 Ibid., p. 102. 



^2 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [342 

wicked as to persuade Mr. Garfield to nominate Mr. Robertson 
for Collector of the port of New York, — he is also opposed 
to Mr. Arthur. 1 

Arthur's nomination was seconded by Bingham of Penn- 
sylvania, Lynch of Mississippi and Pinchbeck of Louisiana. 
Pinchbeck minimized the effect that Stalwart resentment 
would have on Arthur's strength. He also resented the 
charge that had been made that the votes of the negro dele- 
gates were for sale and urged all negroes to continue to 
support Arthur as an answer to the slander. 2 

West of Ohio nominated Blaine in an old-fashoned 
spread-eagle speech. He said that the solid South was 
against them and that the candidate must therefore be one. 
who would appeal to all classes in the North. He dwelt on 
Blaine's long public career and closed with a prediction of 
his overwhelming success. 3 

Davis of Minnesota in seconding Blaine's nomination 
stressed the fact that he had always been regular, that al- 
though defeated in two conventions by narrow margins he 
had never sulked but had been instrumental in electing both 
his rivals. Grow of Pennsylvania also seconded the nomi- 
nation. Most significant of the seconding speeches was that 
of Thomas C. Piatt, who said : " I second this nomination, 
believing as I do, that his turn has come ; believing as I do r 
that expediency and justice demand it; believing as I do, 
that the Republican people of the Republican states that 
must give the Republican majorities want him." 4 

Edmunds' name was presented by ex-Governor Lon^ of 
Massachusetts, who* declared that the interests of the party 

1 Proceedings, p. 1 12. 

2 Ibid., p. 119. 
s Ibid., p. 105. 
*Ibid., p. 108. 



343] THE REPUBLICAN NOMINATION ^3 

were greater than the interests of any one man and that 
the interests of the country were greater than those of the 
party. He urged that the candidate must be one on whom 
all factions could unite. George W. Curtis' speech second- 
ing Edmunds' nomination was as much a speech against 
Blaine as for Edmunds. It was a forceful exposition of 
the Independent point of view. He said : 

Now, fellow-citizens, we approach a new contest, and we shall 
be tried by the candidate whom we submit to the people. I 
say we shall be tried by the candidate that we present. Do not 
forget that upon the man of our choice the eyes of the country 
will turn to see what it is that the Republican party honors and 
respects. It will turn to see what are the objects, what is the 
spirit, and what shall be the method of continued Republican 
administration. And, therefore, our candidate must be in him- 
self a resplendent manifestation of Republican principle, Re- 
publican character, and Republican purpose; a candidate who 
is in himself a triumphant victory. 

We, gentlemen, have been long in power, and prolonged 
power breeds, as we have' learned to our cost in the State of 
New York, and as you have learned, therefore, to your cost — 
prolonged power breeds dissensions within the party. The 
times are hard ; and every man who' feels poor, at once blames 
the administration of the government. The old issues are 
largely settled; and new men with new views are arising all 
around us ; and vast questions, to which no man can be blind, 
solicit our present attention and sympathy. 

This is the state of the country ; this is the state of the party ; 
and we are confronted with the Democratic party, very hungry, 
and as you may well believe, very thirsty; a party without a 
single definite principle; a party without any distinct national 
policy which it dares to present to the country ; a party which 
fell from power as a conspiracy against human rights, and now 
attempts to sneak back to power as a conspiracy for plunder 
and spoils. Nevertheless, fellow-Republicans, we have learned, 



1 64 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [344 

and many of you whom our hearts salute, have learned upon 
fields less peaceful than this, that our foe is not a foe to be 
despised. He will feel our lines to find our weakest point. 
He will search the work of this Convention with electric light. 
He will try us by our candidate. And therefore the man to 
whom we commit the banner — the banner that Abraham 
Lincoln bore — must be, like Abraham Lincoln, a knight indeed ; 
and like the old knight, a " knight without fear and without 
reproach." He must be a statesman identified with every 
measure of the great Republican past, and a pioneer in every 
measure of its future of reform ; and in himself the pledge that 
the party will not only put its face forward, but will set its 
foot forward ; and a pledge also, that that mighty foot will 
trample and crush and utterly destroy whatever disgraces the 
public service, whatever defiles the Republican name, whatever 
defeats the just expectation of the country and of the Re- 
publican party . . . 1 

After the nominating speeches, in spite of the opposition 
of some of the Blaine men the convention adjourned. Dur- 
ing the night numerous conferences were held among the 
anti-Blaine forces but no one opposition candidate could be 
agreed upon. 2 Many of the Edmunds men were willing to 
support Arthur but the Edmunds votes were independent 
and could not be transferred in a body. A fusion move- 
ment had to be led by the Arthur men since they came first 
on the roll call, and they would support no other candidate.'* 
Mark Hanna and Theodore Roosevelt tried without success 
to start a boom for John Sherman. 4 General W. T. Sher- 
man had sent a telegram positively refusing to be a candi- 
date or to serve if elected, 5 but a boom started in spite of 

' Proceedings, p. 126. 

2 N. Y. Times, N. Y. Tribune, June 4, 5, 6: White, Autobiog.. p. 203. 

3 Harper's Weekly, June 14. 

4 Rhodes, in Scribner's, Sept. 191 1. 
b N. Y. Times, June 5. 



345] THE REPUBLICAN NOMINATION ^5 

this by Senator Hoar and G. W. Curtis was blocked by 
opposition to his wife's religion. 1 

The first ballot resulted about as had been predicted. Of 
Arthur's 278 votes, 196 came from the South, nine from 
the territories, thirty-one from New York, eleven from 
Pennsylvania, with the others scattered. With the excep- 
tion of the solid Maine delegation and one vote from Massa- 
chusetts, Blaine received no votes from New England, but 
he had votes from every other state except Georgia, includ- 
ing solid delegations from California, Colorado, Nevada, 
Iowa, Oregon and West Virginia, and at least half the votes 
from Arkansas, Delaware, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, Pennsylvania 
and Texas. No important changes were made on the 
second or third ballots, Blaine gaining a few votes on each. 
After the third ballot an attempt to adjourn was frustrated 
by the Blaine men. Foraker of Ohio, amid great confusion 
in the galleries and on the floor, moved to nominate Blaine 
by acclamation, but the motion was ruled out of order. On 
the roll call for the fourth ballot Cullom of Illinois at- 
tempted to read a telegram from Logan withdrawing in 
favor of Blaine, but it was ruled out of order. Cullom 
then withdrew Logan's name and cast the vote of the state 
— Blaine thirty-four, Logan six, Arthur three. When Ohio 
was called Foraker " in the interest of the party " withdrew 
the name of John Sherman and cast the forty-six votes of 
the state for Blaine, insuring his nomination. After the 
vote had been announced, in accordance with the rules of 
the convention, the motion to make the nomination unan- 
imous was put and carried without dissent. 2 Curtis' biog- 
rapher asserts that Curtis did not vote on the motion and 

1 Rhodes, op. cit. 
-Proceedings, pp. 151-160. 



[66 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURX TO POWER [346 

resisted strong pressure to take the platform and speak in 
favor of it. 1 

Blaine's nomination undoubtedly accorded with the 
freely expressed will of the great majority of the Repub- 
lican party. It was won without the use of office-holders 
or official pressure of any kind. However distasteful to the 
fndependent element, they had to admit that it was brought 
about fairly. 2 If Blaine was an unworthy candidate the 
indictment must be brought against the rank and file of the 
Republican party. 

G. W. Curtis is said to have remarked after the conven- 
tion that Blaine's nomination was " a desperate and daring 
experiment." 8 It was an experiment in the sense that it 
was unusual for a party to nominate a man with so long a 
record as a political leader and public official. There was 
nothing of the dark horse or " impromptu statesman " 4 
about Blaine. His strength and his weakness lay in the fact 
that his record was known. The voters could not plead the 
excuse of uncertainty as to what sort of a man the candi- 
date was. 

Superficially Blaine's nomination appeared to be a strong 
one. The votes of Sherman, his strongest rival in his own 
faction, and of Logan, one of the Stalwart leaders who had 
been his bitterest opponents in 1880, had been voluntarily 
given to him. Piatt, another of his former enemies, had 
done yeoman work for him. 5 The two strongest factions 
of the party numerically appeared united. The Independ- 
ents were to be reckoned with, however, and events proved 

1 Cary, Curds, p. 287. 

- A r . Y. Times, June 7; Nation, June 12; Roosevelt. Autobiography, 
p. 06. 
x .V. Y. Tribune, June 8. 
4 1 lamilton, Blaine, p. 629, letter of Evarts. 
r ' Ibid., p. 627, letter of W. W. Phelps. 



347] THE REPUBLICAN NOMINATION 167 

that it was more important that the nomination be agree- 
able to them than that it be agreeable to either of the other 
two factions. The Half-Breeds had not been enthusiastic 
about the nomination in 1876, that of 1880 had been un- 
satisfactory to the Stalwarts, yet the sense of party loyalty 
had been strong enough to prevent a break. In 1884 the 
Independents were dissatisfied and their defection and the 
defeat of the party resulted. 

Logan received the nomination for Vice-President with- 
out a contest. A motion was passed almost unanimously 
to nominate him by acclamation, but for the sake of regu- 
larity the roll was called and he secured the votes of all 
except the New York delegation. 1 

Logan was a politician of the old school. He entered 
politics in Illinois in the early fifties as a disciple of Stephen 
A. Douglas and, after serving in the state legislature and 
two terms in Congress as a Democrat, he organized a regi- 
ment in Illinois at the outbreak of the war, and served 
throughout the war with credit, rising to the rank of major- 
general. In 1866 he was elected to Congress as a Repub- 
lican, and after two terms was elected Senator in 1870 and 
again in 1878. In Congress he was noted more for his 
strong partisanship than for his statesmanlike qualities. 
He aligned himself with the radicals on the reconstruction 
question and his principal speeches in the House and Senate 
were attacks on the ex-Confederates. He was a loyal sup- 
porter of Grant and with the help of the federal patronage 
made himself supreme in the Republican councils of Illi- 
nois. He was active in G. A. R. affairs and had served 
three terms as commander-in-chief of the organization. 
His popularity with the veterans was increased by his warm 
advocacy in Congress of pension bills both general and 
private. His education had been fragmentary and his gram- 

1 Proceedings, p. 168. 



l(& THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [348 

mar was often a source of amusement to his opponents. 
He owed his political strength to hard work, willingness to 
serve his friends, and skilful manipulation of the patronage 
and the political machinery. Although a Stalwart, a boss, 
a politician who knew no other than machine methods, he 
had always shown more regard for public opinion than 
many of his associates and had willingly modified his course 
when he saw that it was likely to be unpopular with the 
more thoughtful elements of the community. His advocacy 
of the Pendleton civil-service act is a case in point. He had 
favored greenbacks but had voted for the resumption act 
and was considered " sound " on financial questions in 
1884. His integrity was unquestioned. His nomination, 
however, added nothing to the strength of the ticket in the 
eyes of the Independents. 1 

J Dawson, Life and Services of Gen. John A. Logan, passim; Rhode?. 
op. cit., vol. vi, p. 224, vol. vii, pp. 53, 58; N. Y. Tribune, June 7. 1884. 



CHAPTER IX 
The Democratic Nomination 

With the prospects of a Democratic victory brighter in 
1884 than they had been in years, a large number of Demo- 
crats were in a receptive mood for a nomination. Favorite 
sons flourished. There were few among them, however, 
who were of what was generally considered to be Presiden- 
tial caliber. The long exclusion of the Democrats from 
any share in the executive offices had limited the number of 
their leaders of national prominence. Among their leaders 
in Congress a large number of the ablest were unavailable 
because of their active sympathy with the South during the 
war. The lack of unanimity within the party on the tariff 
question made inadvisable the nomination of any of the 
men who had taken an extreme stand on either side of that 
issue. Thus, advocacy of free trade barred Carlisle of 
Kentucky and Morrison of Illinois, while Randall of Penn- 
sylvania was too much of a protectionist to suit the West 
and South. 

There was a feeling in the West that, after twenty years 
of failure with eastern candidates, it was time that the 
West should be recognized. 1 Indiana, one of the doubtful 
states which it was especially important to carry, had two 
candidates, Joseph E. McDonald and Thomas A. Hendricks. 
Both had served in the House before the war and in the 
Senate since. Both were men of ability and there had been 
a long rivalry between them for leadership of the party in 

l Vide Proc. Nat. Dem. Cotw., 1884, p. 106. 
349] J 69 



170 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [350 

Indiana. 1 McDonald, who had been a workingman him- 
self, was thought to be strong with labor. He was sus- 
pected, however, of leanings toward free trade. 2 Hendricks 
had opposed McDonald in 1880 and prevented his getting 
the united support of the Indiana delegation, but in 1884 
Indiana sent a solid delegation for McDonald to the con- 
vention and Hendricks made the speech nominating him. 
There was a rumor current before the convention, which 
events seemed to substantiate, that McDonald's candidacy 
was a blind and that Hendricks would be brought forward 
at the proper time if that time came. 

Hendricks was one of the Democratic old guard. As a 
member of the House he had voted for the Kansas-Nebraska 
bill and been defeated for re-election. He was elected to 
the Senate in 1863 and although he had skated at times on 
rather thin ice in his opposition to the administration, 3 no 
charge of disloyalty to the Union could be made against him. 
He had favored greenbacks and his ideas on most financial 
questions were much more acceptable in Indiana than in 
the East. 4 Bigelow's estimate of Hendricks in his Life of 
Tilden, that he " might have been a statesman if he had 
been less of a demagogue," seems to be a fair one. 5 He 
had been one of the leading candidates for the nomination 
for the Presidency in 1868 and had accepted second place 
in 1876. Although he had lost ground to McDonald in In- 
diana he was talked of both as a candidate for President 
and as a running mate for Tilden again in case the old 
ticket should be revived. 

1 McClure, Lives of Cleveland and Hendricks, p. 194. 

2 iV. Y. World, June 13, 1884. 

3 A". Y. Tribune, July 12, 18S4. 

4 Rhodes. Hist, of U. S., vol. vii, p. 213; Woodburn. Political Parties 
and Party Problems, p. 105. 

r ' Vol. i, p. 205. 



351 ] THE DEMOCRATIC NOMINATION iy 1 

Ohio, the other middle-western state which the Democrats 
had hopes of carrying, also had several candidates, among 
them Allan G. Thurman, Oliver Payn and George W. 
Hoadly. Thurman was another old-time Democrat. He 
had served in Congress before the war, had been narrowly 
defeated by Hayes for governor of Ohio in 1867, had been 
chief judge of the Supreme Court of Ohio and had been in 
the Senate from 1868 to 1880. Payn, who had been elected 
to succeed Pendleton in the Senate, was spoken of favorably 
in the East, but his connection with the Standard Oil Com- 
pany and his lack of political experience made him unavail- 
able. 1 Hoadly was one of the Republicans who had joined 
the Liberal movement of 1872 and then gone back to the 
Democrats. He was a lawyer of national prominence and 
had been elected governor of Ohio in 1883. None of the 
Ohio candidates was strong enough to secure more than a 
minority of the delegates from his own state. The fact that 
the Congressional election was held in Ohio in October also 
was against the selection of any candidate from that state, 
as the Democrats were not certain of carrying it and feared 
the psychological effect of failing to- carry the home state of 
their candidate. 

There was a great deal of talk in the early part of the 
canvass about the " old ticket " — Tilden and Hendricks. 
Most Democrats believed that Tilden had been deliberately 
cheated out of the Presidency in 1876 and the " fraud " 
issue had been prominent ever since in every Democratic 
gathering. Tilden received many letters from prominent 
Democrats urging him to accept the nomination. 2 Several 
state conventions instructed their delegates to support him. 
It was generally believed, however, that Tilden was phys- 

1 N. Y. World, July 13. 1884. 

2 Bigelow, Life of Tilden, vol. ii, pp. 404-410. 



I7 2 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [352 

ically unable to make the canvass and that his boom was a 
strategic move to line up delegates who might be trans- 
ferred later to the man whom the leaders decided on. 1 On 
June 12 a letter from Tilden to Daniel Manning, chairman 
of the New York state Democratic committee, was pub- 
lished in which he definitely declined to accept a nomination 
on account of old age and poor health. 2 Some of his sup- 
porters did not even then give up the idea that he might 
still be a candidate and it was not until after Tilden had 
telegraphed the convention that he would refuse even a 
unanimous nomination that the project was abandoned. 3 

One of the most prominent candidates and one best fitted 
by character and training was Thomas F. Bayard of Dela- 
ware. He had been in the Senate since 1869 and had 
played a prominent and honorable part there. He was 
strong with the more conservative element in his party and 
was well thought of by the Independent Republicans. 4 He 
had received votes in the last three conventions. There 
were several things, however, that counted against Bayard 
with the practical politicians. He came from a small state. 
He was, in theory at least, a free-trader, being one of the 
charter members of the New York Free Trade League, 5 
and was unpopular with protectionists. ,! Above all, he had 
at the outbreak of the Civil War made a speech against the 
war and in favor of allowing the South to secede peace- 
ably, 7 which, whether justly or not, was sure to be brought 
up against him and to hurt his chances if he were nomi- 
nated. 

1 Nation, May 29, N. Y. Tribune, June 12. 

1 N. Y. papers, June 12. 

8 N. Y- Sun, July 8; Bigelow, Letters of Tilden, p. 655. 

* Schurz, Works, vol. iv, p. 205. 
5 Wheeler, Sixty Years, p. 150. 

• N. Y. World, June 14, 24, 1884. 

''Nation, June 19; N. Y. Times, June 10, 1884. 



353] THE DEM °CRATIC NOMINATION ^3 

At the opposite pole of the party was Benjamin Butler, 
who received in May the nominations of the Greenback and 
Anti-Monopoly parties. He was in close touch with the 
Tammany leaders in New York and threatened to make 
trouble at the convention. 1 Charles A. Dana, the editor of 
the New York Sun, after having shown the weaknesses of 
all possible Democratic candidates except himself and But- 
ler, in the days before the convention began to speak favor- 
ably of Butler. 2 

Roswell P. Flower of New York was mentioned as a 
candidate but was not taken seriously. He received some 
Tammany support as the man most likely to defeat Cleve- 
land. Flower had inherited a large fortune and was a 
prominent figure in financial and social circles of New York, 
famous for his contributions to charity. He had been in 
Congress and was generally looked upon as a rich man 
amusing himself in politics. 3 

In 1880 Grover Cleveland was an unknown lawyer in 
Buffalo, New York. He had taken part in local politics as 
a Democrat, serving as assistant district attorney and later 
as sheriff of Erie county and he had been defeated for 
district attorney. In 1880 he was nominated for mayor 
of Buffalo, received the support of independent voters and 
was elected by a majority of 3500. As mayor he proved to 
be an able, hard-working, conscientious and fearless exec- 
utive. His appointments were good; he vetoed several ex- 
travagant appropriations of the board of aldermen and in 
general conducted the affairs of the city on business lines. 
In 1882 he was nominated for governor and, aided by the 
support of the Independents and the general revolt against 

1 Schurz, Works, vol. iv, p. 213. 

■ N. Y. Sun, April-June 1884; A r . Y. Times, June 15, 16. 

3 Alexander, op. cit., vol. iii, p. 488; Nation, Jan. 24, 1884. 



174 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [ 554 

the Republican machine, was elected by the unprecedented 
plurality of 192,000/ 

Cleveland, as governor, lived up to the expectations of 
his supporters. His appointments were uniformly good. 
His attitude in the passage and administration of the 
civil service reform law gained him the approval of civil 
service reformers. 2 He kept close watch over the legisla- 
ture, which was Democratic during his first year and Re- 
publican during the second. He made free use of his veto 
power, showing in his vetoes a disregard for political ad- 
vantage, an interest in the popular welfare and a high sense 
of the duty and obligations of the state and its officials. 
Several bills were vetoed because they were poorly drawn 
and vague, others, notably the five-cent- fare bill, because 
they were not in accord with the letter or spirit of contracts 
voluntarily entered into by the state. Many appropriations 
were refused as being unnecessary or illegal. 3 He was also 
vigorous in his advocacy of legislation which he believed to 
be necessary, so much so that he was accused of unconsti- 
tutional interference with the legislature. 4 Among the more 
important bills passed during his term were the civil service 
bill, the bill creating a bureau of labor and the Roosevelt 
reform bills for the city of New York. 

Cleveland was not a brilliant man. His education and 
his experience had been limited. He was not a polished 
speaker. He lacked most of the qualities usually associated 
with great leaders. " He represented the practical, every- 

1 Parker, Recollections of Grovcr Cleveland, pp. 20-55 ; Hanford, Early 
Life and Public Services of Grovcr Cleveland, passim ; Dorsheimer, Life 
of Cleveland, passim ; Nation, Sept. 28, 1882. 

'Nation, June 19, July 10, 17, 24, 1884; N. Y. Eve'g. Post, Oct. 27, 
1884; N. Y. Times, July 2, 7, 24, 1884. 

3 Public Papers of G rover Cleveland, 1S83, 1884, passim. * 

*JV. Y. Tribune, Jan. 24, March 5, 1884. 



355] THE DEM0CRATIC DOMINATION 175 

day, usual citizen of moderate means and no very marked 
ambitions, a combination of the business man and the un- 
important professional person, blunt, hard-headed, brusque, 
and unimaginative." x He was absolutely honest and 
straightforward, had a great capacity for hard work and a 
real desire to serve the people. He was deliberate in all his 
actions and not easily swerved from his purpose. He was 
conservative rather than progressive on most questions, 
especially economic ones. His humble-mindedness and his 
sense of responsibility are shown in a personal letter written 
to his brother on the night of his election as governor. 

I will tell you first of all others, the policy I intend to adopt, 
and that is, to make the matter a business engagement between 
the people of the state and myself, in which the obligation on my 
side is to perform the duties assigned me with an eye single to 
the interests of my employers. I shall have no ideas of re- 
election or any higher political preferment in my head, but be 
very thankful and happy if I can well serve one term, as the 
people's Governor.- 

Cleveland had always been a party man but not merely a 
party man. His ideas as to the function of parties were well 
expressed in a speech at a Democratic gathering in New 
York city in December, 1882, shortly after his election as 
governor. 

I am quite certain, too, that the late demonstration did not 
spring from any pre-existing love for the r®rty which was 
called to power, nor did the people place th c affairs of state 
in our hands to be by them forgotten. They voted for them- 
selves and in their own interests. If we retain their confidence 
we must deserve it, and we may be sure they will call on us to 
give an account of our stewardship. We shall utterly fail to 

1 Peck, Twenty Years, p. 29. 

' Parker, Writings of Grover Cleveland, p. 535. 



17 6 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [356 

read aright the signs of the times if we are not fully convinced 
that parties are but the instruments through which the people 
work their will and that when they become less or more the 
people desert or destroy them. The vanquished have lately 
learned these things and the victors will act wisely if they 
profit by the lesson. 1 

There was nothing in his conduct as governor to indicate 
that these were not his real ideas. The charge that he was 
a machine politician and had used his office to build up a 
personal organization for himself, 2 had little foundation. 3 
While the Republicans were complaining of his partisan 
activities the Democratic New York Sun was condemning 
him for " his plan of governing without reference to the 
party that put him in power." 4 The principle factions in 
the Democratic party of the state were Tammany and anti- 
Tammany. Tammany had a strong organization in New 
York city and a few scattered supporters upstate. Their 
opponents were the County Democracy in the city and the 
group upstate of which Daniel Manning of Albany was the 
leader. Manning, the owner of the Albany Argus, had 
been active in politics for several years and his great polit- 
ical shrewdness and his ability to manage men had won 
him a commanding position in the party. He had been a 
protege of Tilden, had supported Robinson, and now turned 
to Cleveland as the coming Democrat/' He had been active 
in bringing about Cleveland's nomination and election and 
was one of his chief advisers. When Cleveland found it 
necessary to choose between the factions, he chose the anti- 

1 Parker, Writings of Grover Cleveland, p. 242. 

*N. Y. Tribune, July 18, Oct. 21, 23, 1884. 

s Wheeler, op. cit., p. 415 ; White, Autobiog., pp. 199, 207. 

* July 21, 1884. 

r> Alexander, op. cit., vol. iii, p. 419; Hudson, op. cit., p. *53. 



357] THE DEMOCRATIC NOMINATION iyy 

Tammany one. Hubert O. Thompson, the leader of the 
County Democracy, was commissioner of public works of 
New York city. A bill, called the Tenure of Office bill. 
which changed the term of several New York city officials 
and incidentally legislated Thompson out of office, passed 
the legislature and was vetoed by Cleveland on the ground 
that it was poorly drawn and would not effect its avowed 
purpose. 1 Tammany made the charge, which the Repub- 
licans took up, that Cleveland had vetoed the bill in order 
to protect his friend Thompson, 2 but the author of the bill 
later admitted that it had been amended until it was, as 
Cleveland had said, a piece of "defective and shabby legis- 
lation." 3 

Tammany's real reason for opposing Cleveland was, 
then, that he had sided with their opponents within the party 
and refused to give them what they considered to be their 
share of the spoils. The reason that they gave, however, 
was that he could not carry New York state, and they cited 
as proof of this the election of 1883 in which Cleveland's 
candidate for secretary of State had been defeated. The 
governor was said to have gained the ill-will of the anti- 
monopolists, the laboring men, the Roman Catholics and 
the Irish. 4 

There was undoubtedly some opposition to Cleveland on 
the part of labor, as he had vetoed several bills in which the 
workingmen were interested. Cleveland's views as to the 
rights of labor were really enlightened for his time. He 
believed that the welfare of the workingman was a proper 
subject for legislation, and that labor should be given its 
full and exact rights under the law. He was just as insis- 

1 Public Papers of Cleveland, 1884, p. 164. 

z N. Y. Tribune, Oct. 19, 21, 1884. 

3 N. Y. Eve'g. Post, July 10, 1884. 

4 Proceedings of Conv., pp. 120-130. 134-139. 169- 



THE DEI TIC RETURN TO POl ri- 

ghts : capita] and all vested interests • 
be z i is tbat under the curren: p 

; philoe the rights of capital had 

\ ] I such an extent that the growing needs and aspi- 
- Elal - zre ound to : th them. Cleve- 

:m reduced the rate ::' fare 
the New \ ated railway.- : five cents at all 

d the gr and that it as an impairment 
: the . sting the charter tc the ai and 

d had taken place is required by the 

" bill on the ground thai I - ; rly 
drawn and would inane rs' 

r : He had vetoed a bill to limit the 

. ■-- : rk i car [rivers ictors t twelve 

hot:: *r and that - lass legislation and 

old be inefl the ther hand, laws had been 

-ed and approved by ring a bureau of labor 

£ the manufacture of cigars in tenement 

lishmgl . r.tract prison labor, pro- 

g the ma: I hats in prisons, and rr 

g child labor in institutions. 4 Walter X. Thayer. 

rk State Tra b - rote 

. letter endorsing Cleveland and declaring that bis record 

him : - rt E al 

that Cleveland had shown undue re$ 
for cot intment bi : :he rail- 

- ad comrr. I : the i superintendent 

eB as ' y his vet : me five-cent- 

- - 
3 lir.z i :;- 

Tt ■- -■::-z: : .c Ci":cz : .gi Texibl [884, i -- -" -"-" ■ '■ '-'■ '-'■ ~ : -'^^-- '. ■'■': 

- '-- ■ <■ 

: 7 ■:■ ;.; 22 



359] THE DEMOCRATIC NOMINATION 

bill. 1 These appointments had, however, gained general 
approval. In his letter accepting the nomination for gov- 
ernor Cleveland gave a clear statement of his ideas as to the 
rights of corporations and their necessary limitations. 
" Acting within their legitimate sphere, they should be pro- 
tected; but when . . . they oppress the people, the same 
authority which created should restrain them and protect 
the rights of the citizens." " Cleveland's acts as governor 
were quite in harmony with this statement. In his message 
of 1884 he said: " It is a grave question whether the for- 
mation of these artificial bodies ought not to be checked or 
better regulated and in some way supervised." At the 
same time he recommended a law providing publicity for 
all corporation accounts for the protection of the stockhold- 
ers and the investing public. 3 During his term he vetoed a 
large number of bills granting special privileges to indi- 
vidual corporations. 4 

Roman Catholic opposition to Cleveland, so far as it ex- 
isted at all. was based on his veto of a bill appropriating 
state funds for the Catholic Protectory in Xew York city. 
His reasons for this veto were that it was a bad precedent 
to grant funds to a sectarian institution and that the Pro- 
tectory was properly a charge against the city of Xew 
York alone. 5 Tames Shanahan. superintendent of public 
works. John A. McCall. superintendent of insurance, two 
prominent Catholics appointed by Cleveland, together with 
ex-Senator Kernan. hurried to the National convention of 
1884 to put down the rumor that Cleveland was anti- 
Catholic. 6 

1 Proceedings, p. 123. 

2 Dem. Camp. Textbook, p. 22. 
1 Public Papers, 18S4, p. 3S. 

* Dem. Camp. Textbook, p. 22 et seq. 
5 Public Papers, 1883, P- "4- 
' Hudson, op. cit., p. 165. 



!8o THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [360 

Interest centered in the New York state Democratic con- 
vention, for it was felt that Cleveland's success at Chicago 
depended largely on his ability to control New York. Tam- 
many demanded equal representation with the County 
Democracy and received it without opposition. The con- 
vention was so evenly divided that Cleveland's friends took 
care to avoid any test vote and thereby got the credit for 
controlling the convention. No attempt was made to pledge 
the delegates to any candidate but a resolution was adopted 
instructing the delegation to vote as a unit, as the majority 
might direct, on all matters. 1 Cleveland's margin of con- 
trol was very slight and was not definitely secured until the 
national convention met at Chicago. 2 

There had been considerable gossip as to what effect 
Tilden's withdrawal would have on Cleveland's chances, the 
general opinion being that it would help them. Finally 
Tilden came out definitely for Cleveland. Other prominent 
Democrats of the state, among them Seymour, Kernan, 
Hewitt and Dorsheimer, endorsed Cleveland. 3 Tammany's 
opposition, however, was not lessened. The Sun adopted a 
tone more and more hostile to Cleveland, declaring that he 
might be strong with those who were not Democrats but 
that with Democrats he was weak. It hinted at and justi- 
fied a Tammany bolt in case he was nominated. 4 At the 
Tammany Fourth-of-July celebration on the eve of the 
convention opposition to Cleveland was rife. John Kelly'^ 
speech making thinly-veiled attacks on him was warmly 
applauded. Cleveland's name was hissed and Butler's 
greeted with cheers. 5 

1 .V. Y. World, Times, June 19. 20; Nation, June 19, 26; Ann. Cyc 
1SS4, p. 584; Breen, Thirty Years, p. 690. 
- Hudson, op. cit., p. 166 

3 .V. Y. World. June 13. 18, July 5 ; Nation, July 3. 
1 June 30, July 3, 4, 6, 7. 
5 N. Y. Times, July 7. 



361] THE DEMOCRATIC NOMINATION igi 

Cleveland had received many Republican votes in his 
campaigns for both mayor and governor, and his record 
had strengthened his hold on the Independents. The nomi- 
nation of Blaine improved Cleveland's chances as it was 
evident that a large number of Independents would not 
support Blaine but would support such a Democrat as 
Cleveland. Curtis declared after the Republican conven- 
tion that Cleveland, if nominated, would get most of the 
Independent votes and would carry New York. 1 On June 
7, the Massachusetts Reform Club voted to repudiate the 
Republican nominations and to request independent voters 
throughout the country to join them in trying to secure the 
nomination by the Democrats of such a man as they could 
support, and failing in that, to call a convention to make in- 
dependent nominations. 2 Conferences of Independents 
were held in Boston on June 13, and in New York on June 
17, which adopted resolutions condemning the Republican 
nominations and calling on the Democrats to make nomina- 
tions which they could support. No names were men- 
tioned but it was generally understood that they would 
support either Bayard or Cleveland if nominated. 3 Har- 
per's Weekly came out for Cleveland and declared that he 
should, and probably would, receive Independent support if 
nominated. 4 Schurz wrote to Bayard, June 28, saying that 
the Independents would support either Bayard or Cleveland, 
that either could carry New York, but that he himself pre- 
ferred Bayard because of his wider experience. He warned 
Bayard not to allow the rivalry between himself and Cleve- 
land to permit the nomination of some one not acceptable to 
the Independents. The warning was repeated in another 

1 N. Y. World, June 8, 1884. 
'Nation, June 12. 

3 AT. Y. Times, June 13, 14, 18; Nation, June 19; Ann. Cyc. 1884, p. 770. 

4 June 24. 



1S2 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [362 

letter dated July 2, in which Schurz said that Tammany and 
Butler were using Bayard to beat Cleveland and urged Bay- 
ard not to be a Tammany tool but to cooperate with Cleve- 
land's friends. 1 A message to Schurz from Blaine in a 
letter from John B. Henderson showed that Blaine fully 
appreciated the situation. 2 

The Democratic convention assembled in Chicago on 
July 8. The call for the convention, contrary to former 
practice, invited the Democrats of each organized territory 
and of the District of Columbia to send two delegates. 
These territorial delegates were given votes by action of the 
convention/ 5 Richard B. Hubbard of Texas was elected 
temporary chairman and William F. Vilas of Wisconsin 
permanent chairman of the convention. The committee on 
credentials had but one contest to decide, that of the twelfth 
Massachusetts district, and it recommended that the votes 
be divided between the contestants. 4 

The anti-Cleveland forces first showed their hand in an 
attempt to abolish the unit rule. To the motion that the 
rules of the convention of 1880 be adopted, Grady of New 
Y< rk proposed an amendment that when the vote of a state 
was challenged the secretary should call the names of the 
individual delegates and their individual votes should be 
recorded as the vote of the state. This precipitated a long 
and acrimonious debate during which the galleries had to 
be frequently called to order for a too noisy display of their 
feelings. The main point made against the amendment 
was that the New York delegates had been elected by the 
state convention and not by congressional districts and that 
it would be contrary to all Democratic precedents for the 

1 Schurz, Works, vol. iv, pp. 205 et seq. 

2 Ibid., p. 212. 

3 Proceedings, p. 53. 

4 Ibid., p. 52. 



363] THE DEMOCRATIC NOMINATION ^3 

national convention to overrule the expressed will of a 
state. The amendment was finally lost by a vote of 332 to 
463 and the rules of the convention of 1880, with the addi- 
tion that no state be allowed to change its vote until the 
roll call had been completed, were adopted. 1 New York 
was the only state that had instructed its delegation to vote 
as a unit. The minority of the New York delegation made 
various efforts to have the vote of the state recorded as cast 
by individuals. 2 

The main excitement outside of the struggle over the 
unit rule and the nomination itself was furnished by Ben- 
jamin Butler. Butler was a member of the committee on 
resolutions and took no part in the preliminary proceedings 
of the convention. His candidacy had received a set-back 
by his failure to unite the Massachusetts delegation in his 
own support and his name was not presented to the conven- 
tion. With his chances for a nomination appearing hope- 
less he evidently determined to make all the trouble that he 
could for the Democrats and then appear before the coun- 
try as a man who had sacrificed his chances for a nomina- 
tion to his principles. When the platform was submitted 
by the committee of which Morrison of Illinois was chair- 
man, Butler offered a set of resolutions on the tariff as a 
substitute for those of the majority and proposed the addi- 
tion of several other planks to the platform. 

His tariff project declared that it was the duty and aim 
of the party to depend on customs duties for all revenue. 
The duties should be so levied that the burden would fall on 
luxuries, allowing necessities to come in free. They should 
be such as to promote American enterprise and foster and 
cherish American workingmen while preventing monopo- 

1 Proceedings, p. 9 et seq. 

2 Ibid., p. 223. 



1 84 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [364 

lies. 1 As to just how this was to be accomplished there was 
no suggestion. 

Butler's other proposals included some that were praise- 
worthy and have since come to be recognized as sound social 
policy, while others, particularly his civil service plank, 2 were 
most reactionary and unenlightened. He demanded for 
labor the right to organize for its own protection and to 
receive a just share of the profits of its own production. 
He opposed the importation of contract labor and the use of 
convict labor. He declared that the public lands should be 
held by the many and not by the few and particularly not by 
" the alien aristocracy of Europe." Corporations were to 
be regulated by the same power that created them and Con- 
gress was to prevent discrimination in interstate commerce. 
As to the currency, he declared that " the legal tender note 
has become the fixed currency of the United States .... 
neither policy nor duty calls for any meddling with it." 3 
His whole platform, despite its good features, had more 
the ring of a demagogic appeal for votes than of a reasoned 
program of definite action. 

Butler defended his proposals in a long speech in which 
he brutally laid bare the attempt of the majority to avoid 
the tariff issue and threatened the party with the loss of the 
votes of his supporters if it did not accept his ideas. He 
said, in part : 

I come here as no mendicant, no beggar. I come here repre- 
senting more than 1,500,000 laboring men. I have brought 
their condition before this Convention. I demand, not that you 
should give them anything, but when you are taking from the 
people you take it only where it will hurt them least. Is that 

1 Proceedings, p. 203. 

2 Vide supra, p. 101. 

3 Ibid., pp. 203-206. 



365] THE DEMOCRATIC NOMINATION 185 

an unreasonable demand ? Do you think that you can get along 
without them ? I do not. And therefore I have brought them 
here as your allies to receive them, and they will see me go 
away sorrowing if you will not receive them. 

I object to the tariff plank of your platform adopted by your 
Committee, for it took them 36 hours to frame it ; and if it took 
those able gentlemen that time to frame it and get it in form 
there must be some reason for it. . . . The difficulty was that 
there was a radical difference between us — a difference of 
principle. The very able Chairman of the Committee, Col. 
Morrison, for whom I have the very highest respect, believes 
that there should be no such thing as protection of American 
labor by revenue taxation — indeed I think he believes that it 
cannot be done — and I believe that there should be such pro- 
tection, and such fostering, and such cherishing. He could 
not yield his convictions; I could not yield mine; and there- 
fore, our associates upon the Committee had to spend all that 
time to say something which would mean one thing one way and 
another thing another. And now read that platform. Read 
that tariff plank and then see if you can find out exactly what 
it does mean. 

It does not mean protection. If it did Col. Morrison is too 
honest a man to bring it here. And yet it is twisted so that it is 
supposed that it might mean protection. Democrats in the Con- 
vention, you passed a tariff plank in 1876 — a tariff for revenue 
only — only for revenue — and you had a statesman that could 
carry a very poor platform on his back and yet win. In 1880 
you had a tariff for revenue only. It broke the back of the most 
gallant soldier of the country and you lost. And now you 
have got a tariff for public purposes exclusively. What is the 
difference? " Exclusively " means " only " ; " only " means 
" exclusively ". Think it over. I am here about no boys' play. 
The success of this campaign, in my judgment, before God, 
depends upon the question this night to be settled here and now. 
If you will not say to the workingmen of New York, New 
Jersey, Connecticut, New Hampshire and Massachusetts that 



1 86 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [366 

you mean protection to their interests when you can, and say 
it with no uncertain sound, God help you, for I cannot. . . . 1 

After Butler's speech, Converse of Ohio and Watterson 
of Kentucky, representing the two extremes of the party 
on the tariff question, spoke in defense of the platform. 
Both declared that there was a necessity for compromise 
on minor matters and that reform in government was the 
one big issue before the party. 2 The motion to substitute 
Butler's tariff plank was then defeated by a vote of 96^ to 
7215^2, the votes for Butler's plank coming twenty and one- 
half from Massachusetts, twelve from Michigan, twelve 
from California, eleven from Pennsylvania, eight from In- 
diana, seven from Illinois and the others scattered. After 
another motion to add the rest of Butler's proposals had 
been defeated, the platform as reported by the majority was 
adopted without a roll call. 15 

In his speech on taking the chair as temporary chairman, 
Hubbard of Texas struck the three notes that were to be 
sounded again and again in the nominating speeches. These 
were the " fraud of 1876," the dissatisfaction within the 
Republican party with Blaine's nomination and the neces- 
sity for forgetting old sectional animosities between the 
North and South. 4 

Extravagant praise of Tilden and a desire to be able to 
support him again were expressed by the backers of practi- 
cally every candidate. Even Tammany, now that there was 
no chance of his nomination, declared their undying devo- 
tion to him and their desire to have him again at the head 
of the ticket. 5 The convention passed a resolution express- 

1 Proceedings, pp. 206-210. 
7 Ibid., pp. 2ii, 213. 
"'Ibid., pp. 218, 220. 
* Ibid., p. 5- 
5 Ibid., p. 134. 



367] THE DEMOCRATIC NOMINATION 187 

ing regret at his refusal to accept a nomination and declar- 
ing that " though fraud, force, and violence deprived Sam- 
uel J. Tilden and Thomas A. Hendricks of the offices con- 
ferred upon them by the Democratic party of the Union in 
1876, they yet live, and ever will, first in the hearts of the 
Democrats of the country." 1 The platform also contained 
a paragraph bemoaning the fact that Tilden was no longer 
able to lead and announcing the devotion of the party to the 
principle for which he stood. 2 

Hendricks nominated McDonald in a speech which was 
devoted to the claims of Indiana to the nomination, and was 
therefore as good a speech for himself as for McDonald. 
Carlisle was nominated by James A. McKenzie of Ken- 
tucky, who urged that the fact that Carlisle came from the 
" wrong side of the Ohio river " was an outworn plea and 
contrasted Carlisle's record with Blaine's. Thurman was 
nominated by Breckenbridge of California, and Hoadly by 
Powell of Ohio. 3 

In nominating Bayard, Gray of Delaware emphasized the 
dissatisfaction with Blaine and the contrast in character 
offered by Blaine and Bayard. 4 Youmans of South Caro- 
lina, in seconding Bayard's nomination, warned against 
underestimating Blaine's strength, saying that "if it is true 
. . . that he is buoyant by putrefaction, he is buoyant 
still," and urging that " in opposition to the knight of the 
soiled plume " they place " the knight without fault and 
without reproach." 5 

The figure that was in the background during all the 
nominating speeches, however, was that of Cleveland. 

: Proceedings, p. 187. 

2 Stanwood, Presidency, p. 439. 

3 Proceedings, pp. 99, in, 107, 160. 

4 Ibid., p. 97. 
'"Ibid., p. 172. 



^8 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [368 

Many of the speeches, nominally in support of another can- 
didate, were attacks on Cleveland. Cummings of Massa- 
chusetts in seconding Bayard's nomination said : " Thrust 
upon us this man who has rent the garment of success in 
New York and we lose the state. ... If you try to put the 
torn garment of New York on the candidate of the Demo- 
cratic party you have lost the country and you have ban- 
ished the labor vote." In seconding Thurman's nomina- 
tion Ward of Ohio said : " We bring to you no callow poli- 
tician. We bring to you no man who has to tarry at Jericho 
until his beard has grown." In nominating Randall, Wal- 
lace of Pennsylvania declared that the nominee must be a 
man " grounded in the faith and tried in the stern crucible 
of his party's service," and urged the convention not to 
trust " the delusive promises of our erstwhile bitter foes." 
Abbett of New Jersey in seconding Randall's nomination 
said that Hancock had been defeated in 1880 on the tariff 
in New York and that the same fate was awaiting Cleve- 
land if nominated. 1 

Cleveland was nominated by Lockwood of New York, 
who, emphasizing the idea that Cleveland represented the 
new element of the party, said : 

No man has greater respect or more veneration for the honored 
names which have been presented to the convention than my- 
self ; but, gentlemen, the world is moving, and moving rapidly. 
From the North and the South new men — men who have acted 
but little in politics — are coming to the front, and to-day there 
are hundreds and thousands of young men in this country, men 
who are to cast their first vote, men who are independent in 
politics, and they are looking to this Convention praying silently 
that there shall be no mistake made here. 2 

1 Proceedings, pp. 169, 162, 167. 

2 Ibid., p. 117. 



369] THE DEMOCRATIC NOMINATION ^9 

Carter Harrison of Illinois seconded Cleveland's nomina- 
tion, declaring him to be the logical heir to Tilden's reform 
platform and minimizing the opposition to him as mere 
partisan spite. 1 

Tammany then brought forward their heavy artillery. 
Grady declared that he would be glad to second Cleveland's 
nomination were it not for the fact that he could not carry 
New York. He said that the labor element and the anti- 
monopoly element were solidly opposed to him, and justly 
so, and deprecated the idea of alienating a large part of the 
Democratic party for the sake of catching a few Repub- 
lican votes. Grady's speech was interrupted by hisses and 
cries of " Why don't you speak for Blaine?" The point of 
order was made that he had no right to speak unless mak- 
ing or seconding a nomination, but he was allowed to con- 
tinue by unanimous consent given at the request of Daniel 
Manning, chairman of the New York delegation. 2 Grady 
was followed by Bourke Cockran, who with perfervid ora- 
tory bitterly attacked Cleveland in a speech which purported 
to be one seconding - the nomination of Thurman. He said : 



i & 



T am too warm a friend of his to desire his promotion to an 
office for which I do not believe he has the mental qualifications, 
and where too it is designed, that he shall be the puppet of the 
gentlemen who have managed to capture the majority of the 
New York delegation. . . . We have been told that the mantle 
of Tilden has fallen upon the shoulders of Cleveland. Gentle- 
men, when the mantle that fits the shoulders of a giant falls on 
those of a dwarf, the result is disastrous to the dwarf. The 
shoulders of Mr. Cleveland cannot uphold that ample mantle. 3 

The Tammany orators were followed by Apgar of New 

1 Proceedings, p. 120. 

2 Ibid., p. 124 et seq. 

3 Ibid., pp. 134. 139. 



I9 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [370 

York, who said that there were 100,000 independent voters 
in New York state to whom the Democrats must appeal if 
they wished to carry the state, and that these voters all 
wanted Cleveland. The same idea of Cleveland's strength 
with independents was emphasized by Kent of New Hamp- 
shire and Doolittle of Wisconsin. Cleveland's nomination 
was also seconded by Waller of Connecticut, Ross of Ar- 
kansas, and Jones of Minnesota, in behalf of the delega- 
tions of their respective states. After a long speech by 
Mansur of Missouri seconding Thurman, another member 
of the Missouri delegation announced that in behalf of a ma- 
jority of the delegation he wished to second the nomination 
of Cleveland. 1 The strongest speech for Cleveland was that 
made by Gen. Bragg of Wisconsin, as follows : 

Grim and gray personally, fighting the battles of the Democratic 
party, I stand to-day to voice the sentiment of the young men 
of my state when I speak for Governor Cleveland. His name 
is upon their lips ; his name is in their hearts ; and he is the 
choice, not only of that band of young men, but he is the choice 
of all those who desire for the first time as young men to cast 
their votes in November for the candidate nominated by this 
Convention. They love him, gentlemen, and they respect him, 
not only for himself, for his character, for his integrity and 
judgment and iron will, but they love him most for the enemies 
that he has made. ... I do not assume here to speak for labor. 
The child of a man who always earned his daily bread by his 
daily labor; brought up for more than a quarter of a century, 
from boyhood to manhood, among the laborers that have made 
the great Northwest what it is ; I do not assume to speak for 
labor. Labor is not represented in political conventions by the 
soft hand of the political trickster, no matter who. The men 
who follow conventions and talk about the rights of labor are 
the Swiss contingent who place their camps wherever the pros- 

1 Proceedings, pp. 122, 142, 160, 173, 179, 182, 183. 



371 ] THE DEMOCRATIC NOMINATION IO/ i 

pect of profit is greatest, while honest, intelligent, horny-handed 
labor will be found following the old Democratic flag, thanking 
God that its self-styled leaders have gone where they belonged. 
Men come here to talk of labor. Yes; their labor has been 
upon the crank of the machine; their study has been political 
chicane in the midnight conclave. (A voice ; Give them a little 
more grape, Captain Bragg. ) . . . . 

Let our old war-horses be retired with honor. Let the record 
of their achievements be recorded and pointed at with pride 
and pleasure ; but our people say give us new life, give us new 
blood, give us something that has come to manhood and position 
since the war, that we may hear no more about what took place 
before and during the war. 1 

Immediately after the nominating speeches a ballot was 
taken. Cleveland received votes from all but seven states, 
and the total vote of eight states. North Carolina and 
Delaware cast their total votes for Bayard, Indiana for 
McDonald, California for Thurman, and Kentucky for 
Carlisle. The vote of the other states was split, several vot- 
ing for four different candidates, Missouri for five and Illi- 
nois, Tennessee and Wisconsin for six. When the vote of 
Illinois was announced, including one for Hendricks, Hen- 
dricks rose and said : " May I ask the gentleman that cast 
a vote for me from the state of Illinois to withdraw that 
vote? It places me wrongly before the convention." After 
the first ballot an adjournment was forced in spite of the 
efforts of some of the Cleveland men. 3 

During the night a plan was evidently made among the 
anti-Cleveland men to stampede the convention to Hen- 
dricks. The next morning during the roll call on the second 
ballot Illinois again announced one vote for Hendricks. At 
just that moment Hendricks entered the hall by a door 

1 Proceedings, p. 1 76. 

2 Ibid., pp. 225, 230. 



ig 2 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [<$y 2 

directly facing the delegates. 1 Immediately pandemonium 
broke loose in the galleries. The chairman, after vainly 
trying to get order, finally allowed the crowd to yell itself 
out, which it did in about half an hour. The noise was 
confined almost entirely to the galleries, 2 the Tammany 
men being almost alone in their efforts to rouse enthusiasm 
on the floor. 3 When order was restored Voorhees of In- 
diana took the platform and said : 

I understand there is a call of the roll of the states in progress 
at this time. I am reminded by the Chairman that nominations 
are not now in order. I stand before you, however, at the 
unanimous request of the Delegation of which I am a member, 
to withdraw the name of Joseph E. McDonald for the purpose 
at the proper time, of casting the vote of Indiana for Thomas 
A. Hendricks. 4 

The " stampede " did not materialize. After Voorhees' 
speech, the chairman of the Illinois delegation finished an- 
nouncing the vote, which showed a gain of ten for Cleve- 
land. Hendricks received a total of but 123^ votes. When 
the vote was announced Cleveland was still seventy-two 
short of the necessary two-thirds. He had gained eighty- 
three votes, however, thirty-seven of them from Pennsyl- 
vania, Randall having been withdrawn before the beginning 
of the ballot. When it was seen that Cleveland had made a 
large gain, delegations immediately began to change their 
votes. North Carolina started, changing her twenty-two 
from Bayard to Cleveland ; Virginia, Georgia, Florida, 
West Virginia, Texas and Missouri followed. Then In- 
diana, announcing that her thirty votes had been given to 

1 Hudson, op. cit. y p. 168. 
-' Proceedings, p. 237. 

3 N. Y. Times, World, Tribune. July 12. 

4 Proceedings, p. 238. 



373] THE DEMOCRATIC NOMINATION 193 

Cleveland " on behalf of and at the request of Governor 
Hendricks," moved that the nomination be made unan- 
imous. 1 

Cleveland's nomination was undoubtedly the strongest 
that the Democrats could have made under the circum- 
stances. He had the support of the forward-looking ele- 
ments of the party and was stronger with the Independents 
than any other candidate would have been. He was, as 
General Bragg had said, the candidate of the young men. 
The charges brought by the Republicans that he was a 
" political mushroom," that his views on most national 
questions were unknown, and that his nomination was an 
attempt on the part of the Democrats to avoid the old issues, 
were true. 2 His nomination showed a desire, on the part 
of a controlling element of the party at least, to break with 
the past and to make the question of administrative reform 
the prominent one in the campaign. 

Several names were offered to the convention as candi- 
dates for Vice-President. The list included General Rose- 
crans of California, McDonald of Indiana, John C. Black 
of Illinois, and Gov. Glick of Kansas. Then Wallace of 
Pennsylvania nominated Hendricks, the " representative of 
the grossest wrong that was ever perpetrated upon the 
American people." Menzies of Indiana declared that Hen- 
dricks would not be a candidate. Waller of Connecticut, 
however, seconded Hendricks' nomination, asserting that 
Hendricks was too patriotic to refuse to serve if his party 
demanded it. Immediately all the other candidates were 
withdrawn and on the roll call Hendricks received every 
vote. 3 

According to political wiseacres the chief function of the 

1 Proceedings, p. 244. 

*N. Y. Tribune, July 12, 13, 17. 

3 Proceedings, pp. 254-266. 



I94 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [374 

candidate for the Vice-Presidency is to round out the ticket, 
attracting elements and sections to whom the Presidential 
candidate does not appeal. From this point of view Hen- 
dricks' nomination had certain elements of strength. He 
secured to the ticket whatever value there was in the old 
fraud issue. He helped to reconcile the West to an eastern 
candidate, the old-timers to a novice in national affairs, the 
soft-money men to a champion of hard money, and the 
machine faction to a reformer. His strength in Indiana 
probably carried the state for the Democrats. He did not 
strengthen the ticket, however, in the eyes of the groups 
both within and without the party who wanted Cleveland. 



CHAPTER X 

i 
The Campaign and the Election of 1884 

The campaign officially opened with the customary noti- 
fication of the candidates and the publication of their letters 
of acceptance. Neither of the letters was a document of 
great importance. More than half of Blaine's was devoted 
to the tariff and the remainder was taken up with reasser- 
tions of the vague statements of the Republican platform 
and attacks on the policy of the Democrats. He asserted 
that the civil service had been good in all Republican ad- 
ministrations, but that it might be improved by taking 
away all control over appointments from the legislature, by 
subjecting the executive to fixed rules, and by extending the 
rules to the consular service and to minor positions in the 
diplomatic service. 1 The New York Tribune declared that 
the letter marked Blaine as " the foremost man of his time," 
that it " would have done honor to any man in our history," 
and that " it has elevated the standard of public discussion 
for coming generations and raised the nation in the estima- 
tion of the wisest and best men of other lands." 2 The 
Nation characterized it as " a collection of platitudes drawn 
out to the utmost limits of verbosity." 3 

Cleveland, in his letter of acceptance, announced his en- 
tire approval of the Democratic platform and said that it 
needed no supplement or explanation. He devoted consid- 
erable attention to the necessity for civil service reform and 

1 N. Y. papers, July 7, 1884. 

2 July 7- 

3 July 24. 

375] J 95 



I9 6 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [376 

for laws for the general betterment of the condition of the 
laboring classes. He announced himself in favor of a con- 
stitutional amendment that would limit the President to 
one term. He rather mildly stated his opposition to pro- 
hibition. 1 As a whole his letter lacked the definiteness that 
characterized most of his public papers. 

The campaigns of both candidates were under the gen- 
eral management of their respective national committees 
with headquarters in New York. B. F. Jones of Pittsburg, 
whose main qualification seemed to be his wealth, was 
chosen chairman of the Republican committee. Stephen 
Klkins of New Mexico and Xew York was active in the 
campaign, being one of Blaine's chief advisers. 2 The chair- 
man of the Democratic committee was ex-Senator Barnum 
of Connecticut, a politician of the old school whose name 
had been connected with various scandals in former cam- 
paigns. The choice of Barnum was not satisfactory to the 
Independents and gave force to the Republican contention 
that the Democratic party was really under the control of 
unregenerate spoilsmen. 3 Manning, chairman of the New 
York state committee, and Senator Gorman of Maryland 
took a prominent part in the management of Cleveland's 
campaign. The campaign set a precedent in the large num- 
ber of campaign clubs of business men, bankers, lawyers, 
etc. t formed in the interests of each candidate, and the many 
parades and mass meetings, characterized as crowded and 
wild with enthusiasm or poorly attended and unenthusiastic, 
according to the paper that reported them. 

Contrary to custom, Blaine went on the stump himself. 
He started on a speech-making tour in September, speaking 

Y. Times, July 20. 
* Nation, June 12, August 21 ; Stanwood, Blaine, p. 269 et passitn. 
3 Report of Nat. Ex. Com. of Reps, and Indeps. for Pres. Campaign 
of 1S84, p. 17; N. V. Time„, July 25. 



377] THE CAMPAIGN AND THE ELECTION OF 1884 ^y 

briefly en route in New York state, spending two weeks in 
Ohio and a short time in West Virginia, Indiana and Illi- 
nois. Returning to Maine on the eve of the election he ad- 
dressed several meetings in New York city and in New 
England. 1 

Cleveland remained in Albany during most of the cam- 
paign attending to his duties as governor. He spoke at sev- 
eral county fairs but avoided all political questions. In the 
latter part of October he addressed political meetings at 
Newark, New Jersey, and Bridgeport, Connecticut, at both 
of which he emphasized the need for civil service reform 
and reduction of taxation and dwelt upon his friendliness 
toward labor. 2 

The most important event of the early days of the cam- 
paign and the one that makes the whole campaign one of 
unusual interest was the revolt of the Independents against 
Blaine's nomination. The term " Mugwumps " which was 
commonly applied to the Independents is of uncertain 
origin. It was first used in connection with the Independ- 
ents by the Indianapolis Sentinel in 1872, and the New York 
Sun started its use in the campaign of 1884 in March of 
that year. 3 

Although there had been several independent movements 
in various states, especially in New York, there had been 
no permanent organization on anything approaching na- 
tional lines since the disintegration of the Liberal movement 
of 1872. The meeting of the Independents which was held 
in Chicago in 1880 4 had voted to maintain a permanent 
organization under the presidency of Wayne McVeagh, but 
with McVeagh's appointment to the cabinet the project had 

1 N. Y. Tribune, Times, Oct. 1884; Stanwood, Blaine, p. 287. 

2 N. Y. Times, Tribune, Oct. 28, Nov. 1 ; Parker, Cleveland, p. 70. 

3 Peck, Twenty Years, p. 32. 

4 Vide supra, p. 50. 



igS THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [378 

died. The Independent idea had been kept alive, however, 
in various local clubs such as the Massachusetts Reform 
Club and the Brooklyn Young Republican Club. 1 The 
activities of the Independents in the campaigns for the 
nominations have already been described. 2 

In response to a call of Independent Republican com- 
mittees of New York, Boston, New Haven and Buffalo an 
organization meeting was held in New York, July 22, at- 
tended by more than 500 accredited delegates from sixteen 
different states. The meeting, which was presided over by 
George William Curtis, after rejecting a motion to form a 
third party and nominate the same electors as the Demo- 
crats, appointed an executive committee to conduct the cam- 
paign and issued an address to the independent voters of 
the country. The address summarized the reasons for the 
existence of the Independents, declaring that the paramount 
issue of the campaign was moral rather than political, that 
the platforms of the two parties were not different on any 
great issue and that civil service reform was the most seri- 
ous problem of the day. It stigmatized Blaine as 

a candidate who is an unfit leader, shown by his own words and 
his acknowledged acts, which are of official record, to be un- 
worthy of respect and confidence ; who has traded upon his 
official trust for his pecuniary gain ; a representative of men, 
methods, and conduct which the public conscience condemns 
and which illustrate the very evils which honest men would 
reform. 

Cleveland was characterized as a candidate 

whose name is the synonym of political courage and honesty 
and of administrative reform. He has discharged every official 

1 Report of Indep. Ex. Com., pp. 1, 2. 

2 Vide supra, pp. 157. 181. 



379] THE CAMPAIGN AND THE ELECTION OF 1884 T gg 

trust with sole regard to the public welfare and with just dis- 
regard of mere partisan and personal advantage, which, with 
the applause and confidence of both parties has raised him from 
the chief executive administrator of a great city to that of a 
great state. His unreserved, intelligent and sincere support of 
reform in the civil service has firmly established that reform 
in the State and the cities of New York, and his personal 
convictions, proved by his official acts, more decisive than any 
possible platform declarations, are the guarantee that in its 
spirit and in its letter the reform would be enforced in the 
National Administration. His high sense of public duty, his 
absolute and unchallenged official integrity, his inflexible cour- 
age in resisting party pressure and public outcry . . . are pre- 
cisely the qualities which the political situation demands. . . . 
to resist corporate monopoly on the one hand and demagogic 
Communism on the other. . . . He is a Democrat who is 
happily free from all associations with the fierce party differ- 
ences of the slavery contest and whose financial views are in 
harmony with those of the best men of both parties. 1 

The Independent national committee opened an office in 
New York from which literature was distributed and 
speakers sent out. It published during the campaign four- 
teen pamphlets and a large number of smaller circulars 
which were distributed throughout the country. The com- 
mittee raised and expended more than $23,000 and it was 
estimated that the amounts raised by the various state 
organizations would bring the total to $50,000. Besides the 
national committee, local organizations were formed in 
Brooklyn, Buffalo, Rochester and many smaller cities in 
New York. In the smaller places the local clubs usually 
united with the Democratic Cleveland and Hendricks clubs. 
A headquarters was opened in Boston and local organiza- 

1 N. Y. papers. July 23; Nation, July 24; Independent, July 31; 
Address of Nat. Cow. of Reps, and Indcps. (pamphlet pub. by the com.) ; 
Report of Indep. Ex. Com., p. 4. 



200 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [380 

tions formed at various places in Massachusetts. Local 
organizations were formed and a canvass independent of 
that of the Democrats carried on in Rhode Island, Connec- 
ticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, 
Wisconsin and Iowa. 1 The national organization was kept 
distinct from that of the Democrats although frequent con- 
sultations with them were held. The Democrats made a 
great deal of the movement, quoting widely from speeches 
of the Independents in their meetings and in their litera- 
ture. 8 

Among the more prominent speakers for the Independ- 
ents were Schurz, Curtis and Henry Ward Beecher, of 
New York, and Thomas W. Higginson and Josiah Quincy 
of Boston. Schurz especially did valiant work. His speech 
at the Brooklyn meeting of August 3, in which he thor- 
oughly analyzed Blaine's record and summed up the posi- 
tion of the Independents, was one of the principal docu- 
ments of the campaign, being widely circulated and quoted. 3 
He made a western trip in September, speaking in Illinois,. 
Indiana and Ohio. Other prominent men identified with 
the movement were Benjamin H. Bristow, Francis A. 
Walker, President Seelye of Amherst, Samuel Bowles, 
Rev. James Freeman Clark and Charles R. Codman. 

Among the Republican and independent newspapers and 
periodicals that refused to support Blaine were the Nation 
and Harper's Weekly, the Herald, Times, Evening Post 
and Evening Telegram, of New York, the Brooklyn Union, 
the Post-Express and the Herald of Rochester, the Syrar 
cuse Herald, the Advertiser, Transcript and Her old of 
Boston, the Times and the Record of Philadelphia, the 

1 Report of Indep. Ex. Com., passim. 

2 Vide Dem. Camp. Textbook, pp. 280-297. 

3 Schurz's speech was published as a pamphlet both in English and itf 
German by the Independents. 



381] THE CAMPAIGN AND THE ELECTION OF 1884 2QI 

Times and the News of Chicago, the New Haven News and 
the Springfield Republican. The St. Louis Globe Demo- 
crat, the Buffalo Commercial Advertiser, the Albany Ex- 
press, the Troy Times and the Philadelphia Evening Tele- 
gram, which had opposed Blaine before his nomination, sup- 
ported him in the campaign. 1 

There were several men who had been prominent in the 
movement for reform, some of whom had bitterly opposed 
Blaine's nomination, who refused to bolt the ticket. Among 
them were Andrew D. White, Theodore Roosevelt and 
Hamilton Fish of New York, Henry Cabot Lodge and 
Governor Robinson of Massachusetts and Senator Ed- 
munds of Vermont. Some of these admitted that they had 
the highest respect for Cleveland and would prefer him to 
Blaine, but they distrusted the Democratic party, feeling 
that there was no hope of reform with it in power. 2 To 
others party loyalty was decisive. They felt bound to 
support any nominee of the party and emphasized the fact 
that Blaine's nomination had been fairly made and that 
there had been no protest against it on the floor of the 
convention. 3 This argument naturally appealed strongly to 
those who held office as Republicans or were candidates on 
the Republican ticket. There was but little attempt from 
any of this group to defend Blaine. Senator Edmunds, 
after having refused to speak in the campaign, finally made 
a speech in which he praised the Republican party, although 
expressing some sympathy for the " kickers," but had not 
a word to say about Blaine. 4 The Republicans laid the 

1 Nation, July 12. 

2 White, Autobiog., p. 208; Independent, July 17; Harper's Weekly, 
Aug. 2; N. Y. Evening Post, Oct. 21; Nation, Sept. 18. 

s Schurz, Works, vol. iv, p. 218, letter of Lodge to Schurz; A r . Y. 
Times, July 21, Oct. 19, interview and speech of Roosevelt. 
4 Nation, Sept. 4. 



202 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [382 

blame for the falling off of their vote in the Vermont elec- 
tion which was held in September to Edmunds' lukewarm- 
ness. 1 The leaders of the movement against the Cameron 
machine in Pennsylvania in 1882 issued an address as In- 
dependents, which was made much of by the Republican 
papers, urging all Independents to vote for Blaine. This 
group had always been, however, an anti-Stalwart rather 
than an Independent one and many of them had been en- 
thusiastic workers for Blaine's nomination. 2 

The Stalwarts in general supported the ticket; at least, 
few of them aligned themselves with the Independents. 
To bolt openly a regular nomination was contrary to their 
whole conception of politics. Although it was reported that 
the Blaine leaders and Blaine himself were anxious to have 
Conkling's support or his endorsement at least, Conkling 
refused to have anything to do with the campaign and was 
commonly supposed to be secretly supporting Cleveland. 3 
After the election Conkling worked with a committee of 
Independent and Democratic lawyers to ensure a fair count 
for Cleveland. 4 A group of Stalwarts from Conkling's 
home county, Oneida, issued a statement condemning Blaine 
and announcing their intention to support Cleveland. 5 Sev- 
eral who ought to be able to speak with authority have as- 
signed the Stalwart defection, due to the old feud between 
Blaine and Conkling. as the primary cause of Blaine's de- 
feat. There seems to be little evidence, however, to sup- 

1 X at ion, Sept. 11. 

2 N. Y. Times, July 14; Nation, July 17; also vide supra, p. 69. 

3 Vide letter from Blaine to Elkins, Stanwood, Blaine, p. 285; Hudson, 
Recollections, p. 199; N. Y. Times, Aug. 17, Nov. 2. 

4 Stetson and Rice, article in North American Reviezu, Jan. 1914. 
6 .V. Y. Times, Oct. 24. 

15 Piatt, Autobiog., p. 186; McCall, Life of Thomas B. Reed. p. 129; 
McClure, Recollections, p. 122; N. Y. Sun, Nov. 8, 1884. 



383] THE CAMPAIGN AND THE ELECTION OF 1884 20 ^ 

port this view. Such opposition as there was to Blaine 
among the Stalwarts came mainly from Conkling's per- 
sonal following and Conkling was not the type of leader to 
be able to hold any great number once his control of the 
patronage was lost. 

The Republican newspapers and orators devoted a large 
part of their attention, especially in the earlier part of the 
campaign, to the Mugwumps. " Ishmaelites," " Depend- 
ents," " Soreheads," " Pharisees," " Political Hermaphro- 
dites," " Goody-goodies," " Assistant Democrats " were 
among the terms used to describe them. At first the Re- 
publicans attempted to ridicule the movement and to mini- 
mize its importance. Senator Hoar, who had so often elo- 
quently championed reform, spoke of the Independents as 
follows : 

President Eliot expresses the sentiment of a little body of men 
about Cambridge, — I am happy to believe that he does not 
represent the college, — whose influence, in my judgment, has 
tended infinitely to degrade the public life of the Common- 
wealth. These men have taught our educated youth to be 
ashamed of their own history. They have told them that 
" since the close of the war there has been no time when a 
young man knew how he could honorably serve his country." 
They were preaching in the same strain during the war and 
before the war. . . . There is hardly a man who has taken any 
of the responsibilities of public life who has not been compelled 
to undergo the contemptuous criticism of these gentle hermits 
of Cambridge. 1 

Later the Republicans began to speak of the wickedness of 
not supporting a ticket which had been nominated fairly 
and to point out the natural depravity of the Democrats 
and the hopelessness of the reformers' attempt to accom- 

1 N. Y. Tribune, July 16. 



204 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [384 

plish anything through them. Old attacks on Democrats, 
especially on Hendricks, were brought up against Curtis 
and other reformers. 1 

The favorite way, however, of disposing of the Inde- 
pendents was to declare that they were all free-traders who, 
having failed to get a free-trade candidate, were bent on 
destroying the Republican party. Much was made of a 
letter written by Curtis to an Independent in Pennsylvania 
before the Republican convention, in which he said that the 
Independents of New York were anti-protectionist and that 
a candidate to get their support must favor revenue re- 
form. 2 The old stories of " British gold " were revived 
and the Independents were characterized as the " British 
party " and the " New York Cobden Club." s This argu- 
ment had the double advantage of demolishing the Mug- 
wumps and at the same time lending color to the Repub- 
lican contention that the tariff was the main issue. 

It is indisputable that a great majority of those who 
joined the Independent movement were in favor of revenue 
reform and that the Democratic party with Cleveland of- 
fered more promise of such reform than did the Republican 
with Blaine. There were, however, many ardent protection- 
ists in the movement and the Independents as a whole had 
shown their willingness to support Edmunds whose atti- 
tude was distinctly favorable to protection. 4 The Inde- 
pendents announced in their address to the voters that 
there was a difference of opinion on various matters among 
those who had joined the movement and advised the voters 

1 The N. Y. Tribune made good use of Curtis' speech in the Repub- 
lican convention, castigating the Democrats, vide N. Y. Tribune, July- 
Oct, especially July 8, Nov. 1 ; Curtis, Republican Party, vol. ii, p. 156. 

*N. Y. Tribune, Oct. 24. 

'■Ibid., Oct. 1. 

4 N. Y. Times, Oct. 9; Harper's Weekly, Sept. 13. 



385] THE CAMPAIGN AND THE ELECTION OF 1884 2 0$ 

to use their own discretion in voting for members of Con- 
gress. The Independent committee issued a special pamphlet 
on the tariff in which they asserted that all the talk about 
the tariff was simply an attempt to divert attention from 
Blaine's record. They pointed out the similarity of the two 
platforms on the question, the fact that a large element in 
the Democratic party, as shown by its votes in Congress 
and its state platforms, favored protection, and finally that 
the President by himself had but little power over the 
tariff. 1 

There seems to be no reason to believe that the Inde- 
pendent movement was to any great extent a free-trade 
movement or that it was anything else than what it pro- 
fessed to be, an organization of men who felt that with no 
great issues between the parties the main question was one 
of administrative reform, that, whatever the record or per- 
sonnel of the parties, Cleveland offered more promise of 
reform than did Blaine, that Blaine's record showed him to 
be a man to whom it would be unsafe to trust the Presidency, 
and that the first duty of every voter was to put the common 
good above the good of his party. 

It was inevitable that Blaine's railroad dealings should 
play a prominent part in the campaign. The Independent 
papers had published all the details in their attempt to de- 
feat his nomination. 2 The Democratic papers before his 
nomination generally assumed the attitude that the Inde- 
pendents were over-particular in opposing him, but as soon 
as he was nominated they joined in a grand chorus of con- 
demnation. 3 Blaine's record was introduced at practically 
every Democratic or Independent meeting, and in many it 
was the only subject of discussion. Each day during the 

1 Pamphlet issued Oct. 16. 

2 Vide supra, p. 157. 

3 N. Y. World, N. Y. Sun, June 9-15. 



206 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [386 

later weeks of the campaign the Evening Post published in 
parallel columns, under the title " The Blaine Falsehoods 
Tabulated," Blaine's various statements and extracts from 
the Mulligan letters contradicting them. Nast's cartoons in 
Harper's Weekly ridiculed the idea that Blaine was either 
statesmanlike or honest. The tactics of the Republicans 
were either to ignore the subject altogether, to assert that 
the charges were groundless lies similar to the attacks that 
had been made on all great leaders from Washington's time 
on, or to take one small point and, having refuted that, to 
assume that the whole question had been settled. 1 The 
Independents complained that the Republican papers never 
published either the charges or the vindications in full but 
merely said that this man or that had answered all charges. 2 
Of all the attempts to defend Blaine, that of Senator Hoar 
was the strongest, 3 but it was far short of being a complete 
answer to the charges, as Schurz showed in his answer. 4 

On September 15 a new lot of Mulligan letters was pub- 
lished. These letters, which had been in the possession of 
Mulligan and Fisher and were now published through 
action of the Independent committee, 5 contained nothing of 
importance that was new but did make Blaine's guilt seenf 
more probable. The genuineness of the letters was ad- 
mitted, Blaine declaring that his only desire was that every 
voter in the United States might read them in full. 6 The 

1 N. Y. Tribune, July 16, speeches of Hawley, Smith and Evarts at 
ratification meeting in N. Y., and of Hoar, Lodge and Dawes at ratifi- 
cation meeting in Boston; also Tribune, Aug. 4, 19, Sept. 17, 18, Oct. 1. 
No. 2, 7. 

2 Nation, Sept. 11, 18, 25. 
5 N. Y. Tribune, Aug. 26. 

* N. Y. Evening Post, Sept. 1; also published as pamphlet by Indep. 
Ex. Com. 
5 Report, p. 16. 
6 _V. Y. Times, Sept. 16. 



387] THE CAMPAIGN AND THE ELECTION OF 1884 20 y 

Tribune claimed that they were really of great help to 
Blaine, as some of them showed how anxious he was that 
none of his friends should lose by transactions in which he 
had interested them. 1 Fisher later made the assertion that 
Blaine had offered him $10,000 for the letters and had also 
offered to pay the expense of a trip to Europe for Fisher 
and Mulligan which should last till after election. This 
was denied by Blaine but was reiterated by Fisher. 2 

In addition to the Little Rock affair there were other in- 
stances of Blaine's alleged friendliness to privilege-seeking 
corporations. During Blaine's term in the Senate Thurman 
introduced a bill which would compel the Union Pacific 
Railroad to establish a sinking fund and pay into it twenty- 
five per cent of its yearly earnings until its indebtedness to 
the United States was cancelled. Blaine proposed an 
amendment to the bill the effect of which would have been 
to prevent Congress passing any further laws for the regula- 
tion of the Union Pacific for a period of twenty years. 3 
The amendment was defeated and Blaine voted against the 
bill on its final passage. 4 This was brought up against him 
in the campaign, it being claimed that he would not enforce 
the law or that he might appoint judges to the Supreme 
Court who would overthrow it. 5 The charge was also 
made that Blaine held stock in the Hocking Valley Mine of 
Ohio where a dispute about wages had led to a strike. 
Strike-breakers had been imported and violence resulted, 
which continued throughout the summer and attracted a 
great deal of attention. 6 Blaine denied that he owned or 

1 Sept. 16. 

2 N. Y. Times, Oct. 6, 10, 11 ; Nation, Oct. 9. 

3 Cong. Rec, 45 €., 2 S., p. 2331. 
*Ibid., p. 2384. 

5 N. Y. Times, Aug. 8, Oct. 29, 31. 
* Ann. Cyc, 1884, p. 631. 



2o8 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURX TO POWER [388 

ever had owned any stock in the company, and it later de- 
veloped that his interest had been an option on stock. 1 

Various other rumors of Blaine's financial dealings and 
his willingness to use his official position to advance his 
own interests arose during the campaign. 2 Most of these 
were unsubstantiated but they helped lend color to the 
charge made against Blaine by his opponents that he was 
the friend of all that element in financial circles which was 
trying to get rich through stock manipulation and was seek- 
ing favors from the Government to promote the enterprise. 
The conspicuous examples of this group in the public mind 
were Cyrus W. Field, Russell Sage and Jay Gould, all of 
whom supported Blaine. 3 

The charge that Blaine was the candidate of the preda- 
tory and unscrupulous financial interests was urged most 
vigorously in the closing days of the campaign. According 
to one authority who is most sympathetic toward Blaine, 
Blaine's trip to New York in the latter part of October was 
taken against his own better judgment and at the insistence 
of Jones, the chairman of the national Republican com- 
mittee, for the purpose of inducing certain financiers to con- 
tribute to the campaign fund . 4 A dinner was given for him 
at Delmonico's which was attended by many of the notor- 
iously wealthy men of New York. Reporters were ex- 
cluded, only Associated Press men being allowed to be pres- 
ent for a part of the time. 5 The next day and for days 
afterward the Democratic and Independent press was filled 
with stories of this " millionaire dinner." with rumors of 
what had taken place and what fabulous sums had been con- 
tributed to the campaign fund. 

1 Nation, Oct. 9. 

* Vide statement of H. W. Beecher in Nation, Oct. 0. 

* Nation, July 17. 

4 Rogers, Development of the North, p. 148. 

5 Nation, Nov. 6. 



389] THE CAMPAIGN AXD THE ELECTION OF 1884 2Q ^ 

The characterization of Blaine as the candidate of the 
capitalists was in part an attempt to answer the charge that 
Cleveland was the enemy of labor. Cleveland's record on 
r questions had caused some dissatisfaction which was 
carefully nursed by his opponents. The attention given to 
labor in Cleveland's letter of acceptance and in his two 
speeches of the campaign, as well as the amount of space 
devoted to the record of Cleveland and of the party on 
labor question in the Democratic Campaign Textbook is 
evidence that the Democrats realized the importance of the 
issue. 

The attack on Cleveland as the enemy of labor was led 
by Benjamin Butler. Although the Greenback party had 
been in the past largely a farmers' party, 2 Butler devoted 
most of his attention to the labor vote. Butler waited until 
August before announcing that he would stand as the can- 
didate of the Greenback and Anti-Monopoly parties.* 
Later, in a long, rambling and disconnected letter to his 
" constituents " he gave his views on the issues of the cam- 
paign. He declared that his main political interests were 
hostility to all monopolies, preservation of the legal tender 
notes, protection of the workers against capital and reform 
in administration. lie told his version of the Democratic 
convention, denouncing the Democratic platform as a mere 
vote-catcher and the Republican party as the party of privi- 
lege and monopoly. He warned the workers that " those 
who ape the British aristocracy " were trying to get con- 
trol of the government, and that workingmen could hope 
for nothing from either of the old parties. He urged that 
his followers in each state unite with the minority, nomi- 
nating the same electoral ticket, with the agreement that 

1 Pp. 179-245- 

2 Commons, op. cit., p. 440. 
s N. Y. Sun, Aug. 7- 



2io THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [390 

the electoral vote of the state be divided according to the 
number of votes cast by each party. 1 This plan of fusion 
was adopted in some cases, the Greenbackers fusing with the 
Republicans in West Virginia and Missouri and with the 
Democrats in Michigan and Iowa. 2 Butler carried on an 
active campaign, addressing meetings of workingmen and 
farmers in New England, New York and Pennsylvania. 3 
In his speeches, when dealing with the conditions of labor, 
he often urged measures for improvement that have since 
come to be looked upon as sound and necessary, but they 
were so intermingled with cant and appeals to ignorance 
that many of the more intelligent of the labor reformers 
distrusted him. 4 

The charge was made and quite generally accepted, ex- 
cept by Blaine partisans, that Butler was merely a stalking 
horse for Blaine in the campaign. The story went that 
Butler met Chandler, the Secretary of the Navy, in Ports- 
mouth, New Hampshire, on July 26, that Chandler then 
went to Bar Harbor where he held a conference with Blaine 
and some of the Republican leaders and then had another 
conference with Butler at Portsmouth on August 4. Fol- 
lowing this last conference Butler announced that he would 
make the canvass as the candidate of the Greenback and 
Anti-Monopoly parties. 3 This story fits in well with But- 
ler's action in delaying so> long before accepting the nomi- 
nations and was never formally denied by Butler. Later in 
the campaign General W. H. Parsons, chairman of the 
Greenback-Labor Committee of Maryland, made the state- 

1 N. Y. Times, Aug. 19. 

2 Ibid., Aug. 16, 21, Sept. 4, 11 ; Ann. Cyc, 18S4, p. 775. 
*N. Y. Times, Aug. 20, 30, 31, Sept. 19. 

* George, Life of Henry George, pp. 449, 506; Hillquit, History of 
Socialism, p. 270. 

5 N. Y. Times, Aug. 17; Nation, Aug. 21; Harper's Weekly, Aug. 30. 



391 ] THE CAMPAIGN AND THE ELECTION OF 1884 2II 

merit that Butler's campaign was being financed by the Re- 
publicans. He declared that he had gone to New York to 
get Butler to come to Maryland to speak and had been re- 
ferred by Butler's manager to the Republican national com- 
mittee, which, the manager said, was directing Butler's 
campaign. 1 Parsons further declared that the books of the 
First National Bank of New York would show that a check 
for $5,000 had been drawn by Jones, the Republican chair- 
man, to Butler's manager each week of the campaign. 2 
This whole story was vehemently denied by Butler. 3 

The attitude taken by the New York Tribune and the 
New York Sun, the leading organs of Blaine and Butler re- 
spectively, strengthen the suspicion that Blaine and Butler 
were working in harmony. The Tribune was throughout 
the campaign rather favorable to Butler. The general tone 
of its editorials was that Butler was pretty bad, but not any 
worse and probably a great deal better than the average 
Democrat, that although he was a demagogue he was one 
with some honesty, while Cleveland and his supporters were 
demagogues and hypocrites as well. 4 The Sun attacked 
Blaine at the beginning of the campaign and, although it 
had opposed Cleveland's nomination and had been most un- 
enthusiastic about him, it did not come out openly against 
him until after Butler had accepted the Greenback nomina- 
tion. The attack on Cleveland's moral character gave it the 
opportunity to throw him over completely. Throughout the 
last two months of the campaign its editorials showed that 
it was more anxious to defeat Cleveland than anything else. 
While singing Butler's praises it lost no opportunity to say 
that as between Blaine and Cleveland, Blaine was much to 

1 N. Y. Times, Oct. 19, 20. 

2 Ibid., Nov. 2. 

*Ibid., Oct. 20; N. Y. Tribune, Oct. 21 ; Ann. Cyc, 1884. p. 774. 
4 N. Y. Tribune, Aug. 19, 20, 25, 31. 



THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [392 

be preferred. The last month before election it printed 
•each day a front-page article on Cleveland's enmity to labor, 
se articles, under such headings as " The Working- 
man's Enemy " or " The Foe te» Honest Labor," consisted 
mainly of interviews with individual workingmen who were 
opposed to Cleveland and who usually " knew of at least 
twenty others in this vicinity " who were of like opinion. 

While definite proof is lacking and would be very hard to 
the probabilities are that Butler had an understanding 
at least with the Republicans. In the account of the cam- 
paign given in his " book " Butler mentions no other reason 
for running than his desire to defeat Cleveland, giving as 
the reason for his opposition to Cleveland the fact that he 
■idered Cleveland's nomination to be a free-trade victory 
was fearful of grave dangers to the country in case of 
Iiis election. 1 

An unusual and a disgraceful feature of the campaign 
was the attack made on the private life and moral character 
>£ both candidates, particularly on that of Cleveland. The 
Buffalo Evening Telegraph of July 21 published a story 
diarging Cleveland with being a libertine and a drunkard 
and giving details of his illicit relations with a woman of 
Buffalo. This story, which was vouched for by two Buf- 
falo ministers, created a great sensation and caused even 
staunch supporters of Cleveland to waver. 2 Demands were 
made that Cleveland withdraw from the canvass. The 
Independent, which had supported Cleveland, came out 
against him. 3 Investigations were made by a committee of 
Independents of Buffalo, by the Rev. Kinsley Twining of 
the Independent and by the Buffalo association of minis- 

1 Butler's Book, pp. 982, 983. 

' Schurz, Works, vol. iv, p. 222, letter of H. W. Beecher. 

1 Independent, Aug. 21, S^pt. II. 



3931 THE CAMPAIGN AND THE ELECTION OF 1884 2I ^> 

ters. The Buffalo ministers divided, some of them declar- 
ing that enough had been proven to show that Cleveland 
was an unfit man to be President, and others that the facts 
did not warrant any such conclusion. The Independent 
committee and Mr. Twining reported that Cleveland had 
had, some eight years previously, a liaison with a Buffalo 
woman, but that there was no evidence of seduction or 
breach of promise and that Cleveland had accepted his re- 
sponsibilities and made ample amends. Cleveland frankly 
admitted this part of the scandal. The general charges of 
intemperance and unchastity, the committee declared, were 
entirely unfounded. The newspaper in which the charges 
appeared had no standing in the community and the editor 
refused to furnish proofs of the statements made. The 
charges were mainly vague and general and therefore diffi- 
cut to answer but every specific charge was traced to its 
source and found groundless. 1 

The scandal died down for a time but with the publica- 
tion of the new Mulligan letters in September it was re- 
vived. Stories of Cleveland's general immorality and 
drunkenness were printed and sent broadcast over the coun- 
try, especially to women and ministers. 2 Republican speak- 
ers, while not usually making open accusations, kept the 
charges alive by underhand innuendo. 3 The charge has 
been made that Blaine himself first sent the story to the 
Republican National Committee. 4 At least he made no 
effort to 1 stop its use in the campaign. 

1 Report of Com. of Indep. Reps, of Buffalo (pamphlet pub. by Indep. 
Ex. Com.) ; Independent, Aug. 14; N. Y. Times, Aug. 12; Peck, Twenty 
Years, p. 34; Harper's Weekly, Nov. 1 ; A 7 . Y. Sun, Aug. 7, 9, Oct. 15, 16 ; 
N. Y. Eve'g. Post, Aug. 5, 6, Oct. 14, IS- 

2 Nation, Oct. 23. 

s Vide especially speech of Edwards Pierpont at N. Y. Academy of 
Music in A r . Y. Times, Nov. 2. 
* Peck, Tzventy Years, p. 34; McClure, Our Presidents. r>. W2. 



214 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER - [394 

An attempt at an answer in kind was made by the pub- 
lication in the Indianapolis Sentinel of August 8 of what 
purported to- be an account of Blaine's early family history. 
Blaine immediately began a suit for libel against the Sen- 
tinel and published a letter explaining the situation which 
satisfactorily quieted the scandalmongers. 1 It is claimed 
by Cleveland's friends that he ordered that the Democratic 
managers pay no attention to the charges against Blaine 
and that he destroyed documents sent to him which w T ere 
supposed to support the charge-."' 

So much attention was devoted to the Mugwumps, to 
Blaine's record and to Cleveland's moral character in the 
campaign that there was little time left to discuss differ- 
ences in party policy, had there been any to discuss. The 
Southern question received comparatively little attention. 
Some orators touched on it, in referring to the menace of 
the solid South, or in such general terms as that " the 
party which attempted to destroy the Union should never be 
permitted to govern it." :; The Republican Campaign Text- 
book described the " recent outrages " in Copiah and Dan- 
ville as steps in the Democratic plot to seize the government. ! 
[n Iris speech of acceptance Blaine said: "Can anyone 
doubt that between the sections confidence and esteem are 
to-day more marked than at any period in the sixty years 
preceding the election of President Lincoln?" His esteem 
for the South, however, did not prevent him from pointing 
out. in his speeches in Indiana, the danger of returning the 
Democrats to power, three-fourths of whose strength was 
in the South, " the old South with its bitterness, its un- 

1 AT. Y. Sun, Aug. 15 ; N. Y. Times, Sept. 20. 

2 Peck, Twenty Years, p. 37; Hudson, Random Recoil., p. 1S4. Report 
of Indep. Ex. Com., p. 15. 

1 .V. Y. Times, Oct. 24. 
4 P, 152- 



395] THE CAMPAIGN AND THE ELECTION OF 1884 2I e 

reconciled temper, its narrowness of vision, its hostility to 
all Northern interests, its constant longing to revive an im- 
possible past." * 

The Democrats had shown by their record, their platform 
and their "candidate that they wished to keep the tariff ques- 
tion in the background. Their newspapers and their speak- 
ers strenuously insisted that it was net an issue. 2 Cleve- 
land made no mention of the tariff in his letter of accept- 
ance and throughout the campaign gave no hint of the 
strong stand he was to take later on the question. His only 
public utterance on the question of revenue or the tariff 
was in his speech at Newark, where he repeated the form- 
ula of the platform that the tariff must be reduced but in 
such a way as not to injure labor. 3 The Independents also 
insisted that the tariff was not an issue, but in spite of all 
that they or the Democrats could do or say the Republicans 
forced it to the front on every occasion. No meeting and 
hardly any speech was complete without some reference to 
it. 4 All the progress of the nation was accredited to the 
protective system and it was taken for granted by the Re- 
publican orators that Republican defeat meant the over- 
throw of that system. The Republican Campaign Text- 
book for 1884 devoted seventy of its one hundred and sev- 
enty pages to the tariff, including elaborate tables showing 
differences in wages in the United States and England. 

Blaine, if not the originator of the idea of making the 
tariff the main issue, was at least thoroughly in accord with 
it. More than half of his letter of acceptance was devoted 

l N. Y. Times, Evening Post, Oct. 24; Blaine's Political Discussions, 
P- 454- 

2 A*. Y. World, June 15, Nov. 3. 

3 N. Y. Times, Oct. 28. 

4 Vide accounts of Republican meetings in N. Y. papers of July 16, 
Aug. 22, Oct. 10, 24. 



2i6 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [396 

to the tariff. In common with other Republican writers 
and speakers, he had no specific recommendations to make, 
but stated that the Republican party was traditionally in 
favor of protection and the Democratic traditionally op- 
posed. He compared the total wealth and general business 
conditions of the country in i860 and 1884 and, by impli- 
cation at least, gave to the protective tariff the credit for 
the development. " Even the opponents of the present 
revenue system," he said, " do not pretend that in the whole 
history of civilization any parallel can be found to the 
material progress of the United States since the accession 
of the Republican party to power." He professed, as did 
other orators of both parties, to be mainly concerned with 
the welfare of labor, and dire consequences to the work- 
ingmen were prophesied as a result of any attack on the 
protective system. 1 In his speeches during the campaign 
he kept the tariff question in the foreground, especially on 
his tour through Ohio, where an increase in the rates on 
wool was promised and where many entire speeches were 
taken up with the question. 2 His general line of argument 
was to ignore the existing depression and dilate on the 
material progress of the country since i860, giving the 
tariff as the cause of this progress and assuming that the 
only way to continue protection and progress was to keep 
the Republicans in power. It was noticeable that in his 
speeches to the business men of New York city, where 
many Republicans were only lukewarm for protection, he 
had little to say about the tariff but talked more of the 
attack on sound money and the national banking system 
that was to be expected from the Democrats. 3 In his 
speech at Augusta on the night of the Maine election he 

1 N. Y. Times, July 19. 

J N. Y. Tribune, Oct. 2, 10; N. Y. Times, Oct. 6, 10, 16. 

3 A r . Y. Times, Oct. 31, Nov. 1, 2. 



397] THE CAMPAIGN AND THE ELECTION OF 1884 2 iy 

said, " our campaign has been conducted on one great 
issue. ... It is the issue of protection to American labor." 
Later in the same speech, in explaining his attitude on the 
prohibition question, he said : " Judicious friends of a pro- 
tective tariff, which is the practical issue of the campaign, 
will not divert their votes to the question of prohibition, 
which is not a practical issue in the national campaign." * 
In his final speech of the campaign, made in Boston the 
night before election, Blaine plainly stated that protection 
was, in his opinion, the foremost issue. In explaining why- 
he had toured the country contrary to the usual custom, he 
said : " I did it, too, for the more specific reason that I be- 
lieved there was a danger lest the leading question which 
related to the Protective System of America should be par- 
tially or perhaps wholly excluded from that consideration 
by the people which its merits deserved." 2 

It is difficult to believe that the action of Blaine and the 
Republican leaders in attempting to make the tariff the 
main issue of the campaign was sincere. The question of 
the merits of protection as a policy was not involved. The 
Democratic party, it is true, had been traditionally opposed 
to protection, but the attitude of the party had changed both 
in theory and practice, as is shown by their action in Con- 
gress and their platform. Both parties agreed that there 
were inequalities in the tariff that should be removed, and 
both were also agreed that it should be done in a way that 
would leave the main idea of protection intact. To ignore 
the change that had taken place in the Democratic party 
and to assume that all Democrats were free-traders in dis- 
guise was either unintelligent or demagogical. It was cer- 
tainly demagogical to claim that all the prosperity of the 

1 N. Y. Times, Sept. 9. 

* Blaine's Political Discussions, p. 465. 



2i8 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [398 

country was due to protection, " denying to nature the 
credit of her bounty and to labor the credit of its toil and 
skill," 1 ignoring the existing business depression or blam- 
ing it on the fear of Democratic tariff changes. The charge 
that the Republicans forced the tarii ion to the front 

to divert attention from Blaine's record seems to be jus- 
tified. 

The strength of the Prohibitionists was a source of con- 
siderable worriment to the Republicans. The Tribune tried 
to reason with them, showing them how they were voting 
against their own interests and strengthening the Demo- 
crats. It declared that St. John's letter of acceptance, in 
which he said that both the old parties favored the contin- 
uation of the liquor traffic, was a libel on the Republican 
party and showed conclusively that St. John's campaign was 
being managed in the interest of the Democrats. 2 The 
New York State Temperance Assembly at a meeting held in 
Brooklyn, October 8, adopted resolutions, signed by Theo- 
dore Woolsey, Thomas Talbot, Noah Davis and others, 
asking St. John to withdraw on the ground that his candi- 
dacy was aiding the Democrats, who were unfit to govern. 5 
When St. John refused to withdraw, the Republican papers 
began a systematic attack on him which so angered St. John 
that he announced that he would cancel all his other en- 
gagements and come to New York to fight Blaine where he 
could harm him most. He made several speeches in west- 
ern New York in which he particularly ridiculed the Re- 
publican claims for protection, declaring that the tariff pro- 
tected monopoly more than the workers. 4 

1 V. Y. Times, Sept. 28. 

2 N. Y. Tribune. Aug. 23, 26, 29, Oct. 2. 

3 Ibid., Oct. 11; Ann. Cyc, 1884, p. 774. 

4 .V. I". Times, Oct. 21, 25, 28. 



399] THE CAMPAIGN AND THE ELECTION OP 1884 2 ig 

Maine voted in September on a constitutional amend- 
ment prohibiting the manufacture and sale of liquor, but 
Blaine carefully avoided taking a stand on the question. 
In a speech in Augusta on election night he said : " For 
myself I decided not to vote at all on the question. I took 
this position because I am chosen by the Republican party 
as the representative of national issues, and by no act of 
mine shall any question be obtruded into the national 
campaign which belongs properly to the domain of state 
issues." x 

The Prohibition party was recruited from the Repub- 
licans rather than the Democrats, not only because the tra- 
ditional political philosophy of the Democrats was opposed 
to the limitation of the freedom of the individual, but also 
because the Republican party contained a large element 
which had been attracted to it by the moral issues involved 
in the slavery question and which had to have some moral 
stimulus to keep it interested in politics. The Prohibition 
party offered an outlet for this moral enthusiasm. It pro- 
posed to direct the power of the law against a great evil 
and Republicans had long been trained to believe in the 
power of the law. 2 Circumstances favored the Prohibition- 
ists in 1884. There were no great issues between the par- 
ties to distract attention from their own particular one. 
Many voters normally Republican distrusted Blaine but 
could not bring themselves to vote for a Democrat or were 
repelled by the charges of immorality made against Cleve- 
land. After the election St. John issued a statement in 
which he claimed the credit for having elected Cleveland, 5 
and his contention has considerable force. His vote in New 
York, Connecticut and New Jersey was larger than Cleve- 

5 N. Y. Times, Sept. 19. 

2 Ibid., Aug. 18, Sept. 18. 

3 Ibid., Nov. 12. 



220 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [ 4 qo 

land's plurality in those states. 1 Of course it is not true 
that all of his votes would have been cast for Blaine if 
there had been no prohibition ticket, but his 25,016 in New 
York doubtless included enough that would have been cast 
for Blaine to change the result of the whole election. 

There was a great deal of discussion as to what attitude 
Tammany, after its rebuff at the Democratic convention, 
would assume toward the ticket. The Tammany leaders 
appointed a committee to take up the question of endorsing 
Cleveland and this committee said in its report : " The 
candidate of the Democratic party having been nominated 
in the National Convention, following the uniform and un- 
broken record of our organization, we acquiesce in the will 
of the majority of the representatives of the party although 
we believe that will to have been unwisely expressed." The 
report was adopted, although Grady opposed it and an- 
nounced his intention of supporting Butler. 2 Grady carried 
out his threat and campaigned for Butler. 3 John Kelly and 
other leaders spoke for Cleveland during the campaign, but 
they were not at all enthusiastic. 4 On city offices Tammany 
made no attempt to combine with the other Democratic 
factions but nominated a straight ticket. The Republicans 
also nominated a straight ticket, while a citizens' committee 
nominated a third ticket, which was endorsed by the County 
Democracy, Irving Hall and the Anti-Monopolists. 5 Just 
before election Tammany sent out circulars lauding its can- 
didates and containing ballots to be cast for city officials, 
but nothing was said of Cleveland and there were no bal- 
lots with the names of his electors. In the election Grant, 

1 Stanwood, Presidency, p. 448. 
2 iV. Y. Times, Tribune, Sept. 13. 
S N. Y. Tribune, Oct. 28. 
* N. Y. Times, Sept. 30. 

5 N. Y. papers, Sept. 30, Oct. 21, 22, 23. 

6 .V. Y. Times, Nov. 4. 



40I ] THE CAMPAIGN AXD THE ELECTION OF 1884 22I 

the Tammany candidate for mayor, received 20,000 more 
votes than Tammany was expected to poll normally, while 
counting the Republican votes which Cleveland probably 
received, his vote was 20,000 short of what it should have 
been. This led to the charge that a deal had been made be- 
tween Tammany and the Republicans by which Republican 
votes were cast for Grant in return for Tammany votes for 
Blaine. 1 Tammany accused Irving Hall of having sold out 
in return for votes for Grace, the fusion nominee. 2 

A great deal was heard during the campaign of the Irish 
vote and the German vote. The German- Americans had been 
largely Republicans but many of them were opposed to pro- 
hibition and were turning to the Democrats on that account. 
The influence which Carl Schurz had with the Germans 
was also a factor in attracting them to Cleveland. A large 
meeting of Germans was held in New York, September 29, 
which was enthusiastic for Cleveland. 3 Blaine was thought 
to be particularly strong with the Irish. The reasons usu- 
ally given were that he was of Irish descent and that he 
had been particularly active while Secretary of State in 
looking out for the interests of American citizens of Irish 
descent imprisoned in England. 4 The records do not show 
that Blaine had been either particularly active or successful 
in behalf of naturalized Irishmen '" but he had shown an 
anti-British feeling which endeared him to all the " pro- 
fessional " Irishmen who hoped for a " vigorous foreign 
policy " against Great Britain. The Irish World, the Amer- 
ican organ of the Irish Land League, was enthusiastic in 
its support of Blaine and in condemnation of Cleveland as 

1 N. Y. Times, Nov. 6, 8; X. Y. Evening Post, Nov. 14. 
s A r . Y. Tribune, Nov. 11. 
s A r . Y. Times, July 8, Sept. 30. 
Hamilton, Blaine, pp. 574, 584; Stanwood, Blaine, p. 286. 
s I'ide supra, p. 154. 



222 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [_j. 2 

the " British " and the " Cobden Club " candidate. It ap- 
pealed to all Irishmen to support Blaine, declaring that a 
sufficient reason for doing so was that all the great London 
dailies were opposed to him. 1 An enthusiastic Blaine meet- 
ing was held by the Irish in New York July 28, at which a 
telegram from Blaine was read thanking them for their 
" friendly assurances." The Democrats, refusing to be 
outdone, held a Cleveland Irish meeting August 28. 2 

As a part of the Irish propaganda for Blaine an attempt 
was made to show that Cleveland was a " Presbyterian 
bigot." This charge seems to have been based on the fact 
that Cleveland's father had been a Presbyterian minister 
and that Cleveland had vetoed the Catholic Protectory bill. 3 
Many of the clergy of the Roman Catholic Church, includ- 
ing the Bishop of Albany, resented the attempt to drag the 
church into politics and came out with endorsements of 
Cleveland, as did some of the Catholic papers. 4 

One of the most important events in this attempt to mix 
politics with religion and race prejudice occurred in the 
closing days of the campaign. While in New York Blaine 
was given a reception by a delegation of local ministers. A 
Rev. Mr. Burchard, who was chosen spokesman for the 
group, in the course of his remarks characterized the Demo- 
cratic party as the party of " Rum, Romanism and Rebel- 
lion." Blaine in his reply made no mention of this remark. 
The occurrence was immediately reported to> the office of 
the Democratic National Committee and was seized upon 
as a means of undermining Blaine's Catholic support. It 

1 Irish World and American Industrial Liberator (New York), June 
28, July 5, 12, 26, Aug. 9, 16. 

2 N. Y. Times, July 29, Aug. 29. 

•*■ Vide supra, p. 179; Hudson, of. cit., p. 164. 

*Cary, Life of Curtis, p. 281 ; N. Y. Herald, Oct. 6; A'. Y. Times, Oct. 
I, 11 ; Nation, Oct. 30. 



4°3l TI!E C AMPAIGN AND THE ELECTION OF 1884 2 2\ 

was telegraphed all over the country, was featured by 
Democratic papers and also circulated by means of hand- 
bills. 1 In some cases the remark was attributed to Blaine 
himself. 2 Blaine in an interview at New Haven, Novem- 
ber i, denied that the remark expressed his sentiments in 
any way, pointing out the fact that although a Protestant 
himself, his mother had been a Roman Catholic. 3 It was 
later reported that Blaine had not been paying attention to 
the remarks of Mr. Burchard and had not heard the phrase 
at all. 4 This incident has attracted an unusual amount of 
attention and has often been cited as the deciding factor in 
Blaine's defeat. 5 Although it probably did influence some 
votes, the importance of the incident can be easily over- 
estimated because of its dramatic qualities. 

Elections for state officials and for Congressmen were 
held in Maine and Vermont in September and in Ohio and 
West Virginia in October. Interest centered in Ohio, as it 
was a doubtful state, and both parties were anxious to carry 
it for the moral effect it would have on the November elec- 
tions. Blaine spent the two weeks preceding the election 
campaigning in Ohio, devoting his attention, as did most of 
the Republicans, mainly to the tariff. The Independents 
sent Carl Schurz to speak for the Democratic candidates. 
Although the liquor queston was not an issue in the elec- 
tion, it had not yet been satisfactorily settled and it was 
thought that it would react against the Republicans. An- 
other supposed source of Republican weakness was the great 
amount of unemployment in the state. The vote resulted 

l N. Y. World, Oct. 30, 31, Nov. 2; Hudson, op. cit., p. 208; Peck, 
op. cit., p. 43. 

2 Hamilton, Blaine, p. 588. 

3 A r . Y. Tribune, Nov. 4. 

4 Hudson, op. cit., p. 210. 

5 Ibid., p. 212; Hamilton, Blaine, p. 588; Cooper, American Politics, 
vol. i. p. 319. 



224 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [ 40 j. 

in the election of the Republican state officials by majorities 
averaging 12,000, and in the election of eleven Democratic 
and ten Republican Congressmen, a gain of four for the 
Republicans. Both sides claimed to be encouraged by the 
result, the Democrats comparing it to the larger majorities 
received by the Republicans in 1880, and the Republicans to 
the Democratic majorities of 1883. All things considered, 
the Republicans had more cause for rejoicing. The Demo- 
crats charged that unfair tactics had been used by the Re- 
publicans, that money had been freely spent and that some 
of the Democratic papers, especially those of Cincinnati, 
had not given loyal support to the ticket. 1 Dudley, the 
Commissioner of Pensions, resigned his position, the resig- 
nation to take effect November 10, and went to Ohio to 
work for the Republicans.' Congress during the session 
following the election investigated the election activities 
of Lot Wright, U. S. Marshal for the Southern district of 
Ohio. It was disclosed that Wright had appointed 1371 
special deputies in the Cincinnati district many of whom 
were not residents of Ohio. It was charged that the pur- 
pose was to intimidate Democratic voters, but no action was 
taken against Wright. 3 

Nothing unexpected developed in the other early elec- 
tions. In Maine the Republican governor was re-elected by 
an increased majority and all the Congressmen were Re- 
publican. Vermont, as usual, was strongly Republican, but 
the total vote was several thousand smaller than in 1880, 
the Republican decrease being somewhat larger than that of 
the Democrats. In West Virginia the fusion between the 
Republicans and the Greenbackers cut the normal Demo- 
cratic majority slightly. 4 

1 Ann. Cyc, 1884, p. 631; N. Y. papers, Nov. 10-20. 

s Nation, Oct. 2, 16. * House Rep., 48 C, 2 S., no. 2681. 

* N. Y. Times, Sept. 1, 6, n; Ann. Cyc., 1884, p. 464. 



405] THE CAMPAIGN AXD THE ELECTION OF 1884 22 ~ 

Throughout the campaign there was a great deal of lau- 
dation by each party of itself for what it had done and a 
great deal of condemnation by its opponents for what it had 
not done, but there was a minimum of discussion as to 
what either party proposed to do. X either had a definite 
program of action on any subject to present. 1 In spite of 
the poverty of issues, the Indq^endent defection and the 
attacks on the public and private characters of the candidates 
made the campaign one of unusual interest and bitterness. 
As the time for election approached both sides publicly 
claimed to be confident of success. As a matter of fact, the 
Republicans apparently were confident, 2 but the Democrats, 
with the estimates of Democratic leaders throughout the 
state before them, saw little chance of carrying Xew York. 2 
Both sides realized that the election would turn on the re- 
sults in the four doubtful state.-, New York, Xew Jersey, 
lecticut and Indiana. 

The day after the election the papers of both sides ad- 
mitted that the election was in doubt but those of each 
part}- claimed that their candidate was in the lead. The 
official returns, so far as they were complete, seemed to 
favor Cleveland. The Associated Press, which received re- 
turns by election districts instead of by counties, claimed 
that Blaine had won. Florida, Virginia, West Virginia, 
Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, Nevada and Xew York were 
claimed by both parties. By the third day, Friday, it had 
apparent that the final result depended on Xew 
York and all the leading papers except the New York 
Tribune conceded Cleveland's election. It was charged that 
Jay Gould, who controlled the Western Union Telegraph 
( !i mpany, and through it the Associated Press, had been 

1 / 'ide, e. g. campaign textbooks of both parties. 

2 Letters of Mrs. Blaine, vol. ii, p. 120. 
7 ' Hudson, op. cit., p. 206. 



226 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [ A 

holding up and falsifying the returns in order to manipulate 
the stock market, and threats of violence were made against 
him. 1 Gould telegraphed Cleveland on Friday congratu- 
lating him cm his election. Saturday morning the Asso- 
ciated Press sent out a report that Cleveland had won. The 
Tribune still claimed that Blaine had carried New York and 
did not give up until November 16, when the returns from 
the official canvass of the votes were available and showed 
that the plurality of the highest Cleveland elector over the 
highest Blaine elector was i 149 and that of the lowest 
Cleveland elector over the highest Blaine elector was 1043. 2 
There were the usual charges and counter charges of 
fraud and the corrupt use of money. None of these were 
definite or were ever pressed. The statement that Blaine 
really carried New York and that he was deprived of his 
victory by falsification of the returns or by counting Butler 
ballots for Cleveland, has been made by men of responsible 
character.'' These repeated assertions finally led F. L. 
Stetson and W. G. Rice of New York, both of whom had 
taken a prominent part in the campaign and in the count, to 
publish a reply 4 in which they seem to prove conclusively 
that the charge is an empty one. They show that both sides 
took all possible precautions to insure a fair count. When 
the closeness of the vote became apparent, telegrams were 
sent out from Albany in the name of Manning, the state 
Democratic chairman, to Democrats in every district warn- 
ing them that the vote was close and asking them to do all 

1 N. Y. Times, Nov. 6, 7. 8. 

2 Ann. Cyc, 1884, p. 585; N. Y. papers, Nov. 5-16; Nation, Nov. 13; 
Harper's Weekly, Nov. 15: Hamilton, Blaine, p. 588; Hudson, op. cit., 
p. 220. 

3 Stanwood, Blaine, p. 291, also article in Atlantic Monthly, Oct. 1912; 
TToar, Autobiog., vol. i, p. 408. 

4 North American Rev., Jan., 1914; also reprinted as a pamphlet. 



407] THE CAMPAIGN AXD THE ELECTION OF 1884 



i 



in their power to insure a fair count. A committee o£ 
Democratic and Independent lawyers was formed in New 
York city to advise on any legal questions that might come 
up. The Republicans had representatives on every election 
board and had responsible men present at the official count 
in each county. Air. Stanwood admitted that his accusal i 
was based on suspicion rather than on fact, and it was 
shown that all the Cleveland votes in Long Island City,, 
where Senator Hoar charged that Butler votes were counted 
for Cleveland, were not sufficient to have changed the final 
result. 

Beside the solid South, Cleveland carried Xew York, 
Xew Jersey, Connecticut and Indiana. In 1880 Hancock 
had carried only Xew Jersey, Nevada and California in ad- 
dition to the sixteen southern states. Beside carrying Cali- 
fornia and Xevada, Blaine received greatly increased plural- 
ities over those of Garfield in Pennsylvania and Maine and 
slightly increased ones in Colorado, Minnesota, Xebraska, 
Xew Hampshire and Oregon. In the other states carried 
by him his pluralities were lower than those of Garfield. l 

Butler's vote was over forty-three percent less than that 
of Weaver in 1880. It was noticeable that, except in Mich- 
igan, where he gained 8,000 votes, Butler's losses were 
mainly in the West. In the industrial states of the East he 
nearly equaled Weaver's vote and in some cases exceeded it. 
In Massachusetts his personal following increased his vote 
to 24,443 as compared to Weaver's 4,548. 

St. John polled 150,369 votes, an amazing total as com- 
pared with the 10,305 received by Neal Dow, the prohibition 
candidate in 1880. St. John received more than four per- 
cent of the total vote in Michigan, more than three percent 
in Massachusetts and more than two percent in New York, 

1 Stanwood, Presidency, pp. 417, 448. 



228 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [408 

New jersey, Rhode Island, Vermont, Kansas, Nebraska 
and Minnesota. His largest votes came in states where 
there had been considerable agitation on the temperance 
question or where the Independent movement was strong. 

In the Congressional elections the Democrats lost sixteen 
seats in the House, reducing their plurality of eighty-one 
over the Republicans in the forty-eighth Congress to forty- 
live in the forty-ninth. The Republicans gained two 1 seats in 
Indiana, three in New York, four in Pennsylvania, four in 
Ohio and five in California. The Republicans retained con- 
trol of the Senate. 1 

The question of just why voters vote as they do involves 
a complex study in political psychology and is one that 
probably a majority of voters could not answer satisfac- 
torily for themselves. The Independent movement, the 

ength of the Prohibitionists, the lukewarmness of the 
Stalwarts, the unfortunate remark of the Rev. Mr. Bur- 
chard, have all been given as reasons for Cleveland's elec- 
tion. Blaine himself declared that the suppression of the 
Republican vote in the South made it necessary for the Re- 
publicans to carry New York, and that New York was lost 
through the strength of the Independents and Prohibition- 
ists and through the remark of Burchard. 2 When we con- 
sider that if Cleveland had lost New York, or that if he 
had lost Indiana and either Connecticut or New Jersey, 
Blaine would have been elected, and that Cleveland's plural- 
ity in New York was only 1149 out of a total vote of more 
than 1,150,000, in Indiana 6527, in Connecticut 1276, and 
in New Jersey 4358, it is evident that any one of the above 
mentioned incidents may have been decisive. All of them 
undoubtedly worked toward the same end, though with 
varying degrees of effectiveness. 

1 McPherson, 1S86, pp. 1, 30. 

"Blaine's Political Discussions, p. 464; A". Y. Tribune, Nov. 17, 1884. 



409] THE CAMPAIGN AND THE ELECTION OF 1884 22 g 

Foremost among these causes contributing to Blaine's de- 
feat must be placed the revolt of the Independents. They 
claimed full credit at the time, 1 and writers who had no 
sympathy for the movement and who have no use for in- 
dependents in general have since paid tribute to their 
strength. 2 They claimed to have polled 60,000 votes in 
New York, 20,000 in Ohio, 40,000 in Massachusetts, 5,000 
in Connecticut, 15,000 in New Jersey, 10,000 in Indiana 
and 20,000 in Illinois. 3 These estimates are undoubtedly 
generous, but the significant fact is that the Independents 
were strongest in the doubtful states where Blaine could 
least afford to lose votes. It is probable that a large num- 
ber of Republicans would have supported Cleveland in any 
case, but the organized campaign of the Independents must 
have materially increased this number. 

The main article in the Independent creed was that the 
affairs of the government be conducted in an honest, effi- 
cient and economical way. The first step toward the goal 
of good government was, they believed, the reform of the 
civil service, which would hasten the elimination from public 
life of the machine politician who worked only for the in- 
terest of party or self and discouraged intelligent participa- 
tion in politics. The Independents fully accepted the cur- 
rent philosophy as to the rights of private property and the 
proper relations between the government and business in- 
terests. They insisted, however, that this relation should 
be open and above board, that the government treat all im- 
partially. There must be no secret understandings between 
government officials and private interests. 

1 N. Y. Times, Evening Post, Nov. 5, 6; Nation, Nov. 13; Harper's 
Weekly, Nov. 15 ; Report of Ind. Ex. Com. passim. 

2 Leslie's Hist, of Rep. Party, p. 444; Curtis, Republican Party, vol, 
ii, p. 484. 

8 Report of Indep. Ex. Con:., passim. 



-3Q THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [_j. IO 

The political situation was particularly favorable for an 
ndependent movement in 1884. In times when great prin- 
ts are at stake the choice between them cannot be com- 
plicated by too careful consideration of the methods by 
which these principles are to be made effective. When, 
however, there are no real differences in principle between 
parties the question of methods becomes of prime impor- 
ce. As long as there was a question of the overthrow of 
slavery, of preserving the Union, or of maintaining what 
I been accomplished by the war, many voters unhesitat- 
ly supported the Republican party, although they were 
repelled by the character of some of its leaders and by the 
fficiency and corruption that had developed within it. 
They would have supported the party in 1884, in spite of 
heir disgust with its methods and distrust of its candidate, 
had there been any real issue between it and its opponents. 
■ fact that both parties were in practical agreement as to 
national policy made the question of how this policy was to 
be carried out the all-important one, and this depended, in 
opinion of many, on the character of the chief executive. 
To the Independents Blaine was the embodiment of all 
i they liked least in politics. Throughout his career he 
1 been a spoilsman rather than a civil service reformer. 
a party leader in his state and in the nation, and even as 
a candidate for the Presidency, he had associated himself 
with many politicians of the worst type. His popularity 
had been to a large extent artificially developed and was the 
lit of skilful appeals to the emotions rather than of a 
reasoned conviction of the importance or the righteousness 
of the causes which he had championed. Above all, he had 
never been able to convince a large number of people that 
had not used his public office for his own private ends or 

he would not do so again if given the opportunity. 
In spite of Blaine's weakness with the Independents, he 



4II ] THE CAMPAIGN AND THE EEECTIOX OF 1884 2 ^j 

had great eleme: :rength and it m be assumed 

that another candidate would have been more success 
To the rank and file of the Republican voters who got their 
opinions on politics ready-made from partisan papers and 
who had little patience with what they considered to be the 
hair-splitting of political purists, Blaine was the " plumed 
knight,'" the bold, dashing, magnetic statesman who had 
been foully slandered by envious enemies. It is hardly fair 

: jmpare Blaine's vote with that of Garfield in 1880, for 
in the meantime the Republican party had experienced a 
general decline. In 1882 the Democrat* had carried Penn- 

. ania. Massachusetts, Michigan. Illinois, Kansas. Col - 
rado. Nevada and California, and although there had been 
slight gains for the Republicans in 1883. few Republicans 

dd have duplicated Blaine's feat in bringing all these 
-rates back into line in 1884. In several states, notably 111 i— 

- and Michigan, the Republican electoral ticket ran well 
ahead of the state and local tickets. 1 A circumstance w: 
hurt Blaine and would have hurt any Republican in 1 8 v _ 
was the existing business depression and the large am 
of unemployment that went with it. ^"hether with reas 
r not. business depression and unemployment are alw 
likely to react unfavorably on the party in power, especially 
when there are no great issues to distract attention from 
them. Business stagnation was one of the causes of 
Republican reverses in 1882 and conditions had grown 
-:-radily worse since that time. 

l N. Y. Tribune. Nov. 14. 



CHAPTER XI 
The Democrats in Power 

The election of Cleveland was an experiment. Could a 
man with absolutely no experience in national affairs, how- 
ever good his intentions, satisfactorily perform the functions 
of President of the United States? Could a group dissatis- 
fied with conditions in its own party join hands with its op- 
ponents and force its program on them with any hope oi 
-uccess? Finally, could a party made up in large part of 
individuals who had attempted or connived at an attempt to 
destroy the state be trusted to administer the affairs of that 
state, however much the ideas and ideals of those individuals 
might have been modified ? These were the questions which 
the Democratic administration had to answer. 

Neither Democrats nor Republicans knew just what to 
expect. The return of the Democrats to power had not 
been a manifestation of approval of any particular policy, 
for the party, as a party, had no policy. To some Demo- 
crats a return to power meant nothing more than safety 
from negro and carpet-bag domination, to others it meant 
tariff reform, to others silver coinage. 1 A large part of 
the population of the North had been brought up to believe 
that a return of the Democrats to power would mean busi- 
ness disaster, derangement of the finances, debasement of 
the currency, annullment of the war amendments, repudi- 
ation of the national debt, payment of the rebel debt, pension- 
ing of Confederate veterans and reenslavement of the 

1 Cf. Schurz, Works, vol. iv, p. 440, letter of Bayard; Nation, Jan. 14, 
1886. 

232] 412 



413] THE DEMOCRATS IN POWER 233 

negro. 1 There could be no real discussion of policies, no 
real argument on issues until the Democrats had proven the 
foolishness of these ideas. The first task of the Democrats 
was the negative one of convincing the country that on the 
fundamental principles of the government they were as 
worthy of trust as their opponents. They might then go on 
to formulate their policies and present them to the country 
on their merits. 

On this negative side the Democrats were successful. 
Cleveland's inaugural address might easily have been en- 
dorsed by any Republican. His cabinet in ability and in- 
tegrity compared favorably with any of those of his Repub- 
lican predecessors. No commercial or industrial disaster 
materialized. On the contrary business was good and 
showed a steady improvement over the previous four years. 2 
The payment of the national debt went steadily on ; the rebel 
debt was not paid ; the negroes were not reenslaved. Events 
proved that the "results of the war" were as safe in Demo- 
cratic as in Republican hands. Cleveland declared in his 
inaugural address that, "All discussion as to their [the 
negroes'] fitness for the place accorded them as American 
citizens is idle and unprofitable except as it suggests the ne- 
cessity for their improvement," 3 and there was nothing in 
his official acts that belied this statement. There were some 
attempts on the part of the Republicans to stir up the sec- 
tional issue : one when the south enthusiastically applauded 
speeches of Jefferson Davis at Montgomery and Atlanta in 
1886 glorifying the rebellion ; another when Cleveland issued 
an order for the return to the states of all flags captured 
during the war, an order which was later rescinded on the 

1 Nation, July 5, 1888. 

1 Com. and Fin. Chronicle, Jan. 9, 1886, Jan. 8, 1887, Jan. 7, 

3 Richardson, vol. viii, p. 302. 



234 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [414 

ground that he had exceeded his powers in issuing it. 
Neither of these events attracted much attention, however, 
except from the professional patriots. 1 One practical dif- 
ference that a Democratic administration did make to the 
South was that there was no threat of interference by fed- 
eral officials in Congressional elections. Another was that 
many southern Democrats, among them several that had 
served in the Confederate army, were appointed to federal 
office. 2 The Democratic office-holders, northern as well as 
southern, proved that they were much like their Republican 
fellow citizens, — some of them good, some bad, some indif- 
ferent. 

What looked like an attempt to stir up sectional animosity 
was the attack on Cleveland's pension policy. More careful 
scrutiny of claims in the pension office and <the consequent 
greater number of rejections led to a large number of special 
pension bills. Cleveland used his veto freely on these bills 
and took occasion in his veto' messages to show that many of 
the claims were ridiculous. 3 In January, 1887, Congress 
passed a dependent pension bill which provided a pension of 
twelve dollars per month for all veterans who had served 
at least three months and were unable to support them- 
selves. Cleveland vetoed this bill on the ground that its 
provisions were vague, that there was no actual knowledge 
as to its cost and that it pauperized the veterans and made 
the pension list which should be a roll of honor a retreat for 
the dishonest. 4 Republican papers declared that this veto 
was a direct insult to Union veterans and an attempt to 
curry favor with the South. They pointed out that Cleve- 
land had signed a bill granting pensions to> all dependent 

1 Public Opinion, June 8, 1886; Peck. Twenty Years, p. 144. 

s Nation, June 11, 1885. 

3 Richardson, vol. viii, p. 443 et passim. 

* Ibid., p. 549. 



415] THE DEMOCRATS IN POWER 235 

veterans of the Mexican war, 1 presumably because this bill 
provided for southerners as well as northerners. 2 The New 
York State Republican platform of 1887 condemned the 
" ilippant, sneery language of the President in vetoing pen- 
sion bills." 3 Some of the officials of the Grand Army of the 
Republic were very bitter against Cleveland and were so> 
successful in stirring up feeling against him that he with- 
drew his acceptance of an invitation to address the encamp- 
ment at St. Louis in 1887. The organization, however, 
refused to pass a vote censuring Cleveland or to endorse a 
general dependency pension bill. 4 Public opinion on the 
whole supported Cleveland in his pension policy. 5 The 
fact that in spite of vetoes, appropriations for pensions grew 
steadily from sixty millions in 1886 tct eighty-one millions 
in 1889 would seem to indicate that the veterans were not 
being neglected. 

Financial interests had been inclined to distrust the 
Democrats because of the soft-money tendencies of a large 
section of the party. In 1885 the unwillingness of the 
country to use the silver dollars whose coinage was compul- 
sory under the Bland act was causing silver to pile up in the 
treasury and imperiling the gold reserve. Cleveland made 
it clear from the start that he was as strong a champion of 
hard money as any Republican. Before his inauguration 
in an open letter to members of the forty-eighth Congress 
he condemned continued silver coinage 6 and in his first mes- 
sage to Congress he declared that currency reform through 
suspension of silver coinage was the most important question 
before the country. 7 He could not get much support for 

1 U. S. Stat, at Large, ch. 70, 1887. ''Public Opinion, Feb. 19, 1887. 
s Ann. Cyc, 1887, p. 552. 

4 N. Y. papers, Oct. 1, 1887; Dewey, National Problems, p. 82. 

5 Nation, July 14, 1887; Public Opinion, Feb. 19, 1887. 
*McPherson, 1886, p. 116. 7 Richardson, vol. viii, p. 342. 



236 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [416 

his ideas, however, from, either party in Congress and no 
action was taken. The increased demand for currency due 
to expanding trade, the withdrawal of bank notes with the 
redemption of bonds and the expedient hit upon by the 
treasury of issuing silver certificates of small denominations 
and replacing greenbacks with them, all helped to force more 
silver into use and to relieve the drain on the gold reserve 
so that the threatened disaster did not materialize. 1 In 
April, 1886, ninety-six Democrats and thirty Republicans in 
the House voted for free coinage of silver, while seventy 
Democrats and ninety-three Republicans voted against it. 2 
On July 14. 1886, a resolution calling on the Secretary of 
the Treasury to purchase bonds whenever the balance in the 
Treasury should exceed $100,000,000 passed the House by 
a vote of 209 to 146. Although the effect of this resolution 
would be to force the payment of bonds in silver, sixty-three 
Republicans were recorded with the majority. 3 Neither 
party could as yet make the currency question a test of party 
orthodoxy but it was evident that hard-money adherents 
had little more to fear from the Democrats than from the 
Republicans, at least as long as Cleveland was President. 

One other negative accomplishment of the Democrats' 
was the fact that there were no big jobs or scandals during 
Cleveland's term. Appropriations increased gradually, it is 
true, but in spite of an overflowing treasury there was 
evidence of an intention to keep expenditures within reason- 
able bounds. Cleveland refused to sign the rivers and 
harbors bill of 1887 and vetoed the bill passed in December 
1888 to return to the states the direct tax of 1861, declaring 
it to be a "bald gratuity". 4 The nearest approach to a 

1 Noyes, Forty Years of American Finance, p. 104. 

2 McPherson, 1886, p. 100. 

3 Nation, July 22, 1886; Public Opinion, July 24, 1886. 
* Richardson, vol. viii, p. 837. 



417] THE DEMOCRATS IN POWER 237 

scandal was the implication of Attorney General Garland in 
the Pan Electric affair. Garland caused, or at least allowed, 
a suit to be brought by his department attacking the validity 
of the Bell Telephone Company's patent, a suit which if 
successful would greatly increase the value of Pan Electric 
stock, of which he was a large holder. The propriety of 
his action was sufficiently questionable to give Republicans 
in Congress and Republican newspapers a chance to declare 
the administration disgraced, but Democrats and independ- 
ents generally refused to see anything improper in it. 1 

On the question of civil service reform the Democrats 
had both a negative and a positive task. The public senti- 
ment for reform was weak and vague, but there was enough 
of it to make disastrous for the party any complete repudia- 
tion of what had been accomplished. On the other hand, if 
the Democrats wished to make reform an issue, to be known 
as a reform party, they must do much more than acquiesce 
in what had been done. The fact that Cleveland had com- 
mitted himself to civil service reform on various occasions 
by his actions as well as his words was one of the main 
factors in gaining him the support of the Independents and 
they naturally expected and demanded not only faithful 
execution of the law but an extension of the principle. The 
great majority of the leaders of the Democratic party, 
however, had no sympathy with reform. They had ac- 
cepted Cleveland because they realized the necessity for 
Independent support, but they had no idea of making their 
party a reform party. While many of the Republican 
leaders professed to be ardent champions of reform, there 
was scarcely one among them who would not put partisan 
advantage above promotion of the idea. The personnel of 
the civil service was not satisfactory. It had been built up 

1 House Rep., 49 C, I S., no. 3142; Public Opinion, July 10, 1886. 



238 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [ 4I g 

for a quarter of a century on the principle that only Re- 
publicans should be appointed to office and they on the 
basis of partisan service rather than ability to perform the 
functions of the office. Many office-holders were inefficient 
and many would have no scruple against using their office 
to discredit a Democratic administration. Cleveland's task 
was, then, to remodel the service into one that would be 
efficient and non-partisan and to do this in a way that would 
satisfy the reformers, would not disrupt his own party and 
would not give the Republicans ground for attack. 

Cleveland's attitude toward the civil service during the 
early months of his administration gained the hearty ap- 
proval of the reformers. Although some of his appoint- 
ments were criticized, in the main they were good, removals 
were comparatively few, some Republicans were appointed 
and others were retained after their terms expired. 1 George 
W. Curtis in his presidential address before the National 
Civil Service Reform League in August, 1885 said: 

Any unprejudiced observer, Republican or Democrat, who con- 
siders the enormous difficulties and perplexities of the situation 
. . . will admit that since the spoils system was first generally 
introduced into our national administration no President has 
given such conclusive evidence both of his reform convictions 
and of his courage in enforcing his convictions as President 
Cleveland. 2 

Cleveland soon found, however, that the path of a re- 
former was by no means a smooth one. The pressure 
upon him from members of his own party to make a "clean 
sweep" of Republicans was tremendous. Many Democrats 
who claimed to be for reform interpreted reform to mean 

1 Nation, July 2, 23, Aug. 6, 13, 1885, Feb. 4, 18, 1886; Schurz, Works, 
vol. iv, p. 367. 

2 Curtis, Orations and Addresses, vol. ii, p. 300. 



419] THE DEMOCRATS IN POWER 039 

replacing partisan Republicans by "good" Democrats. 1 . 
Every appointment that Cleveland made which gained the 
approval of the Independents brought down upon him a 
chorus of condemnation from members of his own party. 2 . 
Cleveland had to depend often on the advice of Democratic 
Congressmen as to removals and appointments and he 
was frequently deceived. Many of his subordinates in the 
executive departments had no real sympathy with his ideas. 
Congress obstructed rather than helped. In the first session 
of Congress during his administration two bills were intro- 
duced by Democrats for the repeal of the civil service act, 
one in the House by Seney of Ohio and the other in the 
Senate by Vance of North Carolina. 3 Both of these bills 
were reported adversely, but in neither case was the com- 
mittee unanimous. 4 . More dangerous than the direct at- 
tacks on the statute were proposals fo amend it in such a 
way as to deprive it of much of its force. Among these 
proposals the most important was an amendment offered 
by Randall to an appropriation bill which provided that 
the names of all applicants found to be qualified should be 
reported to appointing officers, — the effect being to make 
the examination a mere pass examination instead of a 
competitive one. This was defeated on a point of order 
but another amendment of Randall's, which took 150 places 
in the pension office out from the provisions of the statute 
by means of a reclassification, was adopted. 5 

The remarks of Vance in support of his bill, which were 
applauded in the Senate and quoted approvingly by several 

1 N. Y. Sun, March 15, 1885; J. B. Eustis, in North American Rev., 
Oct. 1885. 

2 A r . Y. Sun, Nov. 28, 1885 ; Public Opinion, April 24, 1886. 

3 Cong. Rec, 49 C, 1 S., pp. 401, 464. 

4 Ibid., p. 2287; House Rep., 49 G, 1 S., no. 1001. 

5 Cong. Rec, 49 C, 1 S., p. 5489; Curtis, op. cit., p. 312. 



240 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [420 

Democratic newspapers, may be taken as an indication of 
the attitude of a large part of the part}- toward reform. 
Vance said : 

No more unmistakable sign of the decay of public virtue in 
politics has been furnished by American history than the rise 
... of that maudlin political sentiment which we recognize 
for want of a better, under the name of " Mugwumpism '*, a 
kind of sickly, sentimental, Sunday-school, " Goody Two- 
Shoes " party, which appears desirous of ruling the world not 
as God has made it, but as they would have it. 1 

Democratic state platforms in 1886 and 1887 while en- 
dorsing Cleveland's administration entirely ignored in most 
cases the question of civil service reform or gave it but 
perfunctory endorsement. In 18S7 the New York Demo- 
crats renominated Hill, who had openly flouted reform, 
and declared in their platform that " In view of the 
radical changes in the administrative methods which grow 
out of the civil service laws and the difference of opinions 
which exist in relation thereto, we deem this subject one 
which might properly be submitted to the popular vote." 3 
In the Congressional elections of 1886 the Democrats re- 
tained a majority in the House but lost fifteen seats, a resull 
which the spoils papers were almost unanimous in declaring 
was due to Cleveland's "civil service nonsense." * 

This pressure upon Cleveland from his own party had its 
effect. Removals became more frequent and since usually 
no reasons were given it was assumed that they were made 
from purely partisan considerations. Senator Hale in an 
attack on the administration in the Senate gave figures show- 

1 Cong. Rec, 49 C, 1 S., p. 2946. 
2 Ann. Cyc, 1887, passim. 

3 Ibid., p. 552. 

4 A". Y. Sun, Nov. 7, 10, 1886; Public Opinion, Nov. 6; Nation, Nov. [I. 



42 1 ] THE DEMOCRATS IN POWER 241 

ing that up to June 1887, out of 56,134 more important 
officials who controlled others and whose change meant the 
change of others, 42,992 had been removed. 1 George W. 
Curtis said in his address before the National Civil Service 
Reform League in August 1887 that "almost as complete a 
change as was possible" had been made." Cleveland seemed 
to have determined upon a sort of local option on the civil 
service question. Where there was considerable reform 
sentiment, as in New York and parts of New England, the 
appointments were usually good and removals comparatively 
infrequent; where there was a strong Democratic organiza- 
tion and little reform sentiment removals and poor appoint- 
ments were common. Conditions in Indiana and Maryland 
were particularly bad, calling forth protests from reformers 
and reform organizations. It was charged that in these 
states and also in the Philadelphia post office the civil service 
law was systematically evaded. 3 

Cleveland came into conflict with the Senate on the ques- 
tion of removals. Committees of the Senate from time to 
time requested from heads of departments papers showing 
causes for removals. On advice of the President these 
requests were refused. Several nominations were held up, 
it being intimated that if there was a frank avowal that re- 
movals were made for purely partisan reasons, ratification 
would follow without further ado. 4 The question came to 
a head when Attorney General Garland refused the request 
of the senate judiciary committee for papers in regard to> 
the removal of a Republican district attorney for the south- 
ern district of Alabama. After Cleveland had sent a special 

1 Cong. Rec, 50 C, 1 S., p. 373. 

2 Curtis, op. cit., p. 342. 

3 Sen. Rep., 50 C. 1 S., no. 2373. passim ; Foulke, Fighting the Spoils- 
men, chap, iii ; Nation, July 28, 1887, March 7, 1889. 

4 Cleveland, Presidential Problems, p. 42. 



242 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [422 

message justifying his refusal to submit papers 1 and the 
Senate had adopted resolutions condemning the Attorney 
General, declaring it to be their duty to refuse ratification 
in any case where papers were not submitted and condemn- 
ing the removal of Union veterans, the matter was dropped. 
The sympathy of the public was with Cleveland in the dis- 
pute ; for it was quite clear that the Senate was acting from 
partisan motives. 

Schurz wrote Cleveland early in his administration that 
if he tried to please both Democrats and Independents by 
his civil service policy he would be in danger of "sitting 
down between two chairs. 2 This was practically what 
Cleveland did ; for although his yielding to the Democrats 
did not satisfy them, it alienated many of his Independent 
supporters. The Independents were ready to give Cleveland 
credit for the good accomplished but they were extremely 
critical of any lapses. 3 Cleveland resented these criticisms, 
feeling that the reformers did not appreciate the difficulties 
of his position. He was particularly jealous of his inde- 
pendence. The charges made during the campaign that his 
inexperience in politics would result in his being a puppet 
of the more experienced politicians heightened this feeling. 
He resented anything that remotely resembled interference 
in his own affairs whether it came from members of his 
own party or from the Independents. 4 Schurz, whose 
advice Cleveland had at first welcomed, 5 complained that 
after he had criticized certain appointments his letters to 

Richardson, vol. viii, p. 375. 

* Schurz, Works, vol. iv, p. 402. 

i Ibid., pp. 317, 405, 414; Nation, July 23, Aug. 13, 1885. 

4 Peck, Twenty Years, p. 159. Tilden complained that a recommenda- 
tion from him was enough to ensure a request being denied. Bigelow.. 
Tilden, vol. ii, pp. 306, 316. 

5 Works, vol. iv, p. 297. 



423] THE DEMOCRATS IN POWER 243 

the President remained unacknowledged. 1 In a letter of 
September 11, 1885, accepting the resignation of Dorman B. 
Eaton as a member of the civil service commission, Cleve- 
land spoke disparagingly of those 

who profess friendliness for the cause, and yet mischievously 
and with supercilious self-righteousness, discredit every effort 
not in exact accord with their attenuated ideas, decry with 
carping criticism the labor of those actually in the field of 
reform, and ignoring the conditions which bound and qualify 
every struggle for a radical improvement in the affairs of gov- 
ernment, demand complete and immediate perfection. 2 

In his special message of July 23, 1888, submitting the re- 
port of the civil service commission to Congress he said : 
"The path of civil service reform has not at all times been 
pleasant nor easy . . . both friends and enemies have mis- 
understood and complained." 3 

On July 14, 1886, Cleveland issued an executive order 
warning office-holders against activity in politics. " Indi- 
vidual interests and activity in political affairs are by no 
means condemned," he said, " but privileges are not en- 
larged by . . . office holding." * In pursuance of this 
order he removed during the Congressional campaign of 
the following fall two district attorneys, one a Republican 
the other a Democrat, for partisan activity. He later 
brought down upon himself a storm of protest from Re- 
publicans and Independents when he restored the Demo- 
crat to office but refused to restore the Republican. Schurz 
declared in a letter to Cleveland, " This was a retreat from 
a position of principle — a backdown, apparently for partisan 
reasons or under partisan dictation." B 

1 Works, vol. iv, pp. 437, 475. 2 McPherson, 1886, p. 117. 

■ 1 Richardson, vol. viii, p. 618. * Ibid., p. 494. 

5 Schurz, Works, vol. iv, p. 469. 



244 THE DEMOCRATIC RETl'RX TO POWER [ 424 

Although the Independents were disappointed with Cleve- 
land's civil service record, the majority of them were willing 
to concede that his position had been a most difficult one and 
that the reform had been advanced. The Nation said: 
" Mr. Cleveland has in the matter of civil service reform 
fallen far short of his promises, he has as a matter of fact 
done far more for it than any of his predecessors.'' x Har- 
c'-'s Weekly said : " If reform in the civil service has failed 
to receive from him the support which had been expected . . . 
those who best know the situation are least harsh in their 
censure. . .they have not questioned and do not doubt his 
honesty of purpose, his sincerity of conviction or the actual 
progress in reform which has been accomplished." 

Cleveland's success in converting the Democratic party 
into a reform party was not conspicuous. Some of the 
spoils papers, particularly the New York Sun, were inclined 
to boast that he had yielded on the question. 3 In the Demo- 
cratic national platform of 1888 the only mention of the 
subject was a casual allusion to " honest reform in the civil 
service " in the list of the accomplishments of Cleveland's 
:, ('ministration. 4 Nevertheless Cleveland's feat of keeping 
the reform principle alive and the same time retaining the 
support of his party to such an extent that they renominated 
him without a contest, was no small one. 

The Republicans made the most of the opportunity that 
Cleveland's lapses gave them to show the insincerity of all 
Democratic talk of reform. The most charitable among 
them said that Cleveland had probably done as well as his 
party would let him do. 5 Others asserted that his adminis- 

1 June 14, 1888; vide also Xation of Oct. 25. 1888, and March 7, 1889. 

2 Xov. 17, 1888; vide also A". Y. Times, Nov. 4. 9. 1888. 

8 July 2, 7, Oct. 30, 1888. 

4 Stan\vood. Presidency, p. 469; vide also .V. Y. World, June 7, 1888. 

5 Roosevelt in North American Rev., Oct. 1885. 



425] THE DEMOCRATS IN POWER 245 

tration had been an orgy of spoils. 1 The Republican mem- 
bers of the Senate committee on civil service after an inves- 
tigation reported that many partisan changes had been made, 
that there had been wholesale removals of Union soldiers, 
and that federal officials had freely and openly participated 
in politics. 2 

Any fair estimate of the civil service record of the Demo- 
crats must be based on a consideration of conditions as 
they existed, not on any theory as to the necessity for or the 
practicability of reform. Civil service reform could not be 
put into effect by the enactment of a statute or by a Presi- 
dential proclamation. It required a long process of educa- 
tion. Cleveland realized this and attempted to lead public 
sentiment step by step. If his steps seem slow and falter- 
ing it must be remembered that a reform of the civil service 
was not the only thing he hoped to accomplish. The fact 
that the whole idea of reform was not repudiated, that the 
law, as it went, was fairly well enforced, was in itself a ne- 
gative gain for the Democrats. There was even some posi- 
tive accomplishment. The competitive principle was ap- 
plied to promotions by an executive order of May, 1887 and 
in March, 1889 the law was extended to the railway mail 
service. 3 By this later extension and by the application of 
the law to additional postoffices and customs houses as the 
number of their employees reached fifty, the number of 
persons under the provisions of the law was raised from 
about 14,000 to over 28,000 during Cleveland's term. 4 His 
administration may fairly be called a period of progress 
in civil service reform. — slow indeed, but still progress. 

1 H. C. Lea, in Independent, Oct. 18, 1888; vide also Indep., Oct. 25, 
Nov. 1, 8, and N. Y. Tribune, Nov. 4, 8. 

2 Sen. Rep., 50 C, 1 S., no. 2373. 

3 Richardson, vol. viii, pp. 572, 845. 
* Report Civ. Ser. Com., 1889. 



246 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [^ 2 6 

That it was even slow progress was due, as far as official 
action is concerned, to Cleveland's personal efforts. There 
was in Congress no member of their party who was an 
active worker for the reform. 

The question which more than any other has attracted 
attention to Cleveland's administration is that of the tariff. 
The attempt at tariff reduction, the lack of harmony in the 
Democratic party on the question and the attitude of the 
two parties during the Presidential campaign of 1884 have 
already been told. 1 It will be remembered that both parties 
while accepting the principle of protection had pledged 
themselves to reduce the tariff. It was the surplus revenue 
that led both parties to take this stand and it was the con- 
tinued surplus that kept the question in the foreground. In 
spite of steadily increasing expenditures and in spite of the 
redemption of bonds to the amount of $195,000,000 above 
the requirements of the sinking fund, business prosperity 
with increased consumption and increased imports 2 kept 
the surplus continually mounting. The surplus for the 
fiscal year 1886 was ninety-three millions and for the three 
following years 103 millions, 119 millions and 105 millions 
respectively. The unexpended balance in the treasury on 
June 30, 1885, was $521,000,000 and on June 30, T889 
$659,000,000. 3 

Cleveland from the start gave evidence of his intention to 
live up to the pledges of his platform. In his inaugural and 
in his first message to Congress he pointed out the necessity 
for reducing taxes as the logical means of reducing the 
surplus. " The question of free trade is not involved," he 
said in his message of December, 1885, " nor is there now 
any occasion for the general discussion of the wisdom or 
expediency of the protective system." 4 His first Congress 

1 Vide supra, pp. 116 ct seq., 215. 2 Noyes, op. cit., p. 113. 

3 U. S- Stat. Abst, 1889, P- 2. * Richardson, vol. viii, p. 341. 



427] THE DEMOCRATS IN POWER 247 

did nothing with the tariff. Neither party appeared to take 
its platform seriously. A large majority of the Democrats 
were in favor of reduction but a group of protectionists 
under the leadership of Randall were able by combining 
with the Republicans to prevent action. A tariff bill in- 
troduced by Morrison, chairman of the ways and means 
committee, which reduced duties and increased the free list, 
was killed June 17, 1886, by a vote of 140 to 157, thirty- 
five Democrats voting with the majority. 1 Randall then 
introduced a bill which, it was estimated, would reduce in- 
ternal revenues by $26,000,000 and customs by $8,000,000 
but it was reported unfavorably by the ways and means 
committee. 2 

The Democratic state platforms of 1886 in general fol- 
lowed the formula of the national platform of 1884 on 
the tariff. A few made stronger demands for reduction, 
Indiana declaring that taxation for any other purpose 
than revenue was robbery under the form of law and 
Missouri that any other than a revenue tariff was uncon- 
stitutional. California Democrats, however, demanded the 
restoration of the duty of 1867 on wool. The Republican 
platforms showed a stronger protectionist tone than previ- 
ously, many demanding that the principle of protection be 
maintained and others attacking the Morrison bill as a step, 
toward free trade and a blow at American working-men. 3- 
The Republican papers pretended to see in the results of the 
election, which reduced the Democratic majority in the 
House from forty-five to seventeen, and especially in the 
defeat of Morrison, a mandate against tariff reduction. 4. 
Tariff reformers insisted that the tariff played little part in 

1 McPherson, 1886, p. 156. 
*Ibid., p. 157- 

s Platforms in Ann. Cyc, 1886. 
4 N. Y. Tribune, Nov. 4, 6, 1886. 



248 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [ 4 _>8 

the campaign. 1 Whatever the mandate was, Cleveland urged 
reduction more strongly in his message to Congress in De- 
cember, 1886. Although he based his argument mainly on 
the surplus, he declared that labor and the farmers were 
becoming suspicious of the benefits they gained from high 
duties and characterized the taking by taxation of more 
than was necessary for the needs of the government as 
" a violation of the fundamental principles of a free gov- 
ernment." 2 Congress was still obdurate, however, and 
twenty-six Democrats joining with the Republicans pre- 
vented consideration of tariff bills by a vote of 154 to 148. 3 
It was plain that strenuous measures were necessary if the 
Democratic party was to be united on any tariff policy. 
Cleveland boldly proceeded to take such measures by devot- 
ing his entire message of December, 1887, to the question 
of the tariff. He began by pointing out the necessity for 
immediate action in regard to the surplus. Payment of the 
three-per cent bonds which were redeemable at the option of 
the government had furnished an outlet for the surplus but 
this relief was no longer possible as all such bonds had been 
redeemed. He expressed doubt as to the power of the 
Treasury to purchase bonds in the open market. The 
proposition to deposit money in the national banks he 
characterized as objectionable on the ground that it gave 
rise to charges of favoritism and brought about undesirably 
close relations between the Treasury and the business of 
the country. He declared that there was no complaint 
against the internal revenue taxes and that they laid no 
hardship on any part of the people, but that the tariff laws 
were " the vicious, inequitable and illogical source of un- 
necessary taxation." He then proceeded to attack some of 

l N. Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1886. 

2 Richardson, vol. viii, p. 509. 

3 McPherson, 1888, p. 52. 



420] THE DEMOCRATS IN POWER 249 

the stock arguments for protection. He declared that in 
most cases it was a question of insuring to manufacturers 
not " moderately profitable returns " but " immense 
profits." He asserted that the tariff raised the cost of 
living to the entire country, that the only persons who could 
possibly be benefited were the 2,623,089 employed in pro- 
tected industries and that their supposed gain was nullified 
by the increased cost of the commodities that they had to 
purchase. Competition which might keep down prices was 
prevented, he asserted, by trusts. He repeatedly declared 
that it was not a question of doing away with the protective 
system. for example: 

In a readjustment of our tariff the interests of American labor 
engaged in manufacture should be carefully considered, as 
well as the preservation of our manufactures. It may be 
called protection or by any other name, but relief from the 
hardships and dangers of our present tariff laws should be 
devised with especial precaution against imperiling the exist- 
ence of our manufacturing interests. 

And again : 

Our progress toward a wise conclusion will not be improved by 
dwelling upon the theories of protection and free trade. This 
savors too much of bandying epithets. It is a condition which 
confronts us, not a theory. Relief from this condition may 
involve a slight reduction of the advantages which we award 
our home production, but the entire withdrawal of such ad- 
vantages should not be contemplated. The question of free 
trade is absolutely irrelevant. 1 

The message focused the attention of the entire country 
on the tariff. Democratic and independent papers in gen- 
eral expressed hearty approval, although a small part of the 

1 Richardson, vol. viii, p. 580. 



250 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [430 

Democratic press was inclined to question the wisdom of 
forcing the issue too strongly and to urge the reduction of 
internal revenues before attacking the tariff. Several Re- 
publican papers, among them the Chicago Tribune, the 
Providence Journal and the St. Paul Pioneer Press endorsed 
the message. The majority of the Republican papers, how- 
ever, attacked the message as an argument for free trade. 1 
To characterize every scheme for tariff reduction as free 
trade or as a step toward free trade became the Republican 
policy from this time on. 

Roger O. Mills of Texas was appointed chairman of the 
House ways and means committee of the fiftieth Congress 
and on April 2, 1888, he reported a bill for the reduction of 
taxation. The bill provided for the repeal of all taxes on 
tobacco and its sale except those on cigars, cigarettes and 
cheroots. The estimated reduction in the internal revenue 
was $24,000,000 and in the tariff $53,000,000 — $31,000,000 
by reduced rates and $22,000,000 by additions to the free 
list. Wool, wood, salt, hemp, flax and tin plate were the 
principal additions to the free list. The reductions were 
general, the largest affecting woolen goods and materials 
made from hemp and flax on the theory that free raw mate- 
rials made possible lower rates on the manufactured arti- 
cles. Rates on sugar were reduced an average of twenty 
percent, the estimated reduction being $ 11, 000,000. 2 

The majority report dwelt primarily on the need for re- 
ducing the revenue, but also declared that the enactment of 
the bill would encourage manufacture by stimulating for- 
eign trade. The report asserted that the committee had 
kept in view at all times " the interests of the manufacturer, 
the laborer, the producer and the consumer," and admitted 

1 Public Opinion, Dec. 12; Nation, Dec. 22; N. Y. Sun, Times, Tribune, 
World, Dec. 7-12, 1887. 

2 House Rep., 50 C, 1 S., no. 1496. 



4 3 1 ] THE DEM OCR A TS IN PO WER 2 5 1 

that the bill did not " depart from precedent that tariff 
legislation has been based on the principle of mutual con- 
cession." In his speech introducing the bill Mills pointed 
out that it reduced the average rate on dutiable articles to 
m rtv percent, which was practically the same as that of the 
Morrill tariff of 1861 and not lower than that recommended 
by the tariff commission of 1883. 1 

The minority of the committee attacked the bill as an 
avowedly political measure which, " with the President's 
free-trade message," was to constitute the issue and be the 
platform of the party. They declared the bill to be a " rad- 
ical reversal of the tariff policy of the country " and as- 
serted that it would " disturb every branch of business . . . 
retard . . . prosperity and seriously impair our industrial 
independence." They declared that it would by stimulating 
imports increase rather than reduce the surplus and insin- 
uated that the President had purposely created the crisis by 
refusing to buy bonds in the open market. They attacked 
the majority for not having held hearings on the bill and 
asserted that the minority had been excluded from any share 
in framing the schedules. Finally they asserted that it was a 
sectional measure which protected the iron ore of Alabama 
and Tennessee but not the steel of Pennsylvania, which 
protected Louisiana sugar and South Carolina rice but not 
the products of Republican states. 2 

Debate on the bill began in the House April 17 and con- 
tinued with some interruptions until the final vote on July 
21. The fact that all debate was " educational " campaign 
material, since there was no hope of getting the two houses 
to agree on the tariff, made the discussion more rather 
than less bitter. All phases of the question were gone into 
but the main contention of the Democrats was the necessity 

1 Cong. Rec, 50 C, 1 S., p. 3057. 

2 House Rep., 50 C, 1 S., no. 1496. 



252 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [432 

for revenue reduction, while that of the Republicans was 
that the bill was a step toward free trade and involved the 
overthrow of the protective system. Two Republicans, 
Fitch of New York and Nelson of Minnesota, spoke in 
favor of the bill. 1 No Democrat spoke against the bill as 
a whole although several, among them Randall, offered 
amendments raising rates in specific schedules. Before the 
Mills bill was reported, Randall had introduced a bill pro- 
viding for a reduction of $75,000,000 in internal revenue 
duties and $20,000,000 in customs, which had been referred 
to the ways and means committee without debate. 2 On the 
final passage of the Mills bill he was absent because of illness 
but sent a letter asking for a pair, announcing that if he were 
present he would vote against the bill. 3 He was unable, 
however, to hold those who had previously followed his 
lead on the tariff. 

The Democratic national convention met in June while 
the bill was still before the House. Nearly half of their 
platform was devoted to the tariff, and in a resolution 
adopted separately from the platform the Mills bill was 
specifically endorsed. 4 This meant that Cleveland had suc- 
ceeded in making tariff reduction a party issue. On the 
final passage of the Mills bill in the House the vote was 162 
to 147, the majority containing three Republicans and two 
Independents and the minority four Democrats. 5 

The Republicans in their national platform of 1888 de- 
clared themselves to be " uncompromisingly in favor of the 
American system of protection " and protested against " its 
destruction as proposed by the President and his party." 

1 Cong. Rec, 50 C, 1 S., pp. 2504, 4277. 

2 Ibid., p. 1976. 

3 Ibid., p. 6660. 

4 Stanwood, Presidency, p. 468. 

5 McPherson, 1888, p. 165. 



43 3 ] THE DEMOCRA TS IN PO WER 253 

They asserted that they would effect all needful reduction 
in the revenue by the repeal of all taxes on tobacco and 
upon spirits used in the arts and for industrial purposes, 
and further, " If there shall still remain a larger revenue 
than is requisite for the wants of the government, we favor 
the entire repeal of internal taxes, rather than the surrender 
of any part of our protective system." x In spite of this 
seemingly unequivocal declaration against any reduction 
whatever in customs duties, the finance committee of the 
Senate to which the Mills bill had been referred brought in 
in October, as a substitute for it, a bill reducing rates on 
sugar, adding to the free list certain articles not produced 
in the country and reducing internal taxes. 2 The estimated 
reduction of the revenue was $65,000,000. The introduc- 
tion of this bill was simply for political effect. Both the 
majority and the minority reports were stump speeches de- 
voted mainly to an attack on and a defense of the Mills bill. 
The campaign was conducted almost entirely on the issue 
of the tariff and the opinion was general that Cleveland's 
stand on the question was the main factor in his defeat. 3 
Throughout the campaign, however, as in the previous dis- 
cussion in Congress, there was no agreement between the 
parties as to just what the issue was. The Democrats de- 
clared that it was simply a question of reducing the surplus 
by reducing tariff duties. The Republicans insisted that it 
was a question of whether free trade or protection was to 
be the policy of the country. This attitude on the part of 
the Republicans looks very much like an attempt to becloud 
the issue. It is true that Cleveland in his message used 
arguments which if carried to their logical conclusion would 
lead to free trade, but the arguments of the protectionists 

1 Stanwood, Presidency, p. 473- 

2 Sen. Rep., 50 €., no. 2332. 

3 Cf. newspapers and periodicals, Nov. 1888. 



254 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [434 

if carried to their logical conclusion would lead to the com- 
plete prohibition of imports. The point is that Ceveland 
did not carry or attempt to carry his arguments to their 
logical conclusion. He was simply arguing for a reduction 
of tariff duties, a step to which both parties were pledged. 
Any reduction in the tariff might be called a step toward 
free trade, but a step toward a certain policy does not neces- 
sarily involve the adoption of the policy. The Mills bill 
would have accomplished what the Republicans had prom- 
ised to do in 1884. Its rates were no lower than those 
often recommended by Republicans or by the tariff com- 
mission of 1883. 

While the Democrats did not succeed in reducing the 
tariff, they did perform a service to the country in partially 
clarifying the issue. Their action drove the Republicans 
definitely into the position of supporting high rates as a 
permanent policy and of resisting all attempts at reduction. 
The Democrats were definitely committed to reduction, al- 
though there might be doubt as to how far they would go. 
This clarification of the issues must be considered as a posi- 
tive accomplishment of the Democrats. Here again Cleve- 
land must be given the credit. It was he that forced the 
issue and compelled his party to redeem its platform pledges. 

In the list of positive accomplishments of Cleveland's 
administration should be placed the change in policy in re- 
gard to the public lands. A large part of the public lands 
had fallen into the hands of speculators and corporations 
through evasion of the land laws and through leases made 
by railroads contrary to the terms of their grants. Both 
parties had been promising for years to reclaim the national 
domain for the use of actual settlers but nothing had been 
done. Congress passed an act in July, 1888, forfeiting all 
such lands in railroad grants as lay along the right of way 
where the railroads were not yet completed. An amendment 



435 ] THE DEMOCRATS IN POWER 255 

which would forfeit all grants to railroads where the roads 
had not fulfilled their contracts within the time limit re- 
ceived considerable support from Democrats but not enough 
for its adoption. 1 By enforcing this law, by careful exam- 
ination of other titles and by forfeiture of titles in cases of 
false entries and fraudulent claims over 80,000,000 acres 
were restored to the public domain during Cleveland's 
administration. 2 

The navy department had been, ever since the civil war, 
a favorite field for spoilsmen. Appropriations had been 
wasted and the navy was obsolete and inefficient. President 
Arthur had aroused interest in the condition of the navy 
and a program of rehabilitation was started which Secretary 
Whitney carried on and extended during Cleveland's term. 3 

Republican control of the Senate throughout the period 
made impossible the passage of any strictly partisan legis- 
lation. Moreover, no question of importance, except the 
tariff, developed on which the Democrats presented a united 
front or which could really be called a party issue. There 
were, however, several sound laws passed, which, while non- 
partisan in character, had Democratic support and may be 
placed on the credit side of the Democratic account. Among 
them were the Presidential succession act, 4 the electoral 
count act, 5 the repeal of the tenure of office act, 6 the Dawes 
Indian act 7 and the interstate commerce act. s The bill for 
the repeal of the tenure of office act was introduced in the 

1 McPherson, 1888, p. 138. 

2 Report of Sec. of Int., 1889; Richardson, vol. viii, p. 795. 

3 Reports of Sec. of Navy, 1886, 1889; Peck, Twenty Years, p. 65. 

4 U. S. Stat, at Large, ch. 4, 1886. 

5 Ibid., ch. 90, 1887. 
c Ibid., ch. 353, 1887. 
''Ibid., ch. 119, 1887. 
*Ibid., ch. 104, 1887. 



256 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [436 

Senate by Senator Hoar but its supporters in both houses 
were mainly Democrats, 1 The Dawes act, which followed 
the lines of the President's recommendations in his first 
message, 2 provided for the allotment in severalty of the land 
of any Indian reservation to the individual members of the 
tribe at the discretion of the President and also for the 
attainment of citizenship by Indians receiving allotments. 
The act marks the beginning of the policy of treating the 
Indian as a responsible person rather than a pauper and 
has been abundantly justified by the results. 

Railroad abuses which followed the period of extensive 
construction of the sixties and seventies had aroused a de- 
mand, especially strong in the Middle West, for federal 
regulation of railroads. Bills had been introduced in every 
Congress during the period and the Democratic House in 
1874 and again in 1878 had passed a bill providing for fed- 
eral control. Reagan of Texas, the author, of the bill of 
1878, was the leader of the movement in the House and 
continued to urge his bill in later Congresses. This bill, 
which came to be looked upon as the Democratic bill, pro- 
viding for definite regulation of rates and the prohibition 
of certain abuses, was passed by the House in 1885. The 
Senate passed another bill providing for a commission 
which had power merely to investigate and advise. 3 In 1886 
the Supreme Court in the Wabash decision 4 decreed that a 
state had no power to regulate traffic which went beyond its 
borders. This increased the demand for federal regulation. 
Cleveland called attention to the necessity for it in his mes- 
sage of 1886 and at the next session of Congress both 

1 McPherson, 1888, p. 46. 

2 Richardson, vol. viii, p. 355. 

s Dewey, Nat. Probs., ch. vi ; Johnson, Am. Railway Transportation, 
P- 317. 

*u8U. S. 557- 



437] THE DEMOCRATS IN POWER 257 

houses adopted the compromise which the conference com- 
mittee reported. The bill as enacted provided that charges 
must be reasonable and schedules of rates must be public, 
prohibited rebates and pools and made it illegal to charge 
more for a short haul than for a long haul over the same 
line. It created a commission of five members with power 
to administer the law, but failed to insure to the orders of 
the commission the force of the orders of a court. 

The bill on its final passage received a large majority in 
both houses. 1 It was a proposition which no politician 
would care to vote against if a vote could not be avoided*. 
While the bill cannot be called a partisan measure, the 
Democrats should get considerable credit for it. Public 
opinion was bound to force some legislation sooner or later,, 
but it was largely due to the Democrats that it came when 
it did and that it was as effective as it was. Many Repub- 
licans, while not opposing it openly in Congress or in the 
press, proposed amendments the purpose of which was to 
make the bill of little practical effect. 2 Cleveland's appoint- 
ments to the commission were approved by all parties. 3 

The four years of Cleveland's administration were years 
of widespread discontent among the workingmen of the 
nation. The spectacle of increasing poverty in the midst of 
increasing wealth made labor feel that it was not getting its 
share of the prosperity and made it ready to listen to anyone 
with a remedy to suggest. Strikes and boycotts were fre- 
quent and violence in connection with labor troubles became 
more and more common. The 68,000 votes polled by Henry 
George as the single-tax candidate for mayor of New York 
City in 1887 are an indication of the spirit of the times. 

1 McPherson, 1888, p. 13. 

2 McPherson, 1886, p. 136: Public Opinion, Jan. 8, 1887; N. V. Tribune, 
Jan. 3, 1887. 

3 Public Opinion, April 2, 1887. 



258 THE DEMOCRATIC RETURN TO POWER [438 

Cleveland in his various messages urged reduction of the 
tariff as a means of making labor more contented, and in a 
special message of April 22, 1886, he recommended the 
creation of a permanent commission for the voluntary arbi- 
tration of labor disputes. 1 Congress did not accept this 
suggestion but later passed a bill providing for settlement 
of disputes between railroads and their employees. 2 Other 
labor legislation of the period included an act establishing 
a department of labor, an act prohibiting any officer of the 
government to hire out the labor of prisoners of the United 
States, an act providing for the incorporation of national 
trade unions and an act supplementing the Chinese exclu- 
sion act. The votes on all these bills were non-partisan, 
many of them being passed without a division. 3 There was 
no issue between the parties on these questions, as neither 
party had any definite policy toward labor or any program 
with which to meet the growing labor unrest. 

The labor troubles of Cleveland's administration were a 
portent that the questions of the relation of labor and capital 
and of the attitude of the state toward each were to play a 
prominent part in American politics in the future. As the 
Republican party was becoming more definitely the party of 
large financial interests, it might have been expected that the 
Democratic party would develop into a party which would 
champion the rights of the wage-earner against the rights 
of capital. The Democratic policy, or rather lack of policy, 
toward the labor situation made it clear that this was not 
to be the case. The Democrats could be depended upon to 
lend a more sympathetic ear than the Republicans to pro- 
posals to take away special privileges such as tariffs or land 
grants and to curb the more flagrant abuses of capital, but 

1 Richardson, vol. viii, p. 395. 

2 I T . S. Stat, at large, ch. 1063, 1888. 

3 McPherson, 1886, 1888, passim. 



4 39J THE DEMOCRATS IN POWER 259 

on the fundamental question of the relation of the state to 
private property the parties differed in details rather than 
essentials. Both parties were controlled by and in the in- 
terests of capitalists. However sincere either was in its 
protestations of friendship for labor, the attitude was one 
of friendship rather than partnership. Labor was to be 
treated as a ward ; its benefits were to be a by-product of 
the benefits to capital. There was no idea among the Demo- 
crats any more than among the Republicans of giving labor 
an effective voice in the party councils. The reputation of 
being a " safe " party on questions affecting labor and cap- 
ital doubtless strengthened the Democrats but it drove into 
the Populist and Socialist movements those who desired 
something more than a " safe " policy. 

The positive accomplishments of the Democrats during 
their four years of control may be summed up briefly. The 
laws enacted were few but they were necessary and sound. 
New policies in regard to the public lands, the Indians and 
the regulation of railroads were instituted. The principle 
of civil service reform was maintained and extended. The 
question of tariff reduction was forced to the front and an 
issue, tolerably clear, was drawn between the parties. 

The main achievements of the Democrats, however, were 
negative rather than positive. They showed that they had 
accepted the results of the war, that they were not plot- 
ting the reestablishment of slavery nor the overthrow of 
the Union. They showed that the everyday affairs of the 
country went on much the same as when their opponents 
were in power : business was not disturbed ; the currency 
was not debased ; public obligations were not repudiated. 
They proved that their standards of administration were on 
the whole as high as those of the Republicans, that neither 
party had a monopoly of ability. In short, the Democrats 
had again become respectable. They had put themselves on 



VITA 

Harrison Cook Thomas was born in Frankfort, New 
York, November 25, 1888. He received the degree of 
VI 5. from Hamilton College in 1909. During 1910-11 he 
was a graduate student in the department of History at the 
University of Pennsylvania, taking seminar courses with 
Professors Ames and Cheyney. Since 191 3 he has been a 
graduate student in the department of Political Science at 
Columbia University and has taken courses with Professors 
Dunning, Osgood, Shepherd, Beard, Robinson, Shotwell, 
Simkhovitch, Seligman and Sait, including seminars with 
the first three mentioned. 

From 1 909-1 9 1 1 he was Instructor in History and Mathe- 
matics in Blight School, Philadelphia. From 1911-1913 he 
was Instructor in History in Radnor High School, Wayne, 
Pennsylvania. Since 19 13 he has been Instructor in His- 
tory in DeWitt Clinton High School, New York City. 

263 



